Casting Through Ancient Greece
Casting Through Ancient Greece
88: Brasidas' Thracian Adventure
What if one man's daring ambition could change the entire course of a war? In our latest episode, we dive into the dramatic events of 424 BC during the Peloponnesian War, spotlighting the audacious Spartan general Brasidas. We’ll recount Athens' initial victories, like the fortification at Pylos and the shocking Spartan surrender at Sphacteria, and their setbacks, including the failed attempts to control Megara and Boeotia and the devastating loss at the Battle of Delium.
Follow Brasidas as he embarks on his bold campaign northward through the dangerous landscapes of Thessaly, employing shrewd diplomacy to navigate his way to Amphipolis. Discover how he forged key alliances with local oligarchs and negotiated with powerful figures like Perdiccas and Arabaeus. Brasidas’ calculated risks and strategic brilliance not only secured crucial territories but also inspired cities to revolt against Athenian rule, significantly boosting Spartan influence in the region.
Finally, we unravel the intricate political manoeuvres and shifting allegiances that defined Brasidas' campaign. Learn how his moderate terms for surrender and shrewd tactics led to the strategic capture of Athenian positions and a reshaped power dynamic. This episode provides a captivating look at the twists and turns of 424 BC, highlighting how one leader's vision and strategy could turn the tide of war. Tune in for an enlightening exploration of ancient Greek history and the brilliant tactics of a Spartan hero.
The passage of Brasidas was a complete surprise to the people in the city, and the capture of many of those outside, as well as the flight of the rest within the wall, combine to produce great confusion among the citizens, especially as they do not trust one another. The capture of Amphipolis recounted by Thucydides. Hello, I'm Mark Selleck and welcome back to Casting Through Ancient Greece, episode 88, brassidus' Thracian Adventure. The last couple of episodes, we had been focused on the offensives of Athens, where they would, for the first time, take the advantage during the war. As we saw, this change in the strategic situation would take place in 424 BC. Seven years into the war, demosthenes' insistence on developing a fort on Peloponnesian soil while on the way to Caesarea, would lead to an opportunity that would put Sparta on the back foot. The port at Pylos would see Sparta react to an enemy within their territory. In an attempt to surround the Athenian position at Pylos, the island of Sphacteria, just off the coast, would be occupied. However, in the attempt to cut off the Athenian fort, the Spartans themselves would become isolated. When the Athenian fleet arrived on the scene, a combination of force and diplomacy would be employed by the Spartans to make contact with their Spartiites, though in the end, after an Athenian assault on the island, the Spartans would be forced to surrender their arms and go into Athenian captivity, shocking the Greek world. Athens would then continue their offensive against the Peloponnese into 424 by establishing more forts off the Peloponnesian coast. At this stage, sparta failed to act in a decisive manner, allowing the Athenians to conduct their operations without any real opposition. This had marked a point where Athens now held a strategic advantage over Sparta and were using this situation in their negotiations with Sparta to attempt to get the best peace deal possible.
Speaker 1:However, the Athenian offensive would continue further, with an ambitious operation arranged that would target Sparta's allies. The first would target Megara, on the Attic side of the Corinthian isthmus. The aim here was to have Megara fall into Athenian influence so that access from the Peloponnese into Attica could be better guarded. The Athenians would take advantage of factional differences within Megara to gain access to the port and the city. However, the plan would go astray when the oligarchs of the city got wind of the democratic scheming with the Athenians. This would see that the assault stalled and allowed time for a Peloponnesian force under the command of Brazidas to come up and prevent the Athenian capture of Megara.
Speaker 1:The other operation would target the Boeotians. The first part of the plan was to march inland from Neopactus and then west towards Boeotia, capturing villages and forcing the Boeotians to react. The second part would see an Athenian force cross the Attic border into Boeotia and occupy Delium around the same time. This would see that the Boeotians would not be able to assemble their entire force against the attack on Delium. However, this operation would also break down into failure, with the coordination between the Athenian allies and the separate armies proving too complicated, with the two-pronged attacks occurring some time apart, enough time for the Boeotians to regroup and march in full force against Delium. This would result in the Battle of Delium, where Athens would suffer its worst loss in the way of hoplites in the Peloponnesian War so far. We would also find at Delium new tactics being used by Thebes in hoplite battles, with much heavier use of light troops, mass phalanxes and flamethrowing siege weapons. These failed Athenian operations and the defeat of Delium would see that the pendulum of strategic advantage begin to swing back again, for these setbacks would encourage the Spartans and would install some more resolve when it came to negotiations.
Speaker 1:For this episode, we're going to look at an expedition that the Spartans were arranging that would head into Thracian lands. This force would be led by Brasidas and he had begun preparations just before the Athenian attack on Megara in which he would intervene, since he was assembling his forces nearby. Although Sparta was in a precarious position by mid-424, they were still looking to attack Athens where they could. The confused response on the Peloponnese reacting to Athenian incursions was one thing, but something had to be done to try and improve Sparta's position after the disasters of the year. So far, attacking Athens directly was out of the question. For the time being, athens still had the Spartans captured on Sphacteria as hostages. Plus they were attempting negotiations. Perhaps if they could attack the Athenians indirectly through regions outside Attica, they could avoid the consequences of a direct attack on Athens.
Speaker 1:Realistically, the only region outside of Attica Sparta could reach, where Athens had interests and they could be hurt strategically, was up north in Thrace. Here, the main goal of Brasidas' force was the city of Amphipolis, being a source of strategic materials, with its dense forested areas as well as gold and silver mines, while the city was situated in a vital location that held control over passage on the Strymon River and the coastal road heading east to the Hellespont. As we have seen before, this path heading east was vital to Athens' grain supply. However, this plan of Brasidas' was a tricky one, as the rugged region of Thrace had always been a hostile land to outsiders, which both the Athenians and Persians had learnt. While, to reach these lands, the Spartan force would need to march through Thessaly on friendly terms with Athens, which was the most northern region of Greece, though Brasidas judged the risk was well worth it, with Sparta strategically on the back foot on the Peloponnese, this would help ease some pressure, if successful, while the timing for the campaign seemed to be better than ever, with Boeotia north of Attica hostile to Athens, while Perdiccas, the king of Macedon, had shown to be an unreliable ally to Athens and had been willing to listen to the Spartans. However, these regions also had their own motivations for Spartan involvement up north, as Athenian incursions into Boeotia were expected while Perdiccas was fighting his own war against the Lincistians, another tribal group within Macedonia. Brasidas would put forward his plan to the Spartan government and, although a high degree of risk was involved, they had recognised that Sparta needed to take some form of offensive action against Athens, with the various regions in the northwest openly hostile hostile or at least unfriendly to Athens. It was thought that they could reasonably rely on them supporting a Spartan campaign.
Speaker 1:Having gained approval, brasidas would then head east to Sicyon, not far from Corinth, where he'd begin assembling his force and where we had seen him last episode. When we looked at Athens' attack on Megara, we would hear that he had a force of 1,700 men, made up of 700 helots armed as hoplites and 1,000 mercenary hoplites from the Peloponnese. Sending these 700 helots to fight as hoplites appears to have been another strategic consideration. As we had seen, the Mycenaeans, when being landed at Pylos, were actively trying to incite a new helot revolt. Sparta had gathered the most able helots and sent them out of the region, where they would be absent for some time and, for many, likely never to return.
Speaker 1:Brasidas had set out with his army on their northward march, where they would stop at Heraclea in Trachis, the last friendly city, before entering hostile lands. Once reaching here, brasidas would send envoys forward to make contact with Pharsalus in Thessalian territory. Here he was able to make contact with those who were known to be friendly to Sparta. The envoys had the mission of securing escorts so that the army would be able to make it through Thessaly safely, even at the best of times, most Greeks were very suspicious of outsiders marching through their territory, especially an army. Brasidas was in luck, though, as Thessaly, at this stage, was not ruled by a democratic government and he was instead able to appeal to the local oligarchic ruling faction for assistance.
Speaker 1:Brasidas would end up securing his escort, but he would still find that there were those in Thessaly still hostile towards him and would attempt to prevent his passage through the country. Upon reaching the river Onypus, he would be challenged by the opposing factions, who deemed his passage illegal. They claimed that he had not sought the permission of the people across their country. Therefore, they were acting unlawfully. Brasidas, still with his escort, now in a position where his expedition could be well over, as he appears not to have had the strength to deal with this challenge, especially in the face of a river crossing, instead of looking to force his way, he would turn to diplomacy and instead address his accusers. He would say he came as a friend to the land of Thessaly and to its people. It was against Athens, with whom he was at war, not against the Thessalians, that his army was directed. He knew of no quarrel between Thessaly and Sparta to prevent either party going through each other's territory. Now, if they refused him permission he would certainly go no further. Nevertheless, he did not think it right that they should stop him. After hearing what Brasidas had to say, those opposing him would abandon their position on the opposite bank.
Speaker 1:It seems this opposition had been hastily arranged to march out and intercept the Spartan force, but was probably not strong enough to feel confident in fighting a pitched battle. This had now freed the passage up to continue the march northward. However, it appears that those escorting had become nervous of the encounter and seemed to think more opposition may present itself. For this reason, they now advised Brazidas that the march should continue at full pace without halting. The force would end up reaching the safety of Pharsalus, where his guides had come from and where the army could finally rest for a period. The march would then continue, with their guides taking him as far as the region of Peribia, where others friendly to Sparta would take Brasidas into Macedonian territory, to the town of Diom under Mount Olympus.
Speaker 1:Brasidas had managed to navigate his army through Thessaly without having to face any armed resistance. However, opposition to this march had emerged. Even though he was able to talk his way past it, it appears there was still a large part of Thessaly that was hostile towards Sparta. His guides appeared to know this and, after their close call at Anepias, they looked to move the force through Thessaly before the opposition faction could arrange a large organised army to prevent his passage by force. News of Brasidas' march out of Thessaly had made its way back to Athens. They knew too well that for the Spartans to march this far north, they would have pleas for assistance to help them make the journey. They assumed that Perdiccas had been at the centre of the scheme, knowing his unreliable nature. This march would then have the result of Athens declaring war against Perdiccas, though this was probably a mere formality, given the hostile tendencies towards Athens even in a state of peace.
Speaker 1:Brasidas was now in Perdiccas' kingdom and required his good will to hold so that his expedition to the Strymon could continue. With the Spartan force present. Perdiccas now looked to take advantage of the additional forces in his own tribal war with his neighbours. To remain on friendly terms with Perdiccas, brasidas initially agreed to march against his enemies. However, brasidas was probably not very interested in fighting any battles before making it to his objective. Instead, he would rather increase the size of his own force. So when reaching the border with Perdiccas' enemies, he insisted on allowing him to attempt negotiations with Arabaeus, the king of the Lincistian Macedonians. Brasidas knew that Arabaeus was open to talks, as he previously made it known that he wished for Brasidas to act as an arbiter between himself and Perdiccas. Brasidas was encouraged further to take on this role when many villagers along the borderlands made it known they were willing to go into an alliance with Sparta. However, perdiccas had become frustrated with Brasidas reminding him he was not there to act as an arbiter but to destroy his enemies while he, perdiccas, was maintaining half of his army. However, the interests of both men had now shifted apart. Brasidas saw he was able to swell the men under his command for his real purpose without having to fight beforehand, while Perdiccas now saw the resources he was committing to the Spartan force was being wasted. Given they were not going to support his operations, brasidas would not be persuaded to dispense with these negotiations and would instead make arrangements so that no battle would take place. Perdiccas deemed that he had been disrespected and reduced his support of Brasidas' force. However, given he still provided some support shows, he was cautious not to see the Spartans become openly hostile to him.
Speaker 1:By late August, brasidas was looking to put in motion his plans for attacking Amphipolis. He had recognised the town of Acanthus on the Chalcidian Peninsula as being in excellent position to establish a camp and direct operations towards his target. As being in excellent position to establish a camp and direct operations towards his target, however, for this he needed to win over the people in the area, who were nervous of his presence due to their crops still not being harvested. He would find that the town's opinions were divided between two factions. Again here, brassidas would not turn to force to get what he wanted. Instead, he would use diplomacy and address the people. Thucydides would set Brasidas apart from his fellow countrymen when he would say he was not at all a bad speaker either for a Spartan. He would try and ease the people's suspicions of him being in the area, while also appealing to their frustrations with having to deal with the Athenians exerting their interests in the area. In the end, he was able to convince them that he was there to assist them by outlining the risks he had taken by marching all the way from Sparta for their benefit While he was there to fight against the Athenians interests, which would see the people of the Chalcidides be free once again from their oppression. However, he also saw the need to add in a threat that if they refused to open the city gates to his army, he would destroy all the unharvested crops outside the city walls. Once Brassidas had finished addressing the people, they all came together to cast their ballots on a vote of how to proceed. Thucydides tells us that the vote would go in Brassidas' favour, with part of the population swayed by his words, while the other part were frightened of his threats. This would see Acanthus, who had previously been under Athenian influence, revolt from Athens, while others in the region would also follow suit, providing Brasidas with more momentum in the area. The summer had seen Brasidas get his army into Thrace, having to navigate the dangers that existed on a march northward out of the Peloponnese, while then he had to gather support so that he could attempt to wrest control of parts of the region from Athens. Finally, after having established the army on the Chalcidian Peninsula and winning over the local cities, he was ready to make an attempt on Amphipolis in December.
Speaker 1:As we pointed out at the start of the episode, amphipolis was a strategic location due to its position in relation to the trade routes, as well as an abundance of resources stemming from nearby forests and mines. Greeks had attempted to tame this region within Thrace for their own benefit, stretching back over 80 years. First, aristagoras from Miletus had attempted to establish a colony, but would be driven out by the local population. A generation later, athens would also attempt to settle the area, sending out 10,000 colonists, but the expedition was destroyed by the Thracians. Expedition was destroyed by the Thracians. Another generation later, athens would finally set up a colony under Hagon, the son of Nicias, who was able to drive out the local inhabitants and secure the location. From this time, athens now benefited greatly from the control they could exert over the area and its resources. Now, though, sparta was looking to capture the city, harming Athens' economy and diplomatic connections in the area.
Speaker 1:Brasidas, at the head of his army, set out from his camp with all haste through harsh weather, with storms and snow present. During the march, he even urged on the army through the night, as his goal was to arrive outside Amphipolis without those inside knowing his approach. However, there were some within the region that were fully aware of what was heading towards the city, so had been in talks with Brasidas and were to undermine the city from within the walls. The main driving force of these conspirators was those who had previously inhabited the island of Andros. They had always resented the Athenians and it appears Athens too did not trust them all too much. They had always had designs on breaking away from Athenian influence and establishing their own colony, and now saw Brasidas' campaign as a perfect opportunity. These colonists from Andros inhabited a city near Amphipolis named Argyllis, where Brasidas and his army would be received before making the attack on Amphipolis itself. It was from here that the conspirators would assist Brassidus in overcoming the last hurdle before reaching the walls of Amphipolis.
Speaker 1:To reach the city, the army needed to cross a bridge over the Strymon, which was guarded by those from within the city. However, through the bad weather and assistance from Brassidus' latest allies, who appeared to have friends amongst the guards, he was able to capture the crossing relatively easily. With this action, brasidas had taken control of all the area surrounding the city. As the inhabitants had been taken completely by surprise, this saw all those who had dwelled outside the city walls rush for the safety of Amphipolis. It appears there were a number of different groups or factions who lived in and around the city walls rushed for the safety of Amphipolis. It appears there were a number of different groups or factions who lived in and around the city, as Thucydides tells us that the citizens within the walls were mistrustful of each other. He also gives the impression that it was an opinion of the time that if Brasidas marched straight into the city it would have fallen due to the surprise and disunity within.
Speaker 1:However, once his army had crossed the bridge, he allowed them to turn and plunder the surrounding countryside. As we have seen, he had already demanded a lot from his troops to get to this stage. He probably saw it was prudent to allow his men rest and to gather supplies and booty for themselves. We need to remember here a large part of his hoplite force were mercenaries. Often the promise of plunder was a factor in securing the loyalty of these troops.
Speaker 1:However, another factor Brassidus was also likely considering was the strength of his force. A direct assault on the city walls would have likely led to many casualties. His force was not that big, so he would have been interested in preserving its strength while he could. If we look back to how he conducted his operations up to this point, it would make sense that he would be continuing this approach Once he did take Amphipolis. He would need to hold it and be able to defend against any counterattack that would surely come. His force was unlikely to be reinforced in any timely manner, if at all, so Brassidas would make camp outside the city and would see if he could force some of those from inside the walls to turn traitor and have the gates open to his army. By this stage, the faction who held majority within the city had managed to regain some control back within the walls. This would see the opportunity for a quick assault on the walls had now passed. However, it appears the gates were well guarded now, as they were aware of some within the city wanting to negotiate with the Spartans. The Athenian general Euclides was in command of the defenders within Amphibolus, and he had also managed to send off a message for reinforcements to come to support him.
Speaker 1:Half a day's sail away was the general Thucydides with seven triremes at the island of Thassos. This is the same Thucydides that is currently making up the majority of our primary sources for the Peloponnesian War through his history. Once he had received word of the troubles Amphipolis was in, he set sail at once with the aim of arriving before those inside would surrender. He'd also had in mind the city of Aeon. If Amphipolis should fall, he wanted to ensure that he could at least prevent this also strategically important location falling into Spartan control.
Speaker 1:Brasidas had received word that Thucydides had been recalled to Amphipolis, which caused him some concern. Supposedly, thucydides held great influence within the villages that were in the nearby mines, so could potentially call on others to harass the Spartans from outside the walls. Plus, if Thucydides did arrive, it would seem as though the resolve of those within Amphipolis would be strengthened. However, brasidas wouldn't launch an assault on the city, but would approach them with very lenient terms for surrender. Thucydides would give us what he heard would be offered. He therefore put forward very moderate terms, making a proclamation to the effect that all who wished to do so, whether from Amphipolis or Athenians, could remain in the city with possession of their property and full political rights guaranteed to them. Could remain in the city with possession of their property and full political rights guaranteed to them, and those who did not wish to remain could take their property away with them and leave within five days.
Speaker 1:Although Euclides had managed to regain control amongst the panic and stiffen the people's resolve, it appears these terms had now undermined this position. It is unclear if the terms on their own, saw the mass of the people swing in their opinions, or if those who were for negotiations had now used these very lenient terms to convince others, if they rejected them and Brasidas did assault the city and capture it, surely all the men would be killed and the rest of the population would be sold into slavery. Although Amphipolis was an Athenian possession, the Athenians themselves only made up a small proportion of the city's population, so were somewhat at the mercy of the majority. If the Athenians were present in great numbers, it seems probable these terms would have not been entertained, given how we have seen them conduct themselves through the war so far.
Speaker 1:The situation with Amphipolis now saw that the people were no longer taking any notice of the orders Euclides was issuing. This made it clear to the Athenians of Amphipolis that they had no power in preventing the surrender of the city. With this realisation, they were glad that they had the opportunity to leave the city safely. There was no way they would remain, given that they were in small numbers and had not held authority with the people any longer. Brasidas would hold the influence behind the walls, and with this situation, how long could their safety really be guaranteed? So the city of Amphibolus would surrender to the light terms given by Brasidas. Due to the feelings of the majority of the population, of the majority of the population, they had been relieved from the great danger of resisting the Spartans. With the promise of the terms, they saw them hold onto their property and political rights.
Speaker 1:However, on the same day that Brassa dissented and took control of Amphipolis, the cities would arrive on the coast at the city of Aeon. Thucydides would arrive too late to prevent the capture of Amphipolis, though landing at Aeon, he was able to prevent this city also falling into Brasidas' hands. Upon arriving at Aeon, thucydides tells us, they would set about arranging the defences of the city. This effort would come just in time as Brasidas had set sail some boats down the Strymon, with some land forces marching in support. Their aim was to capture the headlands, which would see them control the entrance to Aeon. However, due to the defences at the city being arranged, thucydides was able to see that both the naval and land forces would be beaten off to where they would return, to Amphipolis.
Speaker 1:Brasidas, although failing to capture Aeon, would continue to work towards Spartan interests in the region. We would hear of a number of cities and towns in the region coming over to him after his success at capturing Amphipolis. As well as this, perticus would come to Brasidas in Amphipolis, where he would work in cooperation with him, although Brasidas had not followed the actions he wanted on arriving in his territory, brassidas now held a strategic position where, no doubt, perdiccas saw his own interests could be advanced. This development in Thrace had become quite concerning for Athens. Not only had it threatened the control over trade and resources, but, due to the moderate approach that Brassidas was taking in the campaign, athens was concerned. More cities in the region would revolt.
Speaker 1:Athens had good reason for this concern. Word had spread throughout the area and cities who were under Athenian influence were embracing the idea of change. Brasidas and his treatment of Amphipolis had encouraged many to attempt to shake off Athenian control, with it seeming like there was no negative effects coming from allying themselves with the Spartans. The cities would tell us that they made overtures to him, begging him to march onto their territory, and vied with each other in being the first to revolt. Indeed, they fancied that this was a perfectly safe thing to do. However, as we have seen so far in the Peloponnesian War, there were, at this stage, no sure things when it came to changes in circumstance. Should Athens regain control in the region, these cities would have to pay a hefty price, as Athens would not forget who would act against them.
Speaker 1:With Amphipolis captured and other nearby cities presenting favourable signs to revolt from Athens, brasidas' position was even more secure now. This would allow him to continue campaigning and attempt to exert Spartan influence further, in turn harming Athens' position up north. His next major target was a region called Actae, which was in the same peninsula of the Chalcidides that Xerxes had cut his canal through and where Mount Athos stood. A number of the smaller towns in this area would come over to Brasidas, though the larger towns at Diem and Seine would hold out. Brasidas would remain in the area and his army ravaged their lands, but the towns failed to fall to him.
Speaker 1:The army then moved on to the middle peninsula of the Chalcidides, to Tironi, which was under Athenian control. Perhaps reducing this town might motivate the others to surrender. Apparently, some within the town had invited Brasidas to march onto it, as they were prepared to betray their town to him. So here it is difficult to know if making Tyrone his target was strategic in attempting to reduce the resistance in other towns due to an Athenian town being captured, or was Brasidas acting on an opportunity, given his plans around Sain and Diem were not developing? Nevertheless, brasidas had marched his army through the night and arrived outside the town before dawn. The people inside were unaware of the presence of the army, but the conspirators within had been expecting this arrival and had kept a lookout. Some of them would secretly head out and meet with Brassidas on his arrival, where plans to take the town would be put into action.
Speaker 1:Originally, the plan had been for 20 lightly armed men concealing daggers to slip into the town with help from the conspirators. Apparently, a number of these men would lose their nerve and only seven would end up making it inside. They managed to slip through the fortifications near the sea unnoticed, climbed the hill that the town rested on and took out the guards on duty. This then allowed them to make for the gates and open them for the rest of the army to enter and capture the town. During this operation, tension had set in, with Brassidas and the army waiting outside. As it appeared, things had not been developing in the time frame. First thought the army had been formed up with 100 pelters out front. They were to be the first to rush the gates when opened. Finally, a signal fire was lit after the gates were opened and the rest of the army would now pour into the town.
Speaker 1:Brassidas led part of the force straight up the hill to the top of the town. Others would occupy lower sections and various detachments would branch off in all directions, ensuring the whole town was covered with forces. Through these means, brassidas was able to capture Tyrone while the citizens were still in a state of confusion. Confusion and unable to respond to the events around them. The only resistance the Spartans encountered was from a 50 strong Athenian hoplite force that had been resting in the marketplace. They too were surprised and were only able to mount a token resistance, with a few of them being killed and the rest fleeing deeper into the city.
Speaker 1:With Brasidas in control of Tyrone, he now continued his policy of winning over the hearts and minds of the local people of the area. He extended an offer to those who had taken refuge in the town with the Athenians that they could return to their property and their civil rights would be honoured. He assured the locals of the area that no reprisals would be carried out against them. Many would return, and Brassidas also set about ensuring civil strife would not break out between the factions in the town, since one of these had assisted him in his capture of the town, he would gather the people together and would address them. Thucydides records what he is supposed to have said to the people, with this speech probably being similar to how he addressed the other cities throughout his campaign. He said that it would not be fair to think worse of those who had worked with him for the capture of the city or to regard them as traitors. They had not aimed at enslaving the city, nor had they taken bribes for what they did, but acted entirely for the good of Toroni and for its freedom. Nor would it be right for those who had not taken a hand in the work to imagine that they would not share equally in its results. He had not come to do harm either to cities or individuals. Addressing the people as such had the intention of seeing that strife would not break out in the city, making his job much easier.
Speaker 1:It's interesting in seeing how Brasidas conducted his campaign. From what we have seen of the Spartans, his approach seems to be out of character. However, the way that Thucydides presents Brasidas throughout his history shows that he was not your typical Spartan. We also need to remember Brasidas had not marched off with a large army and was heavily reliant on locals in the regions joining his forces. Plus, if he was able to win over the locals of the area he was looking to spread Spartan influence into, it would make managing the local population much easier. This would allow him to maintain order in these areas with far less troops, allowing more to remain with his army when marching on.
Speaker 1:Winning the hearts and minds of the people was one challenge for Brasidas, but while he was in the process of this, he also had an Athenian force that was still held up in the city. For him to maintain control and order with the population, he needed to rid the city of the enemy who could potentially stir up ideas of revolt with some elements of the population. He needed to rid the city of the enemy who could potentially stir up ideas of revolt with some elements of the population. He had sent a herald to the Athenians who were in one section of the city where he asked them to evacuate the region. He offered them to leave under an armistice where they could take all their belongings with them. However, the small Athenian force refused to leave the city, but asked for a truce lasting a day to be in effect so that they could recover their dead. Brasidas would grant this request, but gave them two days of truce. Perhaps he was hoping, once the Athenians had collected their fallen, they would be more inclined to depart the city, though both sides would begin fortifying the houses around the area they were held up in so to defend their positions.
Speaker 1:After the Athenians had collected their dead, it had become clear to Brasidas that they were not looking like abandoning their positions any time soon, so Brasidas would attack the Athenians. The Athenian defences were nothing to write home about with them, consisting of some hastily fortified houses and a poorly constructed wall. Though being in a confined space, they were able to hold off Brasidas' force for the first day of the attack. On the second day, a siege engine was brought up to help deal with the defensive work. This siege engine was equipped with a device that would throw fire at the wooden wall and houses.
Speaker 1:It was clear to the Athenians where the Spartans were looking to bring the siege weapon up to, since the troops were slowly advancing in a manner to protect the engine as it came close to the wall the Athenians to try and counter the Spartan moves, erected a tower on top of one of the houses, overlooking the wall. On top of this tower would be large casts of water and stones to help extinguish the fires and harass those manning the engine. However, this Athenian attempt at countering the Spartans would end up undermining their defence and their foothold in the city. With all the weight that was being hauled up on top of the tower, the house below was having to support a great weight. Eventually, this became too much and the house collapsed beneath the tower, with it also coming down. Those Athenians near the collapse understood what had happened, but the loud crash was heard further off to those defending other parts. They had not seen what had caused the sound of destruction and had now assumed that the fortifications had been stormed by the Spartans. They now lost all their nerve and fled to the sea where their ships had been anchored.
Speaker 1:Seeing the panic developing inside the Athenian defences, brasidas now ordered his forces to charge the walls and take advantage of the situation. In doing this, brasidas was able to capture the position and killed those Athenians that had remained to defend. Thucydides tells us that just before the collapse of the tower, brasidas was about to make an offer to his men that the first man to scale the walls would be awarded 30 silver mina. However, before he could, disaster struck the Athenians, which Brasidas interpreted as a divine intervention. So instead he would give the 30 mina to a temple devoted to Athena that was nearby, thinking the goddess had a hand in the collapse of the Athenian defence. This would be the last action of Brasidas in 424 BC. The rest of the winter he would go about consolidating the gains that he had made, while also making preparations for continued operations when the warmer months of 423 would approach. So this brings us to the close of the year of 424 BC and, as you can probably see from the last few episodes, it has been a big year. We've also seen a bit of a seesaw effect with the power dynamics. This year.
Speaker 1:Things began extremely well for the Athenians, with their victories at Pylos, sphacteria and further raids on the Peloponnese. This, for the first time, had seen one of the powers gain a strategic advantage. Seven years into the war, sparta was on the back foot, with over a hundred of their Spartiites in Athenian captivity, the class that was fundamental to Spartan society. Not only this, but the Peloponnesian fleet was effectively neutralized without fighting Athens had taken possession of it due to the terms of a truce, but would fail to return it when negotiations broke down. Athens would then continue to keep up the pressure on Sparta by mounting raids and establishing other forts around the Peloponnese. While all this was taking place, negotiations were also being carried out, but terms Sparta were looking for were denied by the Athenians, with them thinking they held all the cards. Athens then continued to try and increase the pressure on Sparta, no doubt looking to force them to their terms in negotiations.
Speaker 1:This time, campaigns directed at Sparta's allies were mounted, one focusing on Megara and the other on the Boeotians. If successful, athens would not only secure their own territory into the future, but Sparta would lose important allies that were instrumental in applying pressure to Athens from multiple directions. Megara would see that the land route out of the Peloponnese into Attica closed off, while Boeotia would see Athens not having to worry about their northern border as much. However, the attack on Megara would be foiled when Brasidas was able to intervene on behalf of the Megarian oligarchs, preventing the capture of Megara itself, while the two-pronged attack on Boeotia would prove to be too complicated for it to be pulled off successfully and Athens would suffer its worst defeat in battle during the war. Yet these setbacks that Athens suffered would see Sparta begin to recover their resolve in the war, making the negotiations swing back away from the advantage Athens had to this point. Athens would also suffer further setbacks with the loss of influence in Thracian territories.
Speaker 1:This was a result of the expedition led by the Spartan General Brasidas we had seen. He was preparing to launch this march north during a low point in the year for Sparta. The forces he would command were made up by very few Spartans, but rather men from allies, the helot class and mercenaries, and even with this his force was quite small. However, with agreements with the Macedonian king, perdiccas, and the promise of liberation to the various cities around the Chalcidides, he hoped to grow this force. Brasidas, as we saw this episode, was successful in wresting cities away from Athenian influence, while also having to deal with the unreliable nature of Perdiccas. He had shown himself to be a great strategist where he recognised the limitations he was working with. He used diplomacy a great deal in gaining his victories in the face of limited resources at his disposal, but was also able to use force when necessary to gain important positions. As we have said, the result of Brasidas' Thracian adventure would see Athenian influence take a hit in the north. However, his expedition was not over yet and he would continue to prepare for more action. However, next episode we are going to turn to the negotiations that had been taking place between Sparta and Athens, as 424BC had seen the situation change between them. The following year would see a truce develop between the two. Sparta had now gained back some confidence, while Athens was not in the highly advantageous position. They were midway through 424.
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