In our return to the tumultuous third year of the war, the Chalcidice comes back into focus once more with renewed operations. The siege of Potidaea may have found resolution in the previous year, but with lingering hostility in the Chalcidice, Athens is forced to act. A fresh operation aims to secure Athens' base in Potidaea, a move designed to solidify their influence in the region. Little did they know, this venture would soon become an early lesson in the challenges of facing effective light troops.
Simultaneously, back on the Greek mainland, the stage is set for a gripping saga. Minor Peloponnesian allies successfully sway Sparta into launching a campaign at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf. Embarking with only a portion of the Peloponnesian fleet, the Spartans face a cautious journey past the Athenian base of Naupactus. The amphibious operation, once arriving at its location encounters setbacks, grappling with issues of ill-discipline, divided forces, and the defenders' ingenious use of terrain, leading to a failed mission.
At Naupactus, the keen-eyed Athenian general, Phormio, observes the initial fleet sail by. However, when the remainder attempts to slip past, he springs into action. Despite being outnumbered, Phormio's superior tactics and intimate knowledge of the area secure a resounding victory. Nevertheless, the Spartans, undeterred after their land defeat, regroup for another naval engagement, placing the Athenians in a dire numerical predicament.
This time around, the odds are stacked against Phormio. After losing half his fleet, fortune smiles upon him, allowing his naval command prowess to shine. Athenian losses are miraculously recovered, and the Peloponnesian forces find themselves in a hasty retreat. Yet, Sparta, yearning for a triumph to bring home, decides on a bold move—an attempt to assault Athens' home port, the Piraeus.
However, the gods seem to favour Athens. Bad weather and a touch of commander hesitancy conspire against the Spartan ambitions, leaving them without the favourable news they sought for the year. Join us as we navigate the treacherous waters of ancient conflict and witness the highs and lows of naval warfare in this gripping chapter of the Peloponnesian War.
In our return to the tumultuous third year of the war, the Chalcidice comes back into focus once more with renewed operations. The siege of Potidaea may have found resolution in the previous year, but with lingering hostility in the Chalcidice, Athens is forced to act. A fresh operation aims to secure Athens' base in Potidaea, a move designed to solidify their influence in the region. Little did they know, this venture would soon become an early lesson in the challenges of facing effective light troops.
Simultaneously, back on the Greek mainland, the stage is set for a gripping saga. Minor Peloponnesian allies successfully sway Sparta into launching a campaign at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf. Embarking with only a portion of the Peloponnesian fleet, the Spartans face a cautious journey past the Athenian base of Naupactus. The amphibious operation, once arriving at its location encounters setbacks, grappling with issues of ill-discipline, divided forces, and the defenders' ingenious use of terrain, leading to a failed mission.
At Naupactus, the keen-eyed Athenian general, Phormio, observes the initial fleet sail by. However, when the remainder attempts to slip past, he springs into action. Despite being outnumbered, Phormio's superior tactics and intimate knowledge of the area secure a resounding victory. Nevertheless, the Spartans, undeterred after their land defeat, regroup for another naval engagement, placing the Athenians in a dire numerical predicament.
This time around, the odds are stacked against Phormio. After losing half his fleet, fortune smiles upon him, allowing his naval command prowess to shine. Athenian losses are miraculously recovered, and the Peloponnesian forces find themselves in a hasty retreat. Yet, Sparta, yearning for a triumph to bring home, decides on a bold move—an attempt to assault Athens' home port, the Piraeus.
However, the gods seem to favour Athens. Bad weather and a touch of commander hesitancy conspire against the Spartan ambitions, leaving them without the favourable news they sought for the year. Join us as we navigate the treacherous waters of ancient conflict and witness the highs and lows of naval warfare in this gripping chapter of the Peloponnesian War.
There is a lot at stake for you in the struggle either to destroy the naval hopes of the Peloponnesians or to bring nearer home to the Athenians their fears for the sea. Let me remind you once more that you have defeated most of this fleet already, and beaten men never quite have the same resolution as they had before when they come up against the same danger for a second time. Formio addressing the Athenian fleet in Thysiides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Hello, I'm Mark Sellak and welcome back to Casting to Ancient Greece, episode 79, victories of Formio. With us now in the third year of the war, we have seen somewhat of a pattern set in with how the Peloponnesian War is unfolding. Athens would remain behind their walls in a defensive posture when it came to the Peloponnesians' offensive operations, while they would target the Peloponnesians through raids of their coastline, avoiding the main land forces and attempting to secure more allies in the process. In addition to this, the Athenians would be focused up in the north, in the Chalcidides, where revolt and diplomatic maneuverings were taking place. Sparta, on the other hand, were attempting to take the offensive to the Athenians, invading their territory to induce them out from behind their walls to engage in a hop-like battle. However, this continued ravaging of Attica was failing to achieve the desired results. While away from Athenian territory, the Peloponnesians would react to the activities Athens would be engaged in on the western coast of Greek lands. Last episode, we saw that the siege of Potodia that developed before the breakout of the Peloponnesian War would finally come to a resolution. This conflict was draining Athens of manpower, resources and money. They could be better used in countering the Spartans. Athenian morale was dropping as the siege continued on with no end in sight. The main force had seen fresh troops come and go, with the only effect being the introduction of the plague into an army that had yet been exposed to it. However, the state of the defenders was even worse and they would seek terms to see the siege ended. The Athenian commanders would agree to terms that were lenient to the defenders, seeing them have safe passage out into the wider Chalcidides. The Athenian government was displeased with the generals acceptance, believing a more complete surrender could have been achieved, though the Athenians seemed to have been glad to rid themselves of the siege and the generals would rid themselves of the charges against them. This resolution at Potodia would see the close of the second year of the war, though, with the opening of the third year, more actions would follow. With the coming of the campaigning season, sparta would leave the Peloponnesians back out through the Corinthianismus, but this time Attica would not be the target of their operations for this year. Instead, they would march onto Plataea who, caught between a rock and a hard place, would attempt to negotiate their position between Sparta and Athens. Plataea would end up being forced into having to resist the Peloponnesian army who would attempt to assault the city, though, after a number of failed attempts, a state of siege would develop around the small polis.
Speaker 1:To then close out the episode, last time we saw that Pericles, who had been so influential in Athenian politics for a generation, would meet his tragic end. During the plague, he would witness the death of his sister and two legitimate sons. This would lead to a crisis in his family line. Though slowly declining from his own contraction of the plague, pericles would be able to secure citizenship for his illegitimate son, also named Pericles. This would see that the assembly would make an exception to the citizenship policy Pericles himself had introduced into the 450s Since September of 429 BC. The man who had shaped Athenian policy and helped the city reach its height in power would succumb to the plague that he already killed so many of his fellow Athenians. This episode will be remaining in the year of 429, as it was so much more taking place than just the events we covered the previous episode.
Speaker 1:Although the siege of Potidia had come to an end, much of the Chalcidides were still hostile to the Athenians. Chalcidides had sent out colonists to resettle Potidia after it was abandoned. But to follow this up, a new operation would be launched focusing on reducing the threat to Athenian interests. With the continuing of Athenian activities up north, we would find Thracian and Macedonian relations would continue to evolve. Another major action that would take place through the year would be the campaigns of the Peloponnesians. These would be focused on the western coastal areas as well as into the Corinthian Gulf, and would see some of the first naval battles developed between Sparta and Athens.
Speaker 1:As we have covered, the city of Polydia was up on the Chelsyderes, this being Athens' main connection into the region. The wider region had become hostile to Athens as the troubles with Polydia had broken out. We had seen that many from around Polydia had been given refuge in areas further north, thanks to Perdicus. Even though Perdicus had swayed back and forward as an ally of Athens, the greater part of the Chelsyderes was still hostile to Athens. Polydia had surrendered at the end of 430 BC, which would see Athens back in control of the city. They had sent colonists back to resettle the city and regain Athens' foothold in the region, with this resettlement taking place over the winter. Athens would now need to focus on securing its position in the face of threats on the Chelsyderes that still existed.
Speaker 1:With the coming of the campaigning season for the third year, athens would now transition from the siege warfare that they had been so accustomed to to operations more offensive in nature. We would hear that this offensive would be undertaken by 2000 hoplites and 200 cavalry, with Xenophon, the son of Euripides, leading them. Their first move after having departed Polydia was to march onto the city of Spartolus, which is thought to have existed in the north-east of the Chelsyderes, not far from Olympus, where we had seen Perdicus take command of the cavalry force. Before the siege of Polydia, the Athenian force would set about ravaging the land around the city, while it was hoped that surrender within the city would be forthcoming. Supposedly, there was a pro-Athenian faction inside and they thought they would be able to secure the city for them, especially with the intimidating actions occurring outside. However, the other elements of the city would not be cowed by the Athenian's actions and would send off for aid from Olympus. Not long after this help was sought, a force of hoplites and other troops would arrive from Olympus and would enter Spartolus to help defend the city. Other defenders, now in a stronger position, that would sally out and meet the Athenians in battle.
Speaker 1:It's interesting to note here we get quite a fuller account of this battle outside of Spartolus than we do of other, seemingly larger engagements that we have covered. For this reason, I want to recount what Thysedides writes. The Chelsyderian hoplites and their axilleries who were with them were defeated by the Athenians and retreated into Spartolus. But the Chelsyderian cavalry and the light troops defeated the cavalry and the light troops of the Athenian side. The Chelsyderians had a few pelters from Cruces and immediately after the engagement some more pelters from Olympus came in support. When the light troops from Spartolus saw this, they gained fresh confidence, both from the arrival of the reinforcements and from the fact that they had held their own previously. They therefore launched another attack on the Athenians, in which they were supported by the Chelsyderian cavalry and by the troops who had just arrived, the Athenians fell back in two divisions which had been left to guard the baggage. Whenever the Athenians charged, their enemies gave way, and as soon as the Athenians began to retire, they fell upon them again and shot at them with their javelins. The Chelsyderian cavalry also kept riding up and charging whenever they saw their chance. Indeed, they were largely responsible for causing panic amongst the Athenians, who were routed and they're pursued for a considerable distance.
Speaker 1:It's interesting to note here that we have been used to hearing about battles where the hoplites have been the main feature of the army and who would be the deciding factor. But we see here that it would be the cavalry and lighter troops that would decide the outcome and defeat the heavily armoured hoplites. As the Peloponnesian War would continue on, we will find that lighter armed troops would be much more influential in the battles that would unfold. This would also see the hoplite of the period before the war becoming lighter armoured, so they would become more mobile and flexible as lighter troops would begin to make up larger portions of the armies. So, as we saw, the result of this engagement would be an Athenian defeat. The surviving troops of the Athenians would make their way back to Podidia. Once inside the city, envoys would be sent out so that a truce could be arranged for the Athenians to recover their dead. With the dust now settling from the battle, it would be discovered that 430 men had been killed, while Xenophon and two other generals had also been killed in the fighting.
Speaker 1:What is also interesting when it comes to the Athenians' operations here was the absence of any help from Athens' new allies, perthicus of Macedon and Scythalses of Thrace. Thysitides gives no account around these absences, though we have seen. Perthicus had been an unreliable ally in the past, while Scythalses, although having assisted Athens in the case of the Peloponnesian envoys, may not have been too enthusiastic at seeing Athenian influence return to the Thrace coast. When it comes down to it, it would seem these alliances were ones of convenience. However, we will also see in the coming winter. Scythalses would march against Macedon, so perhaps preparations for a coming conflict between the two were in the works and might have impacted assisting Athens, though for now Athens would still have hold of Podidia but would fail in this operation to regain influence through the Chalcidides. This would be the extent of the operations in the Chalcidides on Athens' behalf for the coming season.
Speaker 1:So let's now turn to the west coast of the Greek mainland. We have seen over the past two years that operations had been taking place along the western coast, around the Carithian Gulf and the islands in the area. Athens had campaigned in this area without secure more allies in their league while they were raiding the Peloponnesian coast. While we then saw Corinth and Sparta attempt to remove this Athenian influence though their attempts were not completely successful and their efforts were not overwhelming by any means we would also find that the regional cities would look to take advantage of the conflict and attempt to gain more territory for themselves at their neighbour's expense. The previous year we saw these activities taking place on the Ambration coast, just north of the Carithian Gulf opening. Now, this summer, the Ambrosiates and Channonians would look to expand their influence in the area by removing the Athenians. In turn, though, they would seek Spartan assistance, presenting their involvement as part of a grander strategy of protecting the Peloponnes. It's also possible here that Corinth may have been operating behind the scenes to push their agenda in the west, as they had many colonies in the region that were now under threat from Athens.
Speaker 1:A plan was proposed that would see simultaneous operations by land and sea directed in the region. This, it was argued, would see that the Achanianians, who the Athenians had assisted the previous year, would not be able to unite to mount an effective defence. This would also be the first phase of the plan where it was then put forward that, with Achanania captured, the islands of Zagnithos and Cephalonia would fall to the Spartans easily, with the western coast back under Spartan influence, the Peloponnes would become more secure as it would be more difficult for the Athenians to operate their navy in the region. Then it would be put forward that operations deeper into the Corinthian Gulf, namely directed at Neopactus, would be possible. The citadines would tell us that the arguments that were presented by the Ambrosius would be agreed to by the Spartans, while we would hear that the Corinthians were particularly enthusiastic. As we pointed out, corinth would have a great interest in seeing these operations undertaken in the region, as it would remove Athenian influence from the areas where Corinth had interests.
Speaker 1:Sparta would have in command of the Peloponnesian force that would be involved, the Naevark Sinimus. He would set out from the Peloponnes with 1000 hoplites, sailing through the Corinthian Gulf, past Neopactors where the Athenian fleet was stationed, giving them the slip. An interesting point here is that Corinth and Sicion had not departed with the Spartans and were still getting ready. This is the point that we'll be bringing up again once we get to the battle that would end up developing between Athens and Sparta in the Gulf. Sinimus would then make for the shore of the island of Lucas, located just outside the opening of the Gulf. Here he would link up with the allies from Lucas, ambracia, anactinorium and Aparus. Also, herdicus of Mastodon had arranged to supply 1000 troops for use in the coming campaign, showing once again his unreliable nature when it came to the Athenian alliance. It is possible here that the Athenian defeat up on the Chalcities may have influenced his decision to wade the Peloponnesians, though these forces would end up arriving too late to take part. Once Sparta had linked up with all these allies, they did not wait around for the rest of the Peloponnesian fleet. Still at Corinth, they would launch their land campaign into Ocanania, where their target would be the largest city in the region, stratus. On their march, they would sack another village on the road towards their prize that they saw as being key to the region.
Speaker 1:Sinimus believed that, as Stratus fell, the rest of the region would quickly come over to the Peloponnesian side. However, a mixture of ill discipline and the enemy's clever use of the terrain would see that the attack on Stratus would fail. Thesedities would tell us that the non-Peloponnesian elements of Sinimus' force would advance onto the enemy, breaking away from the rest of the army, though, here again, we would find that the superior use of light troops by the enemy would see that these forces would be defeated through ambushes, seeing them retreat back to the rest of the army. The forces of Stratus would avoid attacking the main Peloponnesian force once it had come up and would harass them from a distance with slings. However, sinimus' allies had taken heavy casualties and were severely demoralised. Perhaps if he had his reinforcements from Macedon, corinth and Scyon, he might have been able to continue the attack. But given that the state of his allies were in and word of enemy reinforcements on their way, he had no choice but to fall back onto Inaide, who was friendly to the Peloponnesians. From here the defeated force would end up sailing back to the Peloponnesian side of the gulf and the other allies would return to their cities.
Speaker 1:At the time that Sinimus had invaded Achanania, the cities there had sent help to the Athenian station at Neopactus. Here Athens had 20 triremes which were under the command of the General Formio. We have seen Formio previously in passing where he would share command during the Samyan War in 440 BC. We also saw him lead a naval force to complete the blockade of Potidia in 432, when he would also be involved in land operations on the Chalcidides. However, it would seem he would have a talent for naval operations, which we will soon see. The pleather help had made it to Formio, though he was not able to leave his port in the current situation. It would appear he was fully aware that part of the Peloponnesian fleet was still at Corinth readying to sail. While this was the situation, he could not leave Neopactus. If he did, it would then see this important city open to capture.
Speaker 1:It's also suggested here that there may be more to the Spartans giving Formio the slip that we brought up just before. The historian Donald Cagan would write the wily Formio may have deliberately allowed the fleet of Sinimus to go by in order to engage only part of the Peloponnesian forces. Had he tried to stop Sinimus, he might have had to deal with reinforcements from Corinth and Sicillon when, at last, he chose to engage the reinforcing fleet. The Spartans were fighting in Achanania. If this was the case, this would highlight a high level of strategic thinking of what potentially lay ahead for Formio. It is difficult to prove one way or another that this consideration was in his mind at the time. Though, given the level of tactical thinking that would occur in the upcoming naval battle, I'll end towards the suggestion that Cagan puts forward as being very possible.
Speaker 1:Around the same time that Sinimus began his campaign into Achanania, the fleet that was at Corinth had set out to join with the rest of the Peloponnesians. The Corinthians and the Siconians had set out fully laden, prepared for a land campaign, with their ships acting as transports rather than seeking out a fight on the sea. They would have known that Athens had 20 tri-rooms at Neopactus, where they would have to sail past to link up with Sinimus. However, they must have thought that they should be safe from encountering a naval battle. As they outnumbered the Athenians more than 2-1, with their 47 ships, it would have been reasoned that Formio wouldn't risk sailing out to meet them, given the disparity in numbers. Not to mention, he was the only fleet in the area and if it were defeated, neopactus would be undefended. However, formio had other ideas. He waited for the Corinthian fleet to sail past his location as they followed the Peloponnesian coast. This part of the gulf was quite narrow and he was waiting for the enemy to reach the coastal city of Petraea, where the gulf widened. This appears to show that Formio knew the Corinthians were fully loaded down with extra troops and supplies, making their ships less manoeuvrable. So if he could engage the fleet in more open waters, his lighter and more agile tri-rooms, although outnumbered, would have a huge advantage.
Speaker 1:As the Corinthian fleet sailed past Neopactus, formio had set out with his fleet shadowing from a distance, but once the Corinthians reached Petraea, they attempted to cross the gulf to reach the northern shore where they would need to disembark their land forces. This would be Formio's chance to act. The fleet were now sailing out in open waters, in one of the widest parts of the gulf and in waters to the Athenians' advantage. The Corinthians had thought that they had given Formio the slip in the night, and probably why they attempted the crossing. Now, however, the Athenian fleet were sighted coming on at them and they would be forced to turn and give battle.
Speaker 1:The Peloponnesians, led by the Corinthians, would adopt a defensive position, forming into a circular formation with their prowls, the front of their ships facing outwards and their sterns facing into the centre of the circle. This would see that no gaps would exist large enough for the Athenians to get amongst their formation. In the centre of the circle would be some of the lightest ships, where they would be protected, along with five tri-rooms that were lighter than the rest. Their role was to race out and support or plug any gaps that would be created by the Athenians.
Speaker 1:Seeing the Peloponnesians take this action, formio now formulated his plan on how to deal with the enemy. Factoring in the situation of the enemy ships and his knowledge of the gulf, he would have the Athenian ships sailing in line around the Peloponnesian circle, with their moving in closer and closer as they sailed their circles around the defenders. This started to have an effect of seeing the Peloponnesians tighten the defensive circle. As the Athenian ships gave the impression that they would ram their ships at any moment. The Peloponnesian circle got tighter and tighter, this being the desired result, as, being so laden down and so close to one another, they would start fouling on one another if they tried to manoeuvre. Added to this would be the small ships in the centre now starting to be mixed in in the defensive circle as it tightened. To cap things off, formio knew that a strong wind usually blew in from the gulf as the day came on, and it would not disappoint him today. His manoeuvring and timing had now completely neutralised the numerical advantage the Peloponnesians had, and the advantage was now with the Athenians, who were now in a position to attack whenever they wished. Now that the Peloponnesians were in complete confusion, fouling each other and finding it impossible to manage their ships in the choppy water, formio now gave the signal to attack these entities.
Speaker 1:Describe the battle the Athenians attacked and, after the first sinking of one of the Admiral ships, went on to destroy every ship they came across. In the general confusion, the enemy put up no sort of resistance and fled to Patre and Dima in Arkea. The Athenians pursued them, capturing 12 ships and making prisoners of their crews. The Athenians would mark their victory by setting up a trophy on the coast off where they fought and would dedicate a ship to Poseidon, giving thanks for the victory. After they had completed their victory rituals, they then sailed back to the port of Neopactus. Meanwhile, the defeated Corinthian fleet would make their way for the port of Solene in Elis, where the army of Sinimus would also sail back to after their defeat at Stratus.
Speaker 1:Back in Sparta, the defeat had been met with anger. The Peloponnesians had been humiliated in their first proper amphibious campaign of the war, with Sinimus being an overall command. He was held responsible for the failure. As we saw, the key decision that appears to have led to this campaign failing was the Peloponnesian fleet setting out in two separate forces. If they had left as a combined fleet, formio may have had no choice but to remain in port, given the overwhelming size of the Peloponnesians. Well, in Akanania, sinimus would have had a greater number of Peloponnesian forces, seeing that he would not have to place such a heavy reliance on the allies of the region, while, if he had waited for the Macedonians, this would have also increased his odds of success even more so.
Speaker 1:Now, though, sparta would send to Sinimus three advisors, a sign that they had lost confidence in his ability to lead the campaign on his own. One of the advisors that was sent was a Spartan we have met before, this being Brassidus. The advisors had arrived with orders that preparations were to be made for another battle on the sea and to not be driven from the sea by a few ships. It appears here that the Spartans had viewed that cowardice was to blame for the defeat, not being able to understand how such a small force could defeat them. There's entities suggesting that perhaps the Spartans had yet to grasp the tactics of fighting at sea, with this being their first real naval engagement in generations.
Speaker 1:The Peloponnesians would then begin preparations by making repairs to their surviving ships, while also seeking reinforcements from the cities of the Peloponnesian League. While Sparta was responding to the defeat and preparing for another attack, formia would send a message back to Athens with news of his victory over the Peloponnesian fleet. He also knew that the Spartans were preparing their fleet for another attack, so had requested that Athens send him as many ships as they could to reinforce his current fleet. The Athenians would respond by sending Formia an additional 20 triremes, though they would have orders to stop off at Crete and take the city of Sidonia. When looking at a map, we can see that this diversion is quite out of the way, with the fleet nearing to head south, where to link up with Formia they would need to head west and then north around the Peloponnes, before then entering in the Corinthian Gulf.
Speaker 1:This pit stop on their journey has puzzled historians, as the acidities provides no real reasoning for this attack, especially at such a crucial time, given Formia's situation. For the time being, a couple of possible reasons have been put forward, ranging from Athens attempting to secure trade routes and diverting Sparta's attention, since the city was friendly towards them. Another question also arises with these reinforcements why were only 20 ships sent when Athens had more? Given the Peloponnesians' main effort in the Corinthian Gulf, it appears more could have been spared. Our most likely answer to this question probably lays with the lack of funds and manpower. We had seen that the Siege of Potodia had been draining the treasury, while the plague had taken a great toll on Athens' population.
Speaker 1:Nevertheless, these 20 triremes would set out for their mission to Crete before then being prepared to sail for Formio. However, bad weather would delay them even further. Eventually, sparta had arranged their Peloponnesian fleet back into a fully operational unit and would sail around the Peloponnes not far from Neopactus. This time, the fleet would leave its heavy troops on land that would remain in support there. The Peloponnesians now had 77 ships that were ready to give battle and would be much more manoeuvrable this time around.
Speaker 1:Across on the other coastline, the Athenians lay at anchor with only their 20 ships still waiting reinforcements. Both sides would remain in these positions for the next week, with Formio not looking to make the first move. After all, he was outnumbered almost 4-1 and needed to protect Neopactus. Both sides would have to deal with low morale amongst their forces the Peloponnesians because of the experience of the previous battle, and the Athenians due to the size of the enemy fleet they now faced. However, the commanders of both sides would deliver motivational speeches that would see a fighting spirit rekindled in their men for the coming battle.
Speaker 1:The Spartans would end up putting in motion the second naval engagement by sailing east along the Peloponnesian coast with 20 of their best ships making towards Neopactus. The idea here was to force the Athenian ships back into the narrow waters of the Gulf, where their advantage in manoeuvrability would be reduced. Formio would have rather stayed out and opened waters, but the Peloponnesian fleet was now threatening Neopactus, so he had no choice but to mirror the Peloponnesian movements. Once the Athenian fleet was in the narrow part of the Gulf, a signal was given to the Peloponnesians and the main part of the fleet made a sudden turn towards the Athenian line. The intention here was to cut the Athenians off and prevent their escape into parts where the Gulf widened. The Peloponnesians were not quite quick enough, but would still manage to cut off the Athenian line at its midpoint. The 11 Athenian ships would manage to slip the trap, though nine were cut off from the rest of the line.
Speaker 1:Here, a melee of ships would take place, with the Peloponnesians capturing some ships and men killing others, while some crews managed to make it to the shore where their Messinian allies were supporting them from Remembering here that the Messinians had been given Neopactus as their new home by the Athenians after the Hellot revolt in the 460s. Here, in one movement, the Peloponnesians were able to defeat almost half the Athenian fleet. The remaining 11 Athenian ships sailed directly for Neopactus, with 20 of the best Peloponnesian ships in pursuit. 10 of the Athenian ships made it to the port city and prepared themselves defensively to meet the enemy in what appeared to be a hopeless situation. However, the 11th Athenian vessel had failed to keep pace with the rest for some reason, and it would be this straggler that would be the beginning of a reversal of fortune for the Athenians.
Speaker 1:The Peloponnesians were sailing towards Neopactus together, singing their Pianne Song of Victory, though one of their number was out in front in full pursuit of the Athenian straggler, gaining on it fast as the straggler came close to the port, a merchant ship could be seen anchored off the coast. The Athenian ship would head towards this ship and then would use it as a shield to protect its flank as it circled around and would then head straight towards the Peshua, ramming it and sinking it. This action completely took the following Peloponnesians by surprise and caused all sorts of confusion within their ranks. Some ships would run aground with their crews probably confused with the orders that they were receiving from their panicked commanders, while the rest would drop their oars to bring their ships to a halt, to grasp the situation and possibly await the main body of the Peloponnesian fleet. However, this pause and activity would now see the initiative taken away from the Peloponnesians. They were now effectively dead in the water. They had taken away their momentum and maneuverability, while the Athenians were close at hand and poised to attack. Formio now saw that this was his best chance to defeat the Peloponnesian fleet. He was still outnumbered 2-1, but his enemy were motionless.
Speaker 1:The Athenians engaged the Peloponnesians, who only put up a short resistance before turning and retreating. Demoralized from the turn of events, they would head back to the shore that it originally set out, from where the rest of the main fleet must have turned and followed to their lead, now losing all taste for battle. In the retreat, the Athenians would capture 6 more vessels and would recover their own that had been disabled in the first part of the battle. This would effectively see the end of the naval action around Neopactus. The Athenians would collect their dead and would allow the Peloponnesians to collect theirs under an armistice.
Speaker 1:The Spartan commanders did not want to continue their push on the Athenians, as they had caught wind that Athenian reinforcements were on their way. So during the night the majority of the Peloponnesian fleet would sail past Neopactus under the cover of darkness and make their way to the safety of Corinth. The Athenian reinforcements did arrive not long after the battle, although not arriving in time for the fighting. The imminent arrival had dissuaded the Spartan commanders from launching another offensive. These victories by Formio were a very big deal to Athens. His skills as a naval commander had meant he was able to defeat a Peloponnesian force of 47 ships in his first engagement and then one of 77. All the while he had only 20 ships at his disposal. These victories meant that Neopactus would remain in Athenian possession. It would have been a huge blow to their war effort if it had been lost, while also a defeated sea for Athens would see their naval reputation damaged and encourage more enemy amphibious operations. To highlight how important Formio's efforts were at protecting the port in the west and their reputation, athens, after his death, would have a statue of Formio erected on the Acropolis honoring him.
Speaker 1:The campaigning season was now coming to a close, but Sinimus and Brassidus were reluctant to return to Sparta, with another failure to report. Instead, while in current they would take a daring plan that had been proposed by the Macgarians, they had reported that Athens' main port, the Piraeus, was currently undefended by their navy. If they acted at once, they could launch an attack on the port before the Athenians could get wind of any plans and respond to the threat, while Athens would hardly expect an attack from a force they had beaten twice already and with winter coming on, this was an unusual time to launch a naval attack. So that the attempt could be launched at once, it was proposed that the rowers of the fleet should all head overland from Corinth to the shore of the Seronic Gulf, with an oreach and other equipment needed awaiting them there, with 40 vessels that could be used to carry out the raid. The initial stage of the campaign went as planned, though once on the coast of the Seronic Gulf with their new fleet, the operation would unravel. Thucydides tells us that the commanders became frightened of the dangers involved in such a raid, while apparently unfavourable winds would also prevent them from making for the Piraeus. The winds may well have been an issue, as, with winter approaching, the weather would have not been ideal for sailing. Instead, the fleet would make for the island of Salamis, just off the Attic coastline, where the Peloponnesians would attack and ravage it. However, this action would give warning to Athens of an attack in the region, as, when the fleet attacked, beacons had been lit drawing Athens' attention to what was going on. This had sent Athens into a panic, thinking that they themselves were also under attack. Thucydides points out here that he believes that, had the Peloponnesians made for the Piraeus initially, they would have easily taken it. However, once the situation was known to the Athenians, they would arrange a force to march down to the Piraeus, where several ships would be launched, with some forces remaining in port to defend it. The Peloponnesians on Salamis would become aware of the Athenians' counterattack, so they gathered up the plunder and prisoners they had captured, then sailed back to the Ismus and marched back to Corinth, which would now see an end to their naval operations for the year and returning to Sparta with no news of success. This would see the operations by both Sparta and Athens come to a close for the year.
Speaker 1:Though, to close out this episode, we are going to quickly look at the developing situation between Thrace and Macedon. So Tulsis, the Thracian king, would launch an attack on Perthicus as well as some cities of the Chalcidides. We would hear that the Thracians had a force of 150,000 men, with a third of them being cavalry. So Tulsis would have some initial successes, capturing some cities and fortresses, though the campaign would start to bog down with heavy resistance. The launching of the campaign towards winter also probably didn't help matters. So Tulsis was also still in an alliance with Athens and apparently it had been arranged that Athens would send a fleet with as many men as possible to help with the attack on the Chalcidides. However, this Athenian fleet would not be forthcoming. This would have also added to the difficulties faced by Tulsis, as the arrival of the Athenian ships would also probably meant the arrival of supplies by campaigning. In winter it would be difficult to live off the land and a great reliance would have been on bringing supplies to the army. We would hear that it would be this lack of food and supplies that would eventually see the Thracian campaign being abandoned.
Speaker 1:Another point around this campaign that has been hard to know for sure was why the Athenians did not show up to support the Thracians. The Athenian says in his account that the Athenians did not think that the Thracians would make the march. It's hard to know what this exactly means, but perhaps he is suggesting here that Athenians thought that the campaign would have begun earlier in the season, as it was now November and not an ideal time to be launching a fresh campaign as well as sailing a fleet over open waters. However, other points can also be raised that could explain Athen's failure to show up. The arrangements for this campaign were made earlier in the year, before the naval actions in the Corinthian Gulf. Perhaps these attacks had made Athens think twice about sending ships off for the north once again, with the resources diverted to meet this threat. Also, sending a large fleet off again would be a costly exercise, and we have seen that Athens' treasury was running low, while there would also have been a manpower crisis because of the plague. So, with what we are given in this account, it is hard to pin down the real reason for this failure to assist the Thracians, though I think the points that we have just outlined do make sense, while I also think it is quite possible that the campaign was meant to begin earlier than it had, given this being an unusual time to launch an operation. Given all this, athens would have been able to reassess their commitment, given what had unfolded over the year.
Speaker 1:This aborted Thracian campaign would bring an end to the activities of the third year of the war. Athens, perhaps not yet at a point of crisis, was still in a position where their ability to fund the continuation of the war was diminishing. It has been estimated that they may have had enough funds to keep up their efforts at full steam for perhaps another year or so, though if the war was to continue as it was going, they would need to find another way to continue to fund their efforts. The other major factor that Athens was dealing with was the shortage of manpower that the plague had inflicted on them. They had not rid themselves of this added pressure yet and would have to find ways to mitigate these losses. While, on the political front, pericles had fallen victim to the plague and was now absent from the political landscape. He had been a figure that Athens had depended upon, even if he hadn't been appreciated at times. Now, though, new political figures would emerge to come to the forefront of Athenian political life. It would now be up to them to navigate Athens through the unfolding conflict that still lay ahead.
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