Step back in time with me, Mark Selleck, as we trace the footsteps of Athenian generals post-Pericles, navigating the perilous landscape of public dissent and audacious military campaigns. The death of Pericles marked a significant pivot in Athenian strategy, and we'll peel back the layers of this tumultuous era, scrutinizing the aggressive maneuvers that propelled the city-state into the contentious Sicilian expedition. On the Spartan side, delve into the mysteries shrouding King Plistoanax's comeback and the alleged bribery scandal involving the Oracle of Delphi—an episode that further complicates the rich tapestry of Ancient Greek politics.
Feel the ground shake beneath your feet as we recount how natural disasters left indelible marks on Greek military decisions. The Spartans' superstitious interpretations of earthquakes fuelled a reimagining of their war tactics, prompting them to establish Heraclea. We'll examine how this strategic pivot eventually lost its lustre due to a combination of diplomatic hostility and internal mismanagement, revealing a side of Spartan governance seldom seen in their laconic annals.
The episode culminates with a gripping recount of the Athenian military blunders and unexpected victories. Demosthenes' disastrous Aetolian campaign serves as a stark reminder of the volatility of ancient warfare. Yet, amidst catastrophe, the crafty general redeems himself with a masterful victory in Ambracia. The resulting stalemate in the region underscores the broader lesson of our episode: that the tides of war in Ancient Greece were as unpredictable as they were ruthless. Join us for an enthralling exploration of this era's strategic intricacies and shifting alliances.
Step back in time with me, Mark Selleck, as we trace the footsteps of Athenian generals post-Pericles, navigating the perilous landscape of public dissent and audacious military campaigns. The death of Pericles marked a significant pivot in Athenian strategy, and we'll peel back the layers of this tumultuous era, scrutinizing the aggressive maneuvers that propelled the city-state into the contentious Sicilian expedition. On the Spartan side, delve into the mysteries shrouding King Plistoanax's comeback and the alleged bribery scandal involving the Oracle of Delphi—an episode that further complicates the rich tapestry of Ancient Greek politics.
Feel the ground shake beneath your feet as we recount how natural disasters left indelible marks on Greek military decisions. The Spartans' superstitious interpretations of earthquakes fuelled a reimagining of their war tactics, prompting them to establish Heraclea. We'll examine how this strategic pivot eventually lost its lustre due to a combination of diplomatic hostility and internal mismanagement, revealing a side of Spartan governance seldom seen in their laconic annals.
The episode culminates with a gripping recount of the Athenian military blunders and unexpected victories. Demosthenes' disastrous Aetolian campaign serves as a stark reminder of the volatility of ancient warfare. Yet, amidst catastrophe, the crafty general redeems himself with a masterful victory in Ambracia. The resulting stalemate in the region underscores the broader lesson of our episode: that the tides of war in Ancient Greece were as unpredictable as they were ruthless. Join us for an enthralling exploration of this era's strategic intricacies and shifting alliances.
Demosthenes, at the same time, was being persuaded by the Mycenaeans that, with a large force now at his disposal, it would be a good idea to attack Aetolia. The Aetolians consisted a threat to Neopactus. Also, if he conquered them, it would be easy to win over to the Athenian side all of the other continental tribes in the area, thucydides. Hello, I'm Mark Selleck and welcome back to Castings for Ancient Greece, episode 84, in Search of Victory. Over the last few episodes we have been dealing with the events of the Peloponnesian War after the death of Pericles. We have covered on a number of occasions the general policy Pericles had proposed to run Athens' strategy along In the immediate aftermath after his death. The policy would remain in place, with Athens trying not to overextend themselves or involve themselves in additional conflicts. However, sparta and the Peloponnesians did not look like they were getting anywhere close to giving up the war, while the Athenians were still frustrated with the seemingly passive response to the Peloponnesians' invasions of their territory. Each year, although Athens had been engaging in ventures on the Peloponnesian coast and in the northwest, these were not seen by the general population of Athens and not addressing their immediate concerns of the enemy destroying their livelihoods out in the regions. Now, though, with Pericles, who had dominated policy for many years, out of the picture, new figures and factions were emerging. We had gone into a couple of these figures already, such as Cleon and Nicias, who appeared to be on opposite ends of policy but initially would agree on many areas. Athens was also finding itself under increased strain with the state of their treasury. Initially, no one had thought the war would have continued on for as long as it had, but with it dragging on year after year, more funds were needed to keep the Athenians on a war footing, while more money had been spent on unforeseen commitments like what had taken place at Potidaea. This pressure on funds would also see Athens needing to exert more financial pressure on those within their empire.
Speaker 1:We then saw one of the most dangerous revolts taking place within the empire during a time where focus should have been solely on the enemy. Mytilene, who had enjoyed a relatively privileged existence in the empire, attempted to take power on Lesbos for itself. For Athens, this was a large danger, as Lesbos was one of the larger members within the empire, with their wealth important as well as the number of ships they could provide to the fleet. Lesbos would remain in the empire and Mytilene brought back under control, but Athens had almost lost their moral and ethical compass in doing so.
Speaker 1:With these stresses and others, such as the plague that was still lurking about, the new influential figures now started to try and shift Athenian policy onto new paths. We had initially detected this shift with a changing Athenian response on Caesarea, with the civil war that was developing, athens first appearing to take a moderate policy but then seeming to support the bloodlust of the Democrats of the island. Then, last episode, we saw what appeared to be a dramatic turn from Periclean policy, when an Athenian fleet was sent west to Sicily to involve themselves in conflict there. We had looked over a number of reasons why this decision was made, from being asked to assist by Leotini, an ally of theirs within Sicily, due to conflict with Syracuse. We also looked at the notion that this was part of a wider indirect means to hurt the Peloponnesians by disrupting their trade network, while concerns over the Syracusan fleet and army being recruited were also raised. Syracuse was originally a Corinthian colony and with their growing wealth and influence in Sicily, they may well soon be in a position to start supplying forces to Athens' enemies. And finally, there is always the idea that Athens was still looking to expand their empire into other regions. Sicily would have been a very attractive location, with its expansive trade networks as well as its fertile lands. However, as we saw, the expedition would not achieve whatever aims it was looking to. Athens would be forced off the island and to eventually sail home. Reinforcements had been sent but had failed to arrive in time to save the gains that had been made. In the coming episodes we'll be looking at what happened to this reinforcing fleet, but for today we'll be heading back to around the same time the first Sicilian expedition began and look to the developments that were unfolding on and around the Greek mainland.
Speaker 1:With Sicily looking to be a departure from Athens' traditional policy, it would seem new avenues of obtaining victory were being explored by both sides. We're first going to head back to the Peloponnese and look in on Sparta. By the opening of the 426 campaigning season, they would now find themselves back with two kings we had seen through the years, the exile of Plastionax, the death of Archidamus, and with heirs too young to rule in their own right. Sparta had only one ruling king in place for a couple of years. Sparta had only one ruling king in place for a couple of years we had seen that Plastionax was exiled as he would go ahead and enter initial negotiations with Pericles that would lead to the Thirty Years' Peace. When returning to Sparta, he was accused of having taken bribes from Athens to spare them during the First Peloponnesian War. This had seen Plastionax flee into exile instead of accepting the punishment that had been given down. So from 445 BC, he had lived in Arcadia, building his house on sacred ground to Zeus to protect himself from any harm that may come to him from his countrymen. However, in 427, he was recalled to come back to Sparta and take up his kingship.
Speaker 1:Thucydides tells us a story circulating at the time where the Oracle of Delphi was bribed to enact this recall. He says the charge made against him was that he and his brother Aristocles had bribed the priestess at Delphi to give oracles to the Spartan delegations which had come on various visits, commanding them to bring home from abroad the seed of the demigod of Zeus, or else they would have to plough with ploughshares of silver. However, it appears this story would emerge through Plastionax's enemies in Sparta, and Thucydides brings it up later in his account of the war over the developments involving Plastionax. Over the developments involving Plastionax. It, however, appears more likely reason for this recall was down to concerns over the Spartan kingship lines. Plastionax's son, who had been born at the time of his exile, was too young to rule, so a regent was in place, while with the death of Archidamus, another young, inexperienced king was going to fill the other side of the line's leadership role. Whatever the real motivations for this recall, plastinox would return to Sparta and would take up his leading role on the Agierd side of the house. As we just brought up, archidamus had also recently died, which would see his son, aegis, come to the throne on the Euripontide side. Heading into 426 BC, aegis would be given his first official duty as king, where he would now lead the Peloponnesians for their annual invasion of Attica. However, this time around, the invasion would be aborted, for when reaching the Corinthian Isthmus, the army had experienced a series of earthquakes. Aegis would decide to turn the Peloponnesian army back to the Peloponnese, and no invasion of Attica would take place in 426.
Speaker 1:On a side note, here we find Thucydides talking about earthquakes being a somewhat regular occurrence during this period. We even find him describing one of the earliest accounts of a tsunami taking place, with him understanding its connections to earthquakes. He would record During the same period connections to earthquakes he would record During the same period when earthquakes were happening so frequently. At Arobi in Yubia, the sea subsided from what was the shore and afterwards swept up again in a huge wave which covered part of the city and left some of it still underwater when the wave retreated, so that what was once land is now sea. Thucydides would then continue to give another example and then ends his account with Events of this kind are caused, in my opinion, by earthquakes. Where the full force of the earthquake is felt, the sea is drawn away from the shore and then suddenly sweeps back again even more violently, this causing inundation. Without an earthquake, I do not see how such things could happen.
Speaker 1:Now, getting back to the Peloponnesians aborted invasion. It seems pretty clear from Thucydides' account it was the experience of the earthquake that would see the invasion called off. There is no real good reason to disbelieve this, given that in the ancient world there are many accounts of earthquakes and other events, such as eclipses, that would see campaigns and battles halted or cancelled. These types of events were often seen as ill omens for the side pushing the action. We know the Spartans were highly pious people where, it seemed, the Spartan kings held some sort of religious authority. However, another bit of food for thought around the campaign being called off may not entirely be down to religious reasons. If you remember back, we covered the devastating earthquake of Sparta back in 464 BC. This had seen Sparta truly threatened, with much of its infrastructure ruined, and it would also see a full-scale revolt of the helots. So one wonders if this experience was still in their minds. And after experiencing the most recent seismic activity, they returned to their homes out of fear of what may have occurred to the previous generation. Although the invasion would not go ahead for 426, it didn't mean Sparta and the other Peloponnesians would remain in the Peloponnese for the year.
Speaker 1:We have been talking about how Athens was questioning their policy towards the war over each year. Well, it appears the policy Sparta had entered the war with was now starting to be questioned over its effectiveness. Archidamus had also let his misgivings of the policy be known, but it appears, with the failure of Athens being laid low over the repeated efforts, his warnings were now starting to take hold in more Spartan minds. Up to this point, sparta, without a large navy of its own, had been limited to direct attacks against Athens in Attica, as this was accessible by its land army. However, athens and its power was far more than the region it was located in. Athens was at the head of an empire that spread out through the Greek world, where it had access to many allies and resources.
Speaker 1:Sparta would need to look at attacking and threatening other areas if they were going to have a chance at winning this war. It appears this was the thoughts that were now starting to emerge within Sparta, turning its attention to northern central Greece. Instead of attacking Attica directly, sparta would end up establishing one of their few colonies in the region of Trachis, north of Boeotia and Phocis. This would come about due to requests coming from Trachis and Doris. They were involved in a regional war and their enemies were getting the upper hand. Initially, they thought about seeking Athenian aid, but, thucydides tells us, they thought Sparta would be able to provide better protection. Another factor was that the people saw themselves as having a common ancestor with the Spartans.
Speaker 1:Sparta would accept the invitation to found a new city in the region with them, also recognising its advantageous position in regards to the war against Athens. The city would be named Heraclea and was located not far from the site of Thermopylae. Its location was seen as valuable in its proximity to the sea, which would give it easy access to Euboea, while it would also give Sparta easier access to Thrace, where they could attempt to disrupt Athenian influence and alliances to the north. As pointed out, the Peloponnesians were, for the most part, up to this point, limited to operations in Attica, but if they could secure a base of operations in northern central Greece, then they would be in a position to attack Athens from other angles, not just geographically but strategically.
Speaker 1:News of the founding of Heraclea initially caused alarm within Athens. They had seen the threat it posed to Euboea and shipping in the region. However, the promise that Heraclea offered the Spartans would not end up translating into action. Athens would not need to direct any operations against it, as Thessaly, who were the dominant power in the region, had also seen the establishment of the city as a threat to their interests. Although Heraclea would be established with a large following, thessaly would mount repeated attacks on the settlement. That would end up taking a toll and reducing the city into insignificance in the area.
Speaker 1:Thucydides also reports that the Spartans themselves would hold a great deal of responsibility for the decline of this colony. He would write. It was, in fact the government sent out from Sparta itself who were very largely responsible for the decline of the city and the drop in its population. Their harsh and often unjust administration had the effect of frightening away the majority of the city and the drop in its population. Their harsh and often unjust administration had the effect of frightening away the majority of the colonists so that it was all the easier for their neighbours to get the upper hand over them. Though what this episode did was highlight that Sparta had recognised their early approach to the war was not delivering the results they had hoped for, other ideas on how to wage war was now starting to be explored in the developments of their policies, as we will see in the coming episodes. They would engage in other activities north of Attica that would see Athens having to take notice and become involved militarily, with the Peloponnesians not invading Attica.
Speaker 1:For this season, athens would continue to focus on mounting limited offensives. This too was a slight departure from the Athenian initial strategy, though they were slowly moving to a more aggressive approach in the war. One of the actions that would take place would be directed into the Aegean. Nicias would be in command of 60 ships that would sail against Melos, one of the few islands in the Aegean that were not yet part of the empire. The Athenians would put in at the island and would begin ravaging the countryside in an attempt to induce the Milesians to surrender. Although the Athenians were able to complete their task of laying waste to the surrounds, the people would not come to the Athenians' terms. The people would not come to the Athenians' terms. Nicias would not hang around to lay the island under siege, but would instead direct his fleet back to the western coast of the mainland.
Speaker 1:Another Athenian army had sent out from Athens, with it intending to march into Boeotian territory. It appears Nicias was able to coordinate with the army under the command of Hipponicus and Eurymedon, for the 2,000 hoplites that were with the fleet were able to be landed and joined with a larger army at Tanagra. The aim of this land force was to head into Boeotian lands and ravage the regions where thieves held influence. With their involvement around the actions over Plataea, they had now taken a more active role in the war, and Athens did not want to ignore them. However, the Athenian actions would be limited, as they had no desire in engaging in a major campaign against thieves just yet Athens were still very wary about leaving Attica open to a Peloponnesian attack. If a major part of their army was committed to a lengthy campaign, they might find themselves hard-pressed should Sparta relaunch another invasion of Attica Over a few days, once the two forces had met up, they would set about ravaging the lands and would eventually induce a response from a force from within the walls of Tanagra, also supported by some Thebans.
Speaker 1:The two sides would engage in a battle, with Athens getting the upper hand and able to claim victory by constructing a trophy on the field of battle. With Athens having completed what they had set out to do, the main land force would begin to withdraw back to Attica. Nicias and his 2,000 hoplites would make back for the coast where his fleet had landed and would put back out to sea. They would then continue their operations where they would focus on the coastal areas of Locris, laying waste to what they could, before then turning the fleet to sail back to the Piraeus. These were not the only efforts that Athens would launch in 426. Around the same time, nicias set out with his 60 ships against Melos. The first-term general Demosthenes would be placing command of 30 ships that would set sail westward.
Speaker 1:Demosthenes would have as his first target the island of Leucus on the west coast, just outside the Corinthian Gulf. It appears he had been initially tasked with aiding the allies of the Athenians in the west. Leucus was hostile towards the regions in the area that Athens had been assisting over the past few years. When they would end up landing on the island, a number of their allies would come over to assist in the operation. The people of Lucas were forced to remain inside their city walls, with the forces ravaging their lands, with these forces then being swelled with the arrival of the Athenian allies hands. With these forces then being swelled with the arrival of the Athenian allies, pressure would be placed on the Athenians by their allies to blockade the island and cut off the main city by constructing a wall. The aim here was to starve the inhabitants and force them to surrender. However, this would take time and Demosthenes was, at the time, also being persuaded by another of his allies to assist in operations in their region, although he was already in the process of keeping a collection of his allies around the Corinthian Gulf happy. This new request was coming from an ally who was arguably more strategic to Athens' aims.
Speaker 1:The Mycenaeans held control around the port city of Neopactus and, as we have seen, this was a vital location for Athens to exert control into the west. Pressure on the Mycenaeans was cutting from the Aetolians north of Neopactus, and if they were able to overrun here, this would be a huge blow to Athens' war effort. Many of the areas with Aetolia were somewhat more primitive than other areas of Greece, with the inhabitants living in tribal, unfortified settlements. They were warlike but did not fight in the same hoplite manner as elsewhere. Its warriors were lighter armoured and fought in loose formations. These points had also been highlighted by the Mycenaeans when in talks with Demosthenes. He would be persuaded by the Mycenaeans' proposals, though it seems he had much grander ideas in mind. With a much larger campaign in the region, the largest settlements were identified and would be the initial targets in any campaign into Aetolia when these would fall. It was then seen that the rest of the region would surrender to the Athenians and they would be able to exploit the manpower of the defeated areas.
Speaker 1:Demosthenes' thinking was looking past the campaigning in these areas but pushing into Boeotia from the north. Athens had traditional allies that were on the frontiers of Boeotian territory and it was thought that these old friends would join in the invasion of Boeotia. Demosthenes would advise his allies that they were assisting on Lucreus of his change of plans, with the Acarnanians not being receptive to the idea, since they were the ones primarily pushing for the blockade. However, the Sikynthians and the Cephalonians would sail with the Athenians to meet with the Messenians east of Neopactus, at Locreus. However, these aims of Demosthenes were not sanctioned by the Athenian assembly and he was now operating on his own authority.
Speaker 1:Demosthenes and his force would sail into the Corinthian Gulf and would land at Locris, where it had been planned to link up with the local groups within the region as they marched inland. These locals were seen as an important element to the campaign, as they were armed in a similar way to the Aetolians, being light infantry, while they also had valuable knowledge of the regions the army would be marching through. The army would begin their march in land, where a number of villages were captured. Though the pre-arranged meeting of the Locrian allies would not take place, they appear to have defected. This was a blow to Demosthenes' initial plans. As with any army marching into the rugged lands of the Aetolians, these light troops were extremely valuable, the terrain not being favourable to hoplite warfare. Nevertheless, demosthenes, although concerned with this setback, would continue on as planned. These entities would tell us that his concerns were addressed with further reinsurances from the Mycenaeans that victory would still be easy with this setback. These reinsurances, however, would be misguided, as the Aetolians were fully aware of the campaign that was being launched against them and would put a call out for the various tribes to come together.
Speaker 1:It appears the rallying point would be near the town of Argentium where, it seems, an ambush was arranged for Demosthenes' forces. The Athenians, with their allies, were able to assault Argentium and capture it, with it appearing this had been allowed by the enemy, as the majority of the defenders were able to escape into the hills around the town where the main Aetolian army had assembled. Not long after entering the town, the Athenians were then set upon from all sides, with them being unable to deploy and effectively engage the Aetolians. This is where it quickly becomes apparent that the Athenians needed the lighter troops that their Locrians were supposed to have supplied. The hoplites were unable to form up and advance on the enemy, the enemy's light troops rushing up in open order and launching their missiles before them withdrawing. If Demosthenes was able to secure the Locrian reinforcements, he would have been able to counter these attacks effectively. Reinforcements he would have been able to counter these attacks effectively. The engagement would see the Athenians attempt to advance on the enemy with each repeated attack on their position, although they were getting the worst of the action. The archers, with the Athenian force, were able to hold the enemy off as they attacked, though they would end up panicking and scattering when their commander was killed and they had depleted their stores of arrows.
Speaker 1:By this stage, the Athenians and their allies were outside of Argentium, in the hills, and now, without ranged support, they were forced to fall back. However, further misfortune would take place when the Mycenaean commander was killed, who was acting as their guide. Most of the force got lost in the rough country as they retreated, finding themselves in an unfamiliar wooded area. The Aetolians, seeing them enter these woods, then set fire to the area, with only a few being able to escape. Thucydides tells us that, during the retreat, everything that could go wrong for the Athenians did, and the men perished by every form of death. Only a small amount of Demosthenes' forces were able to escape back to the coast where the campaign had first begun. Thucydides tells us that of the 300 Athenian marines, 120 would be lost. While the losses amongst the Athenian allies were very heavy, an armistice would be arranged with the Aetolians so that the fallen could be recovered before the survivors would make their way back to Neopactus. The Athenians would then re-embark their ships and would sail for Athens.
Speaker 1:Demosthenes, however, would remain behind in Neopactus, fearful of the Athenian assembly. Because of what had unfolded, he had good reason for avoiding heading home. He had dispensed with a campaign that was sanctioned by the assembly and then, on his own authority, he launched another, which would turn out to be a failure. Had he been successful, he would have probably been celebrated, even if he had acted without the assembly's support. Though even with his imaginative thinking, the campaign was executed poorly, at nearly every turn, it running into problems. Instead of recognising these fatal flaws, he decided to continue at every turn, which would end up putting the army in a disadvantaged position operationally. However, demosthenes would survive politically in the long run, as he would come to command again. Donald Kagan points out that, ultimately, the campaign he engaged in was relatively low risk, as Athens itself only lost 120 men, pretty low compared to other campaigns they had been involved in. He had seen the risk involved worth it, given the strategically advantageous position it could have put Athens in against the Boeotians. Demosthenes would learn from his experience in Anatolia and would apply these lessons in the future, where he would prove to be one of Athens' most capable generals.
Speaker 1:Back in Sparta, they had experienced two failures this campaigning season so far. Their invasion into Attica had been called off due to a series of earthquakes, while an opportunity in Trachis could not be capitalised on. However, with Demosthenes' failure in Aetolia, another opportunity presented itself, one that could change the strategic situation in the west. Before the Athenians had arrived at Locris, the Aetolians had sent representatives to the Peloponnesians for an audience with the Spartans. They had gotten wind of the Messenians' call for the Athenians' help in the region and now called for a campaign to be directed at Neopactus, the valuable Athenian port connecting them to the west. It's unclear at what stage the Spartans agreed to launch this campaign at Neopactus, though one feels they would have become much more encouraged at the news of the Athenian setback. It may well be the case that forces were assembling knowing the Athenians were on the back foot in the region, with the surviving Athenian marines sailing home.
Speaker 1:We would hear. At the beginning of autumn the Spartans would send 3,000 hoplites from their allies, 500 of these marching from the colony that had been founded at Trachis. Leading this force would be the Spartan commander, eurylochus, who would meet the converging parts of the army at Delphi. From here, heralds would be sent out on the path of advance, where many of the Locrian towns would come to an agreement with the Spartan force. Motivated out of fear of the invading army as a main force near Neopactus, they would join with the Aetolians and would begin laying waste to the lands around and would occupy the outskirts of the city.
Speaker 1:Demosthenes had remained in Neopactus but had access to very few troops in the city, his Athenians having sailed home. The troops he did have were demoralised after their retreat from Aetolia, so he needed to call upon his allies in the west. In a remarkable twist, the Mostanese would seek help from the Arcanians, as he had become aware of the Spartans' approach, the same people he had deserted to launch his Aetolian campaign. Obviously, they would have been not too pleased with this turn of events, but Thucydides tells us, with great difficulty Demosthenes was able to gain their support. The Arcananians would send a thousand troops aboard their own ships and make for Neopactus. The force were able to make it in time before the Spartans were able to launch an assault on the city itself. The force were able to make it in time before the Spartans were able to launch an assault on the city itself.
Speaker 1:With the arrival of this reinforcement, eurylochus, who was occupying the outskirts by this stage, now concluded that he was not in sufficient strength to storm the city. He would end up withdrawing his forces into Atolean territory. However, this would not be the end of Eurylochus' campaigning. Although he now saw Neopactus was out of reach, he would be persuaded by the Embraceans to focus his forces' effort northwest. This was an area that we have seen a few occasions being fought over, with the Athenians and Peloponnesian interests there. Obviously, the Embraceans were interested in defeating their opponents in the region to gain more control, but both Athens and Sparta were willing to get involved to counter each other's influence in the region. Eurylochus would end up agreeing to the Ambracians' request and would now dismiss their Aetolian allies. Since the campaign there had stalled, the Peloponnesian force would arrange to march northwest and link up with the Ambracians.
Speaker 1:The campaign would begin in the winter, with the Ambracians invading Amphilochia, where they would capture a coastal fortress town. At this stage they were acting independently, as Eurylochus was still marching to link up with them. This development was alarming for the Arcananians, who were rivals and had just sent off a thousand of their troops to Neopactus. If these forces were still at Neopactus all had left is unclear, but it seems a message would get to them to provide orders to intercept Eurylochus marching northeast. Messages were also sent to Neopactus seeking Demosthenes' help and to lead them, while pleas were also made to a fleet of 20 Athenian ships sailing off the Peloponnesian coast.
Speaker 1:Eurylochus and his forces were able to evade the Arcananians that had been sent to intercept them. They would march through hostile territory where they ignored the local forces and eventually were able to link up with the Ambracians. The combined force would establish their camp a little inland from the fortress town of Elope that the Ambracians had captured. Not long after this, the request for aid the Arcananians had sent out had been answered. The 20 Athenian ships would arrive in the Abrasian Gulf and would establish a blockade. Then Demosthenes would arrive on the scene with 200 Mycenaean allies and 60 Athenian archers. Demosthenes and the Arcanian army would meet at Argos and would establish their camp between here and Olpe.
Speaker 1:Both armies now remained in their positions for five days without making a move. Demosthenes' army was smaller than that of the combined Peloponnesian and Umbracian force, so he looked to make plans where he didn't have to attack Eurylochus directly. He was biding his time and hoping the Spartan would take the offensive, where Demosthenes could then launch his trap against the larger army. For Eurylochus, he was waiting for further Ambracian reinforcements to join him at his location. However, after five days, it was unclear if these forces would arrive soon and he would end up taking the initiative Even without these reinforcements. The Peloponnesian army was numerically superior and Eurylochus needed to get moving if he was to capture Argos.
Speaker 1:On the sixth day, both armies were drawn outside their camps, looking across the ground at each other. This would have probably been what was occurring the previous days, but finally the Peloponnesians moved forward. The left wing, commanded by Eurylochus, was able to outflank Demosthenes' right where the Mycenaeans were positioned. However, when the Peloponnesian left was on the point of wrapping up the Mycenaeans, demosthenes' trap was unleashed. The Arcananians had been laying concealed in ambush and now, in the rear of the Peloponnesians, they would launch themselves at their backs. This action had taken the Peloponnesians completely by surprise and would see panic set in, which would become infectious and continue down the line. Demosthenes, leading the Mycenaeans, was now able to go on the offensive and would do some of the best fighting of the day.
Speaker 1:According to Thucydides, on the other end of the battle line, the Umbratians got the better of their opponents and pursued them back to Argos. However, they would end up realising that the rest of the army was in a panic and retreating. They would now look to fall back so as not to become isolated. This would bring them into contact with the Arcanianians where, with great difficulty and many casualties, they would fight their way through to friendly lines. As night descended onto the battlefield, demosthenes and his army held the field of battle where many of their enemies lay dead, including the Spartan commander Eurylochus.
Speaker 1:With the next day dawning, the Peloponnesians and their allies now found themselves besieged in Elope by land and by sea, still awaiting the Ambracian reinforcements, and no word on when their arrival would be. The new commander would seek a truce to take care of their dead and arrange safe passage for the army. Take care of their dead and arrange safe passage for the army. Demosthenes would allow a truce to take place, when he would also gather up his dead and would establish a trophy on the battlefield. However, when it came to arranging safe passage, he would implement a strategy to try and create a rift between the different contingents of the Peloponnesian army. A general agreement of retreat would not be agreed upon, but instead Demosthenes would establish secret agreements with different elements of the Peloponnesian force. This would see arrangements made with the Mantineans and the commanders of the Peloponnesian contingents. The purpose here was to discredit the Spartans with the Greeks of the region they were assisting. If they accepted the safe passage, they would show that they put their own safety above the rest of their allies. The other part of this plan was to severely weaken the Ambracian force seeing their strongest allies flee.
Speaker 1:The secret plan would not remain secret for long. When the time came for the chosen contingents and men to escape, word of the plan would trickle down to the various Peloponnesian commander's men, who would also join the escape. With all this activity going on, the Ambracians would also see what was now occurring. Their commanders would try and explain the complicated terms but would fail in preventing their attempted escape. In the chaos that now developed, the Peloponnesians would be allowed to continue with their departure, but the Ambracians would be cut down if they were caught. In the meantime, the reinforcements that Eurylochus had been waiting on would finally arrive just north of Valope.
Speaker 1:Demosthenes would learn of their arrival and would begin preparations to meet this new threat. An advance guard was sent out to prepare ambushes and take ground that was to their advantage. They would hold the high ground around where the Embracians had made their camp. While still dark, demosthenes would launch his attack on their position, this time showing he had learnt the lessons of fighting in rough terrain. I'll read Thucydides' account of the opening of the ambush Just before dawn.
Speaker 1:He fell upon the Abrasians while they were still sleeping. They had no knowledge of what had just happened and were in fact inclined to believe that Demosthenes' men were their own countrymen. For Demosthenes had purposely put the Mycenaeans in front with the instructions to speak to them in their Doric dialect, so as to disarm the suspicion of the sentries who, in any case, would not be able to recognise them by sight, as it was still dark. This would see that the reinforcing Ambracians would not stand a chance at putting up an effective defence. They had been completely surprised and routed almost at once, with many killed in the camp. Those who did manage to flee before being cut down would, for the most part, find themselves victims of ambushes that had been set up in the surrounding hills. They were not familiar with the terrain, and it was this time Demosthenes' men who were better equipped for the light infantry tactics that the ground favoured. Once the panic had died down, only a few of the Embracean army would manage to make their way back to their cities, seeing that almost the entire army had been wiped out before it could deploy for battle. Thucydides would report that this was one of the greatest disasters an army suffered during the war in as many days. He would not even be confident in providing a number of those who were killed, as it was impossible to calculate due to the scale of the city that they were ambushed in and the nature of the terrain that they fled, where many also met their end.
Speaker 1:Demosthenes now wanted to follow up his victory and take the cities of the Ambracians. However, to his frustration, he would find that his allies of the region were not willing to push the campaign further. Thucydides tells us that their reason for doing this was due to them seeing the Ambracians as being more manageable neighbours. They thought if Demosthenes was able to take the cities of the Ambracians, athenian control would be cemented in the region and they would prove to end up being far more difficult neighbours in the future. However, to not offend the Athenians and show their appreciation for their help, they did provide one third of all booty taken. Demosthenes was personally given 300 suits of armour to bestow on him the glory he deserved, while also attempting to satisfy his appetite for any further campaigning.
Speaker 1:Denying Demosthenes the continuation of his campaign may have posed some risk to the Athenians allies, as he probably would have been aware of their motivations towards their hesitation, though he would also have been in no position to take military action against them. But he could remain in their lands, with the possibility of reinforcements coming from Athens. However, it appears the successes Demosthenes had achieved and the spoils he was given saw that he was satisfied. He was now confident with his success here that he could safely return home, putting the disaster that took place in Atollia behind him. Additionally, the Athenian fleet that had assisted would return to Neopactus, taking back up their station there. Presumably, the Mycenaeans would have also returned with the fleet at this stage, given that this was their home territory.
Speaker 1:The Akarnanians, relieved of the Athenian departure, would now make a truce with their enemies in the region. A regional defensive pact would be made, though this seems to be more for the threats coming from nearby regions, as it would not extend to operations conducted by the Peloponnesians or the Athenians. This would conclude the events taking place while the first Athenian-Cecilian expedition had been unfolding. It was a period that saw both the Athenians and the Peloponnesians look to go beyond their traditional strategy they had been following through the war. So far. However, both sides would not make any breakthrough to tip the advantage in their favour.
Speaker 1:Sparta's attempt at establishing a colony that could threaten Athens from the north did not develop as intended. That could threaten Athens from the north did not develop as intended, while Athens, or more accurately Demosthenes' initiative in Atollia had not succeeded but was a failure. Luckily, though, not much damage was done, athens still held onto their influence around Neopactus. The next action taken by the Athenians in the far west was far more successful, but strategically not much had changed. The region had seen multiple operations over the years, but neither side held a firm grip there. This would remain the case after this latest campaign, with the warring sides now coming to a truce.
Speaker 1:Next episode we'll be looking at events that would take place in 425BC, with us first starting with what happened to the reinforcing Athenian fleet that had been sent to assist Sicily. This will then see us looking at the developments around Pylos and Sphacteria and a showdown between Athens and Sparta that would end in an embarrassment for Sparta. Thank you all for the support and continuing to support the series. It is greatly appreciated for Sparta series over on Patreon and supporting at the Archon level. If you've also found some value in the series and wish to support the show, you can head to wwwcastingthroughancientgreececom and click on the support the series button where you can find the link to Patreon as well as many other ways to support the show. Be sure to stay connected and updated on what's happening in the series and join me over on Facebook or at Castings for Ancient Greece or on Twitter at Casting Greece. Once again, thanks for the support and I hope you can join me next episode where we continue the narrative of the series.