Casting Through Ancient Greece
Casting Through Ancient Greece
90: Clash at Amphipolis
Witness the dramatic power play between two iconic city-states as we pull back the curtain on the strategic chess match that was the conflict over Amphipolis. Could the overconfidence of Athenian generals have been their downfall against the cunning maneuvers of Spartan general Brasidas? This episode promises insights into the mind games and tactical genius that unfolded, unraveling how Brasidas turned the tables on Athens with diplomacy and strategy, charting an unexpected course through the battlegrounds of Thrace. Brace yourself for revelations on how an initial Athenian advantage, following their victories at Pylos and Sphacteria, was compromised by a series of unforeseen events in the region.
As we explore the siege that disrupted the Athenian dominance, we examine the compelling narrative of Cleon's overreach and Brasidas's audacious ambush tactics that caught Athens off guard. Journey with us through the aftermath of the Battle of Amphipolis, where the city's citizens hailed Brasidas as a saviour, leaving Athens to grapple with the ramifications of their loss. The episode shines a light on the shifting geopolitical landscape, where both Athens and Sparta faced unprecedented challenges, prompting strategic recalibrations and new alliances. From the battlefield to the broader political stage, this episode captures the essence of a pivotal moment in ancient history, rich in dramatic twists and strategic lessons that continue to resonate.
The Battle of the Athenians. As soon as Brasidas saw the Athenians in motion, he descended himself from Sidilium and entered Amphipolis. He did not venture to go out in regular order against the Athenians. He mistrusted his strength and thought it inadequate to the attempt. Not in numbers these were not so unequal but in quality, the flower of the Athenian army being in the field with the best of the Lamnians and Embrerians. He therefore prepared to assail them by stratagem, thucydides. Hello, I'm Mark Selleck and welcome back to Casting Through Ancient Greece, episode 90, clash Over Amphipolis.
Speaker 2:The last couple of episodes we have been focused on the events taking place north of Greek lands, in Thracian territory. Events within Greece itself during the war had quietened down after the events of 424 BC. This year had seen Athens gain an advantage over Sparta after their victories at Pylos, sphacteria and other areas around the Peloponnese. However, athens would see their hard-won advantage slip away as they continued to put pressure on Sparta directly and through their allies. These campaigns in the later part of the year would not go the Athenians' way and they'd also suffered one of their biggest losses in the war so far. This would see Sparta regain their confidence to act against Athens, however through indirect means, since Athens still held over 120 of their citizens hostage. This would see the Spartan general, brasidas, launch a campaign focused on undermining Athens' influence in Thrace.
Speaker 2:Brasidas launched a campaign focused on undermining Athens' influence in Thrace. The region was rich in natural resources such as wood and precious metals, while also being a strategic location for overseeing overland trade coming from the east. Over the past generations, athens had worked at exerting their influence into the region. As the Athenian Empire grew, brasidas looked to disrupt Athens' ability to take advantage of the region and its resources, which would affect their ability to maintain their war footing. Brasidas would initially be very successful in seeing many cities switch sides through his smart use of diplomacy out of the ordinary for a Spartan general. However, he did have the hurdles to overcome, such as dealing with the notoriously unreliable Macedonian king Perdiccas. Hurdles to overcome, such as dealing with the notoriously unreliable Macedonian king Perdiccas, while also having to rely on supplies from others and recruiting from the local populations. Nevertheless, brasidas was able to capture Amphipolis, with then other cities opening their gates to him. The capture of Amphipolis had also seen the Athenian general and later historian, thucydides tried and exiled as he had been in command of the region, with more cities coming over to Brasidas, athens looked to make arrangements to send a force to Thrace to attempt to regain control During the winter of 424-423,.
Speaker 2:Athens and Sparta, however, would sign a years-long truce to suspend hostilities. Both had motivations for seeing this truce in place, so the terms appear to have been arranged without much trouble. However, the truce would interrupt the momentum Brasidas had on his side. He would continue his campaign, initially arguing the next cities would fall to him had surrendered before the signing of the truce. Though, with most aware of the timeline, athens had become angry at this disregard of the terms. Athens would end up responding and sent a fleet with forces to check Brasidas' campaign and attempt to reclaim their possessions in Thrace. In doing so, athens, moving further away from the past moderate policies of Pericles, would vow to treat those revolting with the harshest measures. In response to Athens' moves, brasidas once again found himself in a difficult position. On the one hand, he wanted to respond effectively to Athens in the area, but on the other, he had been obliged to assist Perdiccas in his campaigns during the same period. This would end up seeing the alliance between Macedon and Brasidas fall apart and Perdiccas would end up looking back towards Athens for an alliance, athens, after some early setbacks, would begin to reclaim cities previously loyal to them, where we had left them.
Speaker 2:Last episode with Sicone under siege, sparta had attempted to reinforce Brasidas. However, perdiccas had proved to be a useful ally this time around, where he had been able to prevent passage of the Spartan army through Thessaly, though the Spartans had been able to slip some leading men into Thrace, where, it appears, the Spartan government was looking to gain control of Spartan actions in the north rather than Brasidas being left to his own devices. The situation in Thrace was still a contested one between Athens and Sparta. Though still under a truce, both would continue to influence the region militarily. This episode we'll look at Athens' continued campaign to regain control where another force would sail for Thracian lands. This time around, the goal was to try and recover Amphipolis, the city that had seen the domino effect of others break away from Athens. Here we will see the battle around Amphipolis take place, along with the death of important figures from both Athens and Sparta. Then we will see how a longer peace would still be sought, and one that could potentially see the end of the war.
Speaker 2:Actions up in Thrace would once again begin to pick up as the summer of 422 approached, the forces led by Nicias and Nicostratus were still in the region after they had begun campaigning the previous year. At this stage they were still occupied with the siege at Sicone. The truce that had been in place from the previous year was due to expire around March and it seems many in Athens were fed up with Sparta's disregard of the terms of the truce. Although Brasidas appears to have ignored the terms early on without Spartan government knowledge, the Spartans then looked to reinforce his position and sent governors to administer the captured cities. It appears this had two objectives first, to rein in Brasidas' initiative. First to rein in Brasidas and secondly, to attempt to hold on to what had been won, with it seeming the Spartan government was now complicit in breaching the terms of the truce. Some historians, such as Donald Kagan, put forward the idea that the Spartan agreement to the truce was a ploy to buy Brasidas time in Thrace. However, I'm more inclined to believe that the Spartans had made the agreement outside this consideration and only began actively supporting Brasidas and breaching the terms after realising what he had gained at the Athenians' expense. A big reason for leaning this way is due to Thucydides' report of the Spartan government attempting to gain control of Brasidas' actions.
Speaker 2:With a new year had also come a new round of elections, and Cleon, who was back in Athens, would once again be elected to office During the spring. He was able to successfully debate and convince the Athenian assembly to allow him to sail for Thrace with another force once the truce had expired. This shows that in Athens there were still leaders who were for peace that had been voted in along with Cleon, since debate was required. However, it also shows that the Athenians had lost patience with the Spartan actions in the north. Although a force had been sent the previous year to attempt to reclaim Athenian influence, they had now seen it necessary to increase their presence, to not only take back their possessions but to defeat the Spartan forces. Cleon would be granted a fleet of 30 triremes, consisting of an Athenian force of 1,200 hoplites and 300 cavalry, while a larger contingent of allies would also join this expedition.
Speaker 2:Cleon and his fleet would arrive in the waters around the Chalcedones, where they would first land at Sicone, making camp with the Athenian army laying siege to the city there. Here the men were rested and supplies taken in, while plans were also made for the first action of the expedition. The plan was to sail just across the middle peninsula to the tip where Tyrone was located. This had been one of the early cities taken by Brassidus after the fall of Amphipolis. Cleon was also able to take on more hoplites from around Sycone, since the siege could be maintained with less troops.
Speaker 2:With the fleet ready to sail once again, they then commenced their Thracian campaign. The fleet would enter the harbour not far from Tyrone where deserters from the city were encountered. Cleon would learn that Brasidas was not in the city and the defenders were far from strong enough to come out and give him battle. Cleon used this information and then prepared to take the city. He would march with the majority of the army onto the outer fortifications built by the Spartans, while ten ships were sent around the harbour directly to the city.
Speaker 2:The Spartan commander in charge of the garrison had learnt of the Athenians' arrival in the area and had sent off a messenger to Brasidas requesting his assistance. The garrison then, waiting for reinforcements to arrive, hurried out to meet the approaching Athenians manning the fortifications. They would find themselves hard-pressed and parts of the fortifications fell to the Athenians. It had also been noticed that the Athenian ships were sailing towards the city. The garrison, with their defences crumbling, fell back to the city to attempt to defend it against the flanking fleet. However, the Athenian ships had beat them into the city and now the garrison also had the Athenian army on their heels. A melee within the city took place, with a number of the garrison falling while the rest would be taken prisoner, leaving Athens back in control of Tyrone. Brasidas was only some six kilometres from the city with his relief force when he received news that the Athenians had captured it. So he had turned around and marched back to where he had set out from.
Speaker 2:Many historians have pointed out the importance of this victory and Cleon's tactical intelligence, even though Thucydides presents the battle like most other small engagements in his history. Even though Thucydides presents the battle like most other small engagements in his history, donald Kagan echoes other historians where he points out that the obvious move for Cleon to make was to head for Ziccone, as he did, but add his forces to the siege and see the city fall much quicker, as the city had been where Athens' anger boiled over after its revolt. However, it seems Brassidus have also anticipated this and it may have been where his forces were heading when Cleon entered the region. It's possible Cleon had anticipated Brasidas to act in this way and had made land there to convince him that this was the Athenians' intention. However, this had now left Tyrone vulnerable to attack, with no effective mobile army in range to assist, since it had been drawn away. These historians argue that Cleon had recognised Athens' advantage over the sea and looked to use it against Brasidas, who was constrained to land movement. This meant Cleon could move his troops faster and, to a degree, surprise the Peloponnesians in where they would strike.
Speaker 2:Next. Cleon would have the Athenians set up two trophies one by the harbour where the flanking fleet had landed and one by the fortifications in front of the city. This way, he showed his troops that they had both been vital to the capture of the city. For the people of Tyrone, their fate would have the women and children turned into slaves, while the men would accompany the captured Peloponnesians and be sent to Athens. Tyrone was now back under Athenian control and was the first stepping stone in Cleon's campaign to retake Amphipolis. He would place a garrison in the city and would prepare the rest of his forces to continue on in their campaign. From Tyrone, the fleet would head to the island of Thassos, then, from here, it would head back to the Thracian coast and land at Aeon, at the mouth of the Strymon. Remembering here, aeon was still an Athenian possession as it had been defended after Amphipolis initially fell to Brasidas, while in the area, efforts were made to capture two other cities nearby, one to the southeast and one to the southwest. Gallipas, to the southwest, would be captured, but Stagirius in the southeast, would repel the Athenian attempt. It appears these attacks were on a smaller scale and had the intention of securing the Athenian position at Aeon while they prepared to attack Amphipolis.
Speaker 2:Cleon's planning for the attack would see his forces remain idle for a time at Aeon. He had sent envoys out to make contact with both the Macedonian king, perdiccas, and the king of the Thracian Odomantinians. He was seeking troops from both to bolster his forces for their attack on the city. Perdiccas was bound by the alliance he had made with the Athenians to march with an army to assist the Athenians in the campaign, while the Thracian king was sought after. As it appears, his interests were to match the Athenians. It seems the Thracian tribes that had revolted and that were assisting the Spartans were at odds with him. Plus, he would have been seeking to exert influence over as many tribal groups as possible to expand his kingdom. Brasidas would be kept informed of the preparations that Cleon was making and would move a force to some high ground not far from Amphipolis, where he could maintain an uninterrupted view of the moves that would be made. At the same time, cleon was awaiting his reinforcements. Brasidas would also take measures to see his own forces grow. He would call upon his own Thracian mercenaries as well as cavalry and peltas from various regions. The majority of these forces would be stationed within Amphipolis, with only some 1,500 of Brasidas' troops accompanying him to the high ground.
Speaker 2:The next part of Thucydides' account becomes a little confusing. As for a short passage, he now paints Cleon in a different light to how he previously portrays him. We get a picture of a commander not respected by his men and looked at as cowardly. The cities would write inactivity made the soldiers discontented and their thoughts began to turn to the comparison between the daring skill of Brassidus and the incompetence and weakness of their own commander. This is a strange passage as it flies in the face of how Cleon has been treated in previous campaigns and the beginning of his current one. If anything, we have seen how Cleon was bold and looked to act decisively. One wonders if we are seeing a bias slip in against Cleon while he is up against Brasidas. We had looked at last episode how Cleon may have been the instigator behind Thucydides' exile. Perhaps when it came to Cleon having to face the same foe that had bested Thucydides, he wanted to paint Cleon in a negative light. However, we can still turn to Thucydides' account to paint a picture of events around Amphipolis.
Speaker 2:It appears from Cleon's actions that he was preparing to gather enough forces to lay siege to Amphipolis. Thucydides tells us he was forced to rashly send forces against the city due to discontent within his ranks. However, it appears sending out a recon in force would be necessary to plan an attack and eventually to besiege the city. Cleon had reached a hill not far from Amphibolus where he was able to get a good view of the city and its surrounds. Supposedly he was meant to have had the view that, had he brought up siege engines, he would have been able to take the city there and then, with the force he had. For a while he was observing the city, he noticed that there was no one manning the walls and no force was coming out to challenge him. This would see that Cleon felt confident in being able to spend as much time as he wished gathering intelligence and then being able to safely withdraw back to Aeon.
Speaker 2:However, brasidas had other ideas. He had seen Cleon's advance from Aeon and had decided to march his own forces back to Amphipolis. The reasoning we are given is that, even though roughly equal in numbers, the quality of these troops were less than that of the Athenians. He thought if he remained in place, cleon would recognise this and be encouraged to attack Brasidas, though thought his best chances were to attempt to engage the Athenians on his own terms, so hiding as much information from the Cleon would be key. We also need to remember time was not on the side of Brasidas. He could not expect any help coming from Sparta, though as each day passed, the Athenians were getting closer to gaining their reinforcements and their ability to surround Amphibolus.
Speaker 2:However, now with Cleon's recon in force, brasidas now saw an opportunity to attack Cleon, while, in his false sense of security, we are told that all the troops were gathered so that Brasidas could address them to build their morale, while also ensuring all were aware of the plan. The plan would involve taking 150 men to threaten the Athenian position, also to reinforce the idea of a large attack being arranged. Brasidas had a large number of troops positioned at what was known as the Thracian gates, this being the closest to the Athenians' position. Cleon, upon his vantage point, would be able to view this gathering of troops. This, he assumed, would have the effect of Cleon withdrawing from the hill back to Aeon. The route this withdrawal would have would see that the Athenians would need to march past the walls of Amphipolis, where gates into the city were located. This would specifically take them past the southern gate and where, once Cleon no longer had eyes on the movements behind the walls of Amphipolis, brassidus would order forces to the southern gate ready to take the Athenians by surprise. This would then force the Athenians to stand and fight, focusing on the immediate threat. Then a reserve force would be taken out through the Thracian gate and fall upon the Athenians from the rear. This would appear to be the plan that Brasidas had in mind and conveyed to his men and, as we will see, would mostly unfold as he envisioned.
Speaker 2:After Brasidas had finished addressing his forces, his plan would get underway. A body of troops had been gathering at the Thracian Gate, while 150 picked men set out to threaten the Athenian position. With these actions taking place, word was sent to Cleon, who came forward, where he was able to observe all the movements being made in the city below. From his perspective, it looked as though the Peloponnesians were assembling for a sally out of the city. Cleon had not come forward looking to fight a battle, but just to gather intelligence for the upcoming siege. He judged that his reinforcements would not be able to arrive in time, but he would have enough time to organise a withdrawal back to Aeon with the forces he had brought up.
Speaker 2:The quickest route to withdrawal would see the Athenian force having to initially march parallel to the walls of Amphipolis. Cleon appears to have perhaps not been so completely confident in avoiding battle, as he was frustrated with the progress his men were making, so personally ordered the entire force to wheel around, placing the unarmoured side of his right flank towards the walls of Amphipolis. This manoeuvre had seen the army quickly march past the Thracian Gate and where Cleon had seen the danger to his forces developing. However, as the Athenians had been preparing the withdrawal and had been putting it into motion, another force within Amphipolis had been assembling at the southern gates. Cleon's men would also need to march past this position in the wall.
Speaker 2:As they fell back, though having already passed the Thracian gate, cleon thought the immediate danger to his men had been avoided, brassidas, seeing the Athenian movements and now in such a vulnerable position, ordered his men to attack with the following words those fellows will never stand before us. One can see by the way that their spears and heads are going. Troops, which do as they do, seldom stand a charge. Quick someone, open the gates I spoke of and let us be out at them, with no fears for the result, them with no fears for the result. The Athenians were then completely taken by surprise as a rush of forces led by Brassidas came pouring out of the southern gate and fell upon them. This would see Cleon's force stop and look to defend themselves against this new threat.
Speaker 2:The Athenians' attention was now completely focused on the enemies coming from the southern gate. While the Peloponnesians had been attacking from the southern gate, the other force now came out of the Thracian gate to the rear of the withdrawing Athenians. With the Athenians' attention occupied, these men came charging down the road along the wall and crashed into the unaware Athenians, now causing total panic among their ranks. The left wing of the Athenian force, which was furthest from the walls, walls was able to break and fled back towards Eon. However, it would be during this stage that Brasidas would receive a wound and would fall, though the men around him were able to recover him and drag him away from the action, this had been carried out quickly and the Athenians had not become aware that a Spartan general had fallen.
Speaker 2:An event like this in combat can have an influential effect on the battle, with it encouraging the enemy while also harming the morale of the general's army. However, given the swiftness of him being taken from the fighting, it appears not many were aware what had just taken place. The Athenian right wing remained engaged and appears to have been able to gain some cohesion, for they were able to find some high ground. From here. They were able to repulse the advances of their Peloponnesians a few times. However, they would end up being surrounded and, after suffering a barrage of missile fire, they would too now rout, though they would now have to worry about the cavalry and peltas picking them off in their vulnerable state. Those who survived had made for the rough terrain of the hills, where the pursuit of the enemy was made more difficult. From there, they would eventually make their way back to Aeon In amongst the chaos that took place when the Athenians made their withdrawal.
Speaker 2:We hear of Cleon being killed Once again. How Thucydides describes it possibly points to his bias over him, as he is described as dying in a cowardly manner. Points to his bias over him, as he is described as dying in a cowardly manner, supposedly during the stand of the right wing. Cleon is meant to have fled, with Thucydides seeming to describe him as abandoning his men. We then hear he was overtaken by some enemy peltas, where one cut him down as they passed by. As we saw, brasidas had also fallen during the battle and was taken back from the fighting. With the battle now won, those who had rescued him from the front line brought him back to the city of Amphipolis as he was still alive. However, his injuries were too great to be treated effectively, but he would learn of the victory of his troops before he ended up succumbing to his wounds. So would be the end of one of Sparta's most imaginative and courageous generals for a generation. Those at Amphipolis would treat Brasidas with the respect that he had earned himself over his life.
Speaker 2:Thucydides describes a scene within the city. After this, all the allies attended in arms and buried Brasidas at the public's expense, in the city, in front of what is now the marketplace, and the people of Amphibolus having enclosed his tomb ever afterwards, sacrificed to him as a hero and have given him the honour of games and annual offerings. The people of Amphibolus, in the wake of Brasidas' death, would turn to destroying all the monuments that had celebrated the Athenians' establishment of the colony. They instead viewed Brasidas as being their preserver, and it seems they are also looking to be favoured by Sparta, since Athenian recapture of the city would surely mean a horrible fate for many of them. The Peloponnesians, now under the command of Cloridus, would strip the dead of their armour and establish trophies to mark the victory. A local truce would be made so that the dead of the athenians could be returned to them. The usidides tells us that some six hundred of them were killed in the fighting, while only seven of those who had been within amphipolis would die in the fighting. When we see such a disparity in numbers like this, it is tempting to dismiss them. However, we need to keep in mind it does seem to fit with the trend of battles that involve a major rout. The actual engagement tends to see very few casualties when both sides are engaged. The vast number of the dead come from the side that routs and are completely defenceless and vulnerable to the actions of the enemy. Routes and are completely defenceless and vulnerable to the actions of the enemy.
Speaker 2:With the Athenian defeat of Amphipolis, the survivors would reorganise at Aeon but would not remain, as we hear that they would sail back for Athens. The Peloponnesians, on the other hand, would remain in control of the city and now look to arrange themselves and the city for the possibility of another Athenian attempt. The Spartans had been aware of the campaign Cleon had been embarking on, and they had taken some measures to try and filter in more Spartan reinforcements. We are told that a 900-strong Spartan hoplite army had marched up as far as Heraclea in Trachis. However, they would remain here for some time, with the generals enacting reforms within the city. This delay would mean that they were still in Heraclea when the Battle of Amphipolis took place. By the time the Spartan force got moving again, the winter of 422 had arrived. This force would only penetrate as far as southern Thessaly before they too would encounter stiff Thessalian opposition.
Speaker 2:Thucydides indicates here that the usual resolve and determination of the Spartans was not on show here, for they were turned back home with, apparently, news of the death of Brasidas and the thought that the danger the Athenians posed had now passed. He then continues to suggest that the force did not have the same determination for success in the region that Brasidas had, with these reinforcing generals and troops being aware of the desire back in Sparta for peace. The Battle of Amphipolis had seen the death of two of the most enthusiastic opponents of peace developing between the two sides. We had seen. Brasidas had basically ignored the terms of the truce that had been put in effect, with him finding them an annoyance. In the face of his success in Thrace, he was willing to risk breaking the terms for continued victories at the expense of the Athenians.
Speaker 2:While Cleon had been at the head of those seeking an aggressive approach to the war, his policies had been a contrast to those of Pericles. Earlier in the war, as we pointed out, the Spartan government was looking for a way to come to a satisfactory peace with Athens. They were in no real position to pursue the war as they had desired, where we had seen the early strategy had involved invading Attica each year. Now, though, they were in no position to launch these invasions. If they did, they risked the Spartiites captured at Sphacteria being executed. They no longer had the option of supporting the revolts throughout the islands of the Aegean. Their fleet had proved to be ineffective in the face of the Athenians, but at this stage they didn't even possess a fleet worth mentioning.
Speaker 2:After its seizure at Pylos, the only other option that had presented itself, brasidas had taken on campaigning through Thrace. But here now the momentum had been lost, with the Spartan government gaining back control over the operation. Away from Brasidas, the revolting cities found they were no longer receiving support and were being treated like subject populations once again. Had Sparta wanted to continue the campaign here, they were now in a position where they just couldn't support it through lack of manpower. The Athenians' control of the sea, along with Perdiccas and Thessaly remaining hostile, meant there was no way to reach Dracian land via land or sea. Here we see the options of offensive operations closing themselves off to the Spartans. But these factors were only one side of the story.
Speaker 2:For Sparta seeking peace Back on the Peloponnese, they had now also found themselves in a more threatening position. We had seen how Athens had established forts around the Peloponnese. These still remained active and meant Athens could strike into the Peloponnesian territory as they pleased. Not only this, but these bases offered locations that the helots, under Spartan control, could desert to. The Spartans still remembered the great helot revolt of the previous generation and feared that it could develop again with Athenian support. Added to these fears was the fact that Sparta still had rivals on the Peloponnese, such as Argos. The 30 years truce that existed between them was due to expire soon. Argos, not hampered by war, had recovered from their defeats by Sparta a couple of generations earlier and now thrived. Cleon had also approached the Argive democracy. Knowing the truce was due to expire soon. He was looking to gain a powerful ally, peloponnese. Surely, with the rivalry that existed between Sparta and Argos, the Argives would have been eager to take advantage of the weak position Sparta was in, on the back of a powerful Argos entering the war. It was also feared that some Peloponnesian members would then side with Argos, with them appearing to be Peloponnesian League members more out of necessity at the moment.
Speaker 2:Now, though, taking into account Sparta's reasons for seeking a peace, athens would, on the surface, seem as though a continuation of war would be to their advantage, though they too were also seeking to establish a peace. From what we can see, athens had Sparta on the back foot. 424 had been a big year for Athens, seeing the favour tip in their balance. Even with the setbacks the Athenians suffered, sparta still had to contend with potential Athenian incursions around their territory. The Thracian campaign had been somewhat a result of the Athenian setbacks around Megara, boeotia and the defeat at Delium, but now the situation in Thrace was beginning to stabilise. It's for this reason that an often cited motivation for Athens seeking peace was due to their financial situation.
Speaker 2:We have previously spoken about the stresses of the treasury in funding the war. If the treasury was in serious trouble, athens may have wanted to bring peace as soon as possible, as if it was left with no funds, their security would be in jeopardy. Not only would they risk bankrupting themselves, if the war continued on for longer than foreseen, it would also be difficult to respond to other situations that may develop from areas around their empire, not to mention maintaining their own empire. That was also a source of security. However, we find Donald Kagan, among others, who argue that the situation of the treasury doesn't appear to be a motivation in seeking peace.
Speaker 2:The main argument here rests on the fact that Thucydides stresses the importance of money in the waging of war and outlines Athens' financial situation back in 431. One example of this is during the speech that Thucydides places in the mouth of Pericles, during his speech when war with Sparta was being decided on. The argument then continues that if this was the main motivation for Athens seeking a peace, then surely Thucydides, who understands the main role money plays in waging war, would highlight the lack of it. Now, if anything, it has been argued that, based off of yearly estimates of Athens treasury, they still had enough money to continue the war for at least another year, based off the lower-end estimates, while the higher-end would allow for perhaps another five. This also doesn't take into account the emergency fund that still existed. If Sparta were on the edge of defeat, this might be enough to win an outright victory, though, as we have seen before, nothing is certain in war. Unforeseen events could end up bankrupting Athens. However, this argument of the treasury not being depleted I don't think excludes finances being a factor in Athens' desire for peace. If we take the lower-end estimates, the Athenians would have been aware that their funds could dry up in the near future, possibly before the war could be won. I think Athens' desire to win hostilities came from a number of factors, not resting on a single overarching reason. I think the treasury provided one point that needed to be considered, though other factors such as the regional economy, war weariness from the citizens, the unity of the empire and the change in political dynamics all played a role.
Speaker 2:Athens had suffered Peloponnesian invasions for most years of the war, which had ravaged their countryside and destroyed many farms and crops. At the moment, sparta avoided entering Attica due to Athens holding some of their men hostage. However, this was only temporary and the situation could change at any time. If peace were arranged, many could return to their lands and begin reversing the damage which had been done. This could mean the domestic agricultural situation within Attica could be restored to its pre-war status sooner rather than later. This would also feed into the war weariness of the citizens, as many of these citizens who worked the land had lost their livelihoods and had been absent from their farms. Since the beginning of the war, we had seen how many, especially the hoplite class, had been frustrated, sitting behind Athens' walls while their farms and crops burnt. Further, adding to the citizens' morale issues was the plague that had run havoc behind Athenian walls, with all that had survived losing many family members. Further, the hoplite class, as well as many of the lower classes now employed as rowers, were all becoming homesick. They were constantly deployed on campaigns, away from their homes and families. All of this would also come to affect the manpower Paul Athens could call upon. The war and plague had taken a large toll on the fighting age men. If the war continued and expanded, athens might find itself stretched too far for victory to be possible.
Speaker 2:Another factor Athens had to consider was its empire. All the factors we have spoken about could potentially see Athens in a weaker position. One constant that appears to take place within empires is its subject. Populations tend to look at rebelling if they perceive weakness. This had already taken place a number of times for Athens, before and during the war. If their empire began to crumble due to their not being able to maintain it due to lack of resources, then this could downgrade Athens' power in the region and make them more vulnerable to others.
Speaker 2:However, it also appears now, with the death of Cleon, athens was politically now in a better position to push the notion of a peace agreement with citizens. Cleon had wielded great influence and had opposed negotiating with Sparta. However, there were still those in power in Athens that supported peace, the main figure that would now come to prominence was Nicias. However, even with so many reasons supporting peace on both sides of the conflict, one would not be negotiated right away. It appears there was still some opposition on both sides In Sparta. It is difficult for us to understand where it was coming from, as we don't get a complete picture of the internal politics In Athens, though this is understandable, as support for the continuation of war had been strong with Cleon, it would probably take time for many of his supporters to be convinced to look differently at the situation. While, although Nicias would grow in influence, it wouldn't happen overnight. It would need debates within the assembly to win over others to his side, as we will see next episode. It appears many who still supported war saw that the advantage was with Athens and Sparta was on the ropes. It would take events in the following spring to convince them that perhaps this view of victory just around the corner wasn't as close as they thought, and the reasons we outlined in favour of peace now presented themselves as more important in light of Sparta's actions.
Speaker 2:Next episode we'll be turning to the Peace of Nicias that would end up being negotiated. This would be a peace that was supposed to last 50 years. However, this peace has also earned the nickname of the False Peace. And to close out this episode, I want to just leave you with the introduction Donald Kagan provides when introducing part 4 of his history of the Peloponnesian War. The Peace of Nicias lasted no more than 8 years and was seriously damaged and broken in spirit at once and repeatedly, before its formal demise in 414. The central figure in Athens throughout this period was Nicias, the most lastingly important Athenian political leader since the death of Pericles. His strengths and weaknesses would be crucial to the course of events. A critical force in shaping the treaty and bringing it into being. He also determined how it would be carried out.
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