Casting Through Ancient Greece
Casting Through Ancient Greece
94: Diplomacy by Force
What happens when military might meets diplomatic cunning? In the fragile years following the Peace of Nicias, a dangerous dance unfolds across Greece as former enemies circle each other warily, neither willing to strike first yet both preparing for inevitable conflict.
Alcibiades emerges as Athens' bold strategist, orchestrating a brilliant campaign that uses military presence as leverage without actually breaking the peace. With just a small force, he marches confidently through Spartan territory, cutting supply lines and isolating allies in a masterclass of intimidation without battle. His gambit creates a web of alliances that threatens to strangle Sparta's influence across the Peloponnese.
Meanwhile, King Aegis of Sparta finds himself trapped between military necessity and political reality. When his massive army finally surrounds the Argives in what should be a decisive victory, he makes the shocking decision to negotiate a truce with just two Argive generals—no armies or governments consulted. This fateful choice nearly costs him everything, as enraged Spartans plot to destroy his home and impose crippling fines, while one Argive negotiator barely escapes being stoned to death by his own people.
The true power of religion in warfare becomes starkly apparent as both sides manipulate sacred festivals and divine omens to justify strategic decisions. The Argives creatively redefine their calendar to avoid religious restrictions, while convenient "unfavorable omens" provide perfect cover for Spartan withdrawals when circumstances turn unfavorable.
This episode reveals how the machinery of war often runs on factors far beyond battlefield courage—personality conflicts, political ambitions, and the complex dance between military leaders and the governments they serve. As the peace crumbles beneath the weight of unresolved grievances, we witness the seeds being planted for one of the most consequential battles of the entire Peloponnesian War.
Ready to discover how four men stopped an army of thousands? Listen now and join us as we unravel the fascinating diplomatic maneuvers that would ultimately change the course of Greek history.
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The Argives were now completely surrounded From the plain, the Spartans and their allies shut them off from the city. Above them were the Corinthians, the Lysians and Pelanians, and on the side of Nemea, the Boeotians, siconians and Megarians. Meanwhile, their army was without cavalry, the Athenians alone amongst their allies not having yet arrived Thucydides. Hello, I'm Mark Selleck, and welcome back to Casting Through Ancient Greece, episode 94, diplomacy by Force. The Peace of Nicias would see the first phase of the Peloponnesian War come to a close, with a decade of conflict within Greece subsiding. The aim was for both Athens and Sparta to reach an agreement that would allow them to coexist while also pursuing their self-interests. To reach an agreement that would allow them to coexist while also pursuing their self-interests. However, as we have seen, both entered into a peace either at a strategic disadvantage or suffering from war weariness. This led both sides to making agreements without consulting their various allies, placing those allies in a position of disadvantage. While the terms were agreed upon at a time when both sides were tired of war, the question remained would these conditions hold once both Athens and Sparta regain their strength and morale had recovered within their populations? With the peace of Nicias, geographical dynamics within Greece changed dramatically within the year. With Athens and Sparta technically allied, there was no longer a counterweight to support the many smaller cities that had not fared well under the peace terms. As a result, corinth, sparta's largest ally, encouraged, assisted and then became part of the new league under the leadership of Argos, sparta's traditional rival on the Peloponnese. Leadership of Argos, Sparta's traditional rival on the Peloponnese. As the Argive League came into being, the diplomatic situation became confusing and worrisome for many. Sparta attempted to counter the formation of the League diplomatically and then through force, but it persisted. Now, facing two potential threats the Argive League and the prospect of renewed conflict with Athens, sparta began taking measures to eliminate at least one. However, in doing so, they breached the terms of the Peace of Nicias. In an attempt to fulfil the others, Sparta entered into an alliance with Thebes in order to regain territory to return to Athens. Yet for this blatant breach of the peace they would act too little, too late and only worsen their situation with Athens. Many of the issues underpinning the peace remained unresolved, and now Sparta had created a new breach by forming an alliance outside of their agreement with Athens. Sparta's manoeuvring during this period also alarmed Argos, which initially feared it was being isolated in a weak league, believing Sparta and Athens were working together. However, with the rise of the Athenian Alcibiades, who was hostile towards Sparta, argos would come to an understanding of the true nature of relations between Athens and Sparta. Relief also followed when Argos learned of Athens' intention to form an alliance with them as a counter to Sparta. Under the Peace of Nicias this would not have been possible, but Alcibiades had now gained a larger following and enthusiasm had shifted towards his anti-Spartan policies.
Speaker 1:In this episode, we will continue with the disintegration of the Peace of Nicias. Technically, the peace was still in place, but with many unresolved issues and the new breaches it was only recognised in name by this stage, though open hostilities had not yet recommenced between Athens and Sparta. It would only be a matter of time. In this episode, we will see Alcibiades' policy begin to take shape. Initially, he would apply diplomatic pressure, though this time he would use diplomatic pressure, though this time he would use military presence rather than diplomats to pressure Sparta and its allies. Alcibiades campaigning in the Peloponnese would ultimately provoke Sparta to respond and put their army into the field, directed at Argos, with the majority of those in the Athenian council and assembly now backing a policy more hostile to the Spartans, alcibiades continued to pursue as what he saw as Athens' best path forward. As we saw in the last episode, he had used diplomatic manoeuvrings to discredit his political opponent, nicias, while also exposing Sparta as unreliable in negotiations and in upholding terms of the peace. Although he had painted Sparta in this light through deceitful means, we have also seen that a faction within the Spartan government was already looking to discard the peace of Nicias and resume hostilities.
Speaker 1:With the approach of the summer of 419 BC, athens had now established alliances with Peloponnesian cities that would allow them to pursue more aggressive actions aimed at weakening Sparta. With Argos, elos and Mentenea now aligned with the Athenians, alcibiades arranged an expedition into the Peloponnese with their support. The aim was not to march out and engage Sparta in a battle, but rather to use military force as a diplomatic tool. He hoped to apply enough pressure on Corinth and on some engage Sparta in a battle, but rather to use military force as a diplomatic tool. He hoped to apply enough pressure on Corinth and on some of Sparta's other allies to weaken their position in the Peloponnese. Alcibiades wasted no time in launching the expedition, needing to act while he still held the advantage.
Speaker 1:Sparta had lost much of its prestige over the past year and Alcirieties sought to strengthen. The Argive League, a small Athenian force composed of hoplites and archers, sailed to the Peloponnese, where they first linked up with the Argives, before marching on to Mantinea and Elis, gathering more troops at each allied city along the way. Once the allied army was assembled, they moved into Achaea, north of Elis, stopping outside the coastal city of Petrae, which lay on the southern side of the Corinthian Gulf, opposite Neopactus. Alcibiades successfully negotiated with the city, forcing them into an alliance. He also persuaded them to construct walls down to the sea, improving both their defensive position and communication lines against potential attack. Once this was complete, the intention was to move further along the coast, to Reum, which marked the narrowest point of the Corinthian Gulf, where a fort was to be built. If successful, athens would have effectively cut off the Corinthian shipping through the area, as they would control both coasts at this chokepoint. However, before this part of the plan could be carried out, corinth, sicyon and others in the region marched out to prevent Alcibiades from reaching the site.
Speaker 1:Alcibiades and others' perception that Sparta had lost its influence in the Peloponnese appeared to be confirmed by this expedition. He had entered the Peloponnese with only a small force and without naval support. Yet he was able to march through the northern Peloponnese unopposed. Upon reaching Petraea, the city seemed to come over to his side very quickly, despite likely being able to resist the limited force he had with him. Alcibiades had now established a strong position along the northern coast of the Peloponnese. However, this was only one part of his plan to isolate Corinth.
Speaker 1:The second phase was also underway. Further south On the Argolid Peninsula, just inland from Argos, lay the city of Epidaurus, which remained allied with Sparta. The Argives were tasked with marching into its territory and capturing the city of Epidaurus, which remained allied with Sparta. The Argives were tasked with marching into its territory and capturing the city. To justify their actions, argos cited a religious violation as a pretext for the attack. If both objectives north and south could be achieved and held, it was very possible that Corinth and other Peloponnesian cities on the Corinthian side of this line would find themselves isolated from Sparta and vulnerable to attacks from both directions. The broader idea was to exert enough pressure through these military maneuvers and the threats they presented to compel Sparta's allies in the region to either switch sides or at least adopt a neutral stance.
Speaker 1:It appears Sparta was beginning to recognise what was taking place and the damage it could do to their Peloponnesian League if carried out effectively. Corinth was their chief ally in the League and although they held some blame for the creation of the Argive League, unfolding events would see them reaffirm their alliance with Sparta. However, their main intention all along seems to have been to bring Sparta back into conflict with Athens. King Aegis, back in Sparta, would arrange for the full Spartan army to assemble and then march north onto the frontier, into Arcadia. From this position, aegis had options and kept his opponents guessing about his intentions. He could choose to direct his army against any of the Peloponnesian allies who had sided with Athens. However, once he reached the frontier, sacrifices were conducted and, we are told, the omens came back unfavourable. As a result, the Spartan army returned to Sparta, where they would remain for the next month due to the Carnean Festival, a religious observance that restricted Sparta from engaging in warfare during its duration.
Speaker 1:This withdrawal is curious. As Donald Kagan points out, the Spartans had in the past, and would again in the future, ignore unfavourable omens during critical moments, perhaps with forces from other Peloponnesian allies accompanying him. Aegis used the omens as a convenient excuse to return to Sparta before the Carnanian festival officially began. It still feels like a strange reason to abandon the march, but it's difficult for us to fully understand just how seriously the Spartans took their religious festivals. There may also have been non-religious motivations for the withdrawal, but, as with much of Sparta's decision making, we are left with no clear picture.
Speaker 1:The Argives, however, would take advantage of the Spartan withdrawal and employed a bit of trickery to circumvent the restrictions of the Carnean festival, which was meant to apply to all Dorians, of which the Argives were part of. They invaded Epidaurus on the 27th day of the month prior to the Carneia and, while in enemy territory, they continued to recognise each day as still beginning on the 27th day of the previous month. One must wonder whether the Argives held the Carneia in the same regard as the Spartans. With the Argives now in Epidaurian territory, the Epidaran sent out pleas for assistance to their Peloponnesian allies. However, few answered the call, citing the religious period as preventing them from marching. Those that did respond went only as far as the borders of the Epidarus, ensuring they would not technically engage in any form of warfare.
Speaker 1:The Argive League sought to take full advantage of the inaction from Epidaurus' allies, but before they could mount an attack on the city, athens would call for a conference. Instead of forcing a battle to decide matters, alcibiades turned to the hope of achieving his aims through the pressure he had built up via his military manoeuvres. It was likely the withdrawal of the Spartan force that led him to pursue a favorable outcome with Corinth, with his forces positioned in the north and the Argives holding the south. In the Argyllid, a line was effectively drawn that cut Corinth off from Sparta. With the Spartans now seemingly withdrawn, corinth may have felt abandoned, while hostile forces stood within easy reach of the opening of the Isthmus.
Speaker 1:A conference with the Corinthians was held at Mantinea, where Alcibiades attempted to persuade them to abandon the Spartan alliance. However, the Corinthians were not easily swayed. They called Alcibiades out, accusing him of speaking one way but acting another, referring specifically to his talk of peace, while at the same time allied forces were engaged in hostilities with their allies at Epidaurus. Under such circumstances, they saw no reason to continue discussions. Alcibiades, hoping the talks might still produce a favourable outcome, was willing to concede on this point. Both sides agreed to send representatives to halt hostilities in the south. The Argives subsequently returned home and talks resumed once again in Mentinea. However, despite the continued negotiations, no agreement was reached. One wonders whether the Corinthians ever truly intended to make concessions to Alcibiades or whether they were simply stalling for time, waiting for the Spartans to march again.
Speaker 1:With talks leading nowhere, the Argives once again invaded Epidaurus, laying waste to its lands. In response to this renewed aggression, king Aegis mobilized his army and marched into the direction of Argos. This time, the Argives and Alcibiades gained a clear picture of Sparta's intention. Alcibiades dispatched 1,000 Athenian hoplites to support the Argives, prompting the Argive army to fall back to their city. However, as before, aegis was said to have received unfavourable omens upon reaching the border and once again returned home. It seemed he had little interest in engaging in battle, and perhaps his true aim was simply to disrupt the Argive campaign, which he succeeded in doing. Still, once word reached him of the Athenian reinforcement en route, the Omens may have conveniently offered a justification to avoid conflict altogether. This would mark the final manoeuvres in the Peloponnesian campaign of 419 BC.
Speaker 1:Alcibiades had failed to achieve his ultimate goal of severing Corinth from the Spartan alliance. With the campaigning season over, he would lead his Athenian troops back to Attica for the winter. During the winter, sparta would send troops to reinforce Epidaurus in anticipation of renewed attacks from Argos. Once the new campaigning season began, a contingent of 300 men was dispatched by sea to avoid marching through Argive territory and provoking a direct confrontation. Their route, however, took them past Athenian-controlled bases where the voyage could have been intercepted. Thucydides notes that the Spartan fleet eluded the Athenians, but considering Athens' overwhelming control of the region, it is plausible they allowed the fleet to pass unopposed.
Speaker 1:Perhaps Athens, for the moment, was avoiding open conflict with Sparta. Argos would reproach the Athenians for this inaction, pointing to the treaty between them, which stated that enemies of Argos were not to be allowed passage through the allied territory. Seeking consolation, argos demanded that Athens send some of the Mycenaeans and Helots settled at Neopactus to Pylos, from where they could begin harassing Sparta from the west. Alcibiades managed to persuade the Athenian assembly to have it inscribed on the stele bearing the Peace of Nicias that the Spartans had broken their oaths. As a result, it was agreed that a force of helots be sent to Pylos, from where they could raid the Mycenaean region. Still, athens would continue to formally abide by the peace of Nicias and refrain from launching any direct attacks against Sparta.
Speaker 1:Alcibiades had succeeded in gaining broad Athenian support for the alliance with Argos, but it appears this support did not yet extend to the resumption of open war. It appears this support did not yet extend to the resumption of open war. The hesitation wasn't necessarily due to a desire to avoid conflict with Sparta altogether, but rather a reluctance to risk Athenian citizens in renewed fighting. The alliances brokered by Alcibiades, which would potentially see others doing the bulk of the fighting, were far more palatable to the Athenian public. However, alcibiades found himself increasingly frustrated as he attempted to advance his anti-Spartan policy. His setbacks would continue during the latest round of elections, when Nicias and several of his supporters were chosen as generals while Alcibiades was passed over. Donald Kagan interprets this development as a vote for caution over adventure, writing "the failure of Alcibiades' strategy to win an immediate and decisive result, and perhaps the fear of renewed war against Sparta, led to a fateful change in Athenian leadership". This result made clear that Athens was not yet ready to abandon the peace of Nicias.
Speaker 1:Though it remained committed to the alliance with Argos, the city now found itself in a contradictory position of belonging to the alliance of two hostile states. The resurgence of the support of Nicias suggests that the Athenians were attempting to have the best of both worlds. But such a balancing act could not last indefinitely. At this time, divisions within the Spartan government were also evident. Some factions continued to support the peace of Nicias, while others believed it had lost all authority and should be abandoned. The manoeuvres orchestrated by our sobrieties in the Peloponnese the previous year may have strengthened the arguments of the pro-war faction. However, since Athens had technically not violated the terms of the treaty, sparta refrained from declaring the peace formally over and gave no official response to the Athenians' accusations of oath-breaking.
Speaker 1:The remainder of the winter passed without major action from either Sparta or Athens around Epidaurus or Argos. Nevertheless, the two neighbouring cities continued to engage in intermittent skirmishing. Towards the end of the winter, the Argives made a concerted effort to breach the walls of Epidaurus and take the city. Yet this attempt failed due to miscalculation. The Argives underestimated how many enemy forces still remained within the city. The Argives underestimated how many enemy forces still remained within the city by the time of the warmer months of 418 BC arrived.
Speaker 1:Sparta recognised the need to act decisively in the Argolid. Thucydides tells us that they launched a sizeable campaign because their allies, the Epidarians, were in distress, and of their other Peloponnesian allies, some were in rebellion and others ill-disposed. They thought that if they did not take action swiftly, the trouble would go further. In short, the Spartans saw its grip on the Peloponnese slipping Without decisive intervention. Their dominance risked being overtaken by a rising power in the region. Although Alcibiades had not been elected as general for that year, the effects of his previous policies were now reverberating throughout the Peloponnese, helping to provoke Sparta's more assertive response. King Aegis would act far more decisively this year compared to the indecisive manoeuvres of the previous campaign.
Speaker 1:One of the largest Peloponnesian forces yet assembled was called into the field with the intention of concentrating at Phileas in Arcadia, near the Argolid border. The Spartan-led force comprised of two major contingents. The first, gathered in Arcadia, included the full Spartan army, the Tigeans and other Arcadian allies, amounting to some 8,000 hoplites. The second force, set to rendezvous at Phyllis, consisted of other Peloponnesian city-states and Sparta's allies from beyond the peninsula. This contingent added another 12,000 hoplites, 5,000 light troops and 500 cavalry, as well as 500 mounted infantry trained to support the cavalry. The hoplites in this second force came primarily from Corinth, the Boeotian cities and Phyllis, along with the surrounding centres. Thucydides notes that the men from these areas had committed their entire fighting strength, given the likelihood a battle would be fought in or near their own territory. The light troops and cavalry came from Boeotia, where the local terrain encouraged the development of such forces and, by extension, superior training in their use compared to the other regions.
Speaker 1:Argos had been made aware of Sparta's intentions during the early planning stages of the campaign. While it appears they knew of the assembly point, the Argives delayed action until the Peloponnesian forces began to move. They may have been reluctant to commit too early, wary that Aegis may once again change his course mid-campaign, as they had done the previous year. Then the Spartans had deliberately positioned themselves, so their ultimate objective was unclear. Ultimate objective was unclear. Learning from that experience, the Argives likely exercised caution, waiting for clearer indications of Aegis' intentions before making their move.
Speaker 1:In response to the impending threat, the Argives raised a force of 7,000 hoplites. They were joined by 3,000 from Elis and 2,000 from Mantinea, with a combined force setting out to confront the enemy. Although Athens, now again under influence from Nicias and his supporters, had agreed to send a force of 1,000 hoplites and 300 cavalry, this Athenian contingent had not yet arrived by the time the Argive-led force marched out from their city. Looking at the numbers, it is clear that the Argive's and their allies were outnumbered roughly 20,000 troops from the Peloponnesian League against around 12,000 from the Argive Alliance. Given that the Peloponnesian army was assembling in two separate forces, the Argives recognised the importance of intercepting one of these contingents before they could unite. This strategic necessity led them to march west into Arcadia, aiming to intercept the force advancing from Sparta.
Speaker 1:Aegis, however, was fully aware of the vulnerability his army faced before it could link up with the northern contingent. To mitigate this risk, he avoided the most direct route from Sparta to Phyllis. Instead, he took a wider path to the west. As he advanced northward, the Argives had likely anticipated that Aegis would march on Mantinea, one of the key allies and located on the most direct route north. If Aegis had reached Mantinea with only a Spartan-led force, it's possible he could have taken the city, but that did not appear to be part of his plan. Aegis had no intention of engaging in battle until the full Peloponnesian army was united.
Speaker 1:The Argives nonetheless continued their march to Mantinea, where their numbers were bolstered by the Mantinean forces. There they likely learned the Spartans had bypassed the city and had taken a more western route. Now reinforced, the Argos continued westward, hoping to intercept Aegis before he could join his allies. Contact between the two forces was finally made west of Mantinea, near Mithaeodrum, where both sides moved to occupy the high ground and establish defensive positions. Upon learning that Aegis had not yet linked up with the northern army, the Argos prepared to give battle. However, aegis was not yet linked up with the northern army. The Argives prepared to give battle. However, aegis was not willing to risk a fight just yet.
Speaker 1:Though the forces were close in size with the Argives, perhaps slightly outnumbering his own, it was clear that once united with the rest of the Peloponnesian army, the advantage would swing dramatically in Sparta's favour. During the night, while the Argyves were making preparations for battle, aegis quickly broke camp and withdrew under the cover of darkness. The Spartan retreat was not detected until morning. By then. The distance between the armies was too great to overcome quickly. The Argyves, having focused on preparing for combat that morning, could not immediately pursue Breaking down camp, and organising a full army for a forced march would take time. This delay allowed Aegis to reach Phyllis without being forced into a premature battle. There, the Spartan army was joined by the 2nd Peloponnesian force, swelling the numbers to approximately 20,000 hoplites plus additional light troops and cavalry. With the two armies now united, the Spartans held a significant numerical advantage and were prepared for the next phase of the campaign.
Speaker 1:The Argives were aware of where the Spartans had marched and realised that their new position lay closer to Argos than their own. Now united, the Peloponnesians posed a significant threat to the Argive territory. As soon as the Argive broke camp, they marched directly back to Argos to defend their homeland. Upon arrival, and discovering that Aegis had not yet set out, they then moved north to meet the army in the field. There were two possible routes that the Peloponnesians could take through the mountainous terrain to reach the Argive plain. One led towards Namir and was better suited to cavalry. The other, though more direct, passed through rugged country that was difficult for cavalry but still usable by the infantry.
Speaker 1:The Argive army chose to head towards Nemea, expecting to meet the Spartans there. Thucydides simply states this was the road that they anticipated the Peloponnesians would take, though he offers no explanation for the decision. Several possibilities exist. Perhaps the presence of cavalry in the Spartan army made the Nemean route appear more likely. Or maybe the Argives were stalling, hoping for negotiations that might prevent a battle. It's also been suggested that the Argive leadership was unaware of the western route, though this seems unlikely Given its strategic significance. It too emerged on the Argive plain and posed a direct threat to Argos.
Speaker 1:Part of the Peloponnesian force, including the cavalry and troops from Sikion, megara and Boeotia, did indeed advance along the Nemean Road. This was the contingent the Argives initially encountered. However, two additional columns from the main Peloponnesian army made a night march along the western route, positioning themselves behind the Argives and effectively cutting them off from the city. This manoeuvre left the Argive army in a perilous situation. A large hoplite force now stood between them and Argos, while a lighter, more mobile force pressed from the front. A retreat towards Argos risked exposing their rear to harassment and pursuit by the hoplites moving in from behind them. Once word arrived that the countryside behind them was being ravaged, the Argives began withdrawing from their position near Namir. During the retreat, they were attacked by enemy skirmishes, with casualties sustained on both sides. Meanwhile, the main Peloponnesian force from the rear had not yet reached Namir, but continued advancing along the road. The Argives had now fallen back on along the road. The Argives had now fallen back on.
Speaker 1:The Argive army eventually made it back down into the plains, where the rest of the Peloponnesian force, including the Spartans, was located. Contact was made and both sides began forming up for battle. The Spartans ceased their ravaging of the area and likewise prepared for combat. Despite making it back to the plains, the Argives now found themselves in a dangerous position. The Spartan army stood before them, cutting off their route to Argos. To the hills behind them, in the west, another Peloponnesian column, including the Corinthians, had taken up a position, and to the rear, along the path they had just retreated from, were the remaining Peloponnesian allies and the cavalry.
Speaker 1:Yet Thucydides tells us that the Argives did not initially perceive the danger. Instead, they believed they had the Spartans trapped in Argive territory and were emboldened by this false sense of advantage. Both sides were willing to fight, each convinced they held the upper hand. However, within the Argive leadership, two generals recognised the true nature of their predicament. As the two armies prepared to engage, they stepped forward and requested a meeting with Aegis. They urged him not to give the order to attack, proposing instead that Argos submit to a fair and equal arbitration. Thucydides notes that this discussion was held without the knowledge or approval of either army. Only one other man, a high-ranking official trusted by Aegis, was brought into the talks. As a result, all decisions made at this critical juncture were reached solely between these four individuals.
Speaker 1:The outcome of this unusual meeting, just before the battle was to begin, was the unexpected arrangement of a four-month truce. When Aegis returned to his army, he immediately made preparations for the Peloponnesian forces to depart the Argyllid without offering any explanation to his allies, while the Spartans and their allies were legally compelled to follow Aegis' orders. This move severely impacted the morale of the army legally compelled to follow Aegis' orders. This move severely impacted the morale of the army. The allies lost respect for Aegis' authority and a sense of disillusionment spread. The consensus was that the great army which had been assembled with such effort had been utterly wasted. The Peloponnesians had their enemies surrounded, yet they were now retreating without having achieved anything of significance given the size of their force. Back in Sparta, aegis' enemies seized upon this moment to undermine his authority and discredit the policies he supported.
Speaker 1:Meanwhile, in Argos, the news of the truce caused widespread anger. The Argives had believed that victory was within their grasp and were furious that, at the last moment, the battle was taken from them. Argos, a democratic city, saw this as a betrayal and the people were enraged that they had not been consulted about the truce. The anger culminated in violence when the army returned to the city. Thrasylus, one of the Argive generals who had played a role in arranging the truce was almost stoned to death by the mob. He managed to seek refuge at an altar, but the people were not satisfied with his escape. They decreed that he should be stripped of all his property for his actions in brokering the peace.
Speaker 1:After the build-up of forces, the extensive marching and the dramatic counter-marching, the showdown in the Argive Plain ultimately turned into an anti-climax. By the time this pivotal moment had passed, the Athenians had finally arrived with their reinforcements 1,000 hoplites and 300 cavalry. However, their forces were too small to make any significant impact and arrived too late to influence the outcome of the campaign. Despite the discontent within Argos over the truce, the Argives were still hesitant to break the agreement. They feared that allowing the Athenians to address their assembly, given the people's anger, would convince the masses to break the truce altogether. As a result, the Argives requested that the Athenians leave and Athens' repeated requests to address the assembly were denied. However, alcibiades, who had accompanied the Athenian force as an ambassador, seized the opportunity. While in Argos, he addressed the Argives and their allies Elis and Mantinea in what appears to have been a council setting, according to Thucydides. Alcibiades argued that the treaty had not been lawfully made without the consent of the rest of the alliance and that they should now, since the Athenians had arrived at such favourable moment, resume the war. While this was likely the essence of Alcibiades' argument, it was compelling enough to persuade Elis, mantinea and the other smaller allies to continue the fight. This effectively led to the League's decision to continue military action, despite the Argos' reluctance to break the truce.
Speaker 1:The target for the League's next campaign was Orchomenus in Arcadia, a strategically significant city. It sat on a critical route that could prevent an army marching from the Corinthian isthmus from reaching the central Peloponnese. This was essentially an effort to avoid the earlier situation where the two Peloponnesian armies had met and then marched into the Argive plain, a move that had led to the frustrating anticlimax of the truce. The League marched westward and laid siege to Archiminus. After some delay, the Argive forces arrived to join the siege. The defenders, realising their situation, quickly surrendered and the city entered into a new alliance, becoming the newest member of the Argive League.
Speaker 1:News of Archiminus' fall was a blow to Sparta, heightening the anger within the Peloponnesian camp and making Aegis' actions in the Argive Plain seem even more disastrous. Tensions within the Spartan government reached a boiling point and plans were made to destroy Aegis' house and then fine him 10,000 drachma. However, aegis admitted fault and vowed to avenge the disgrace in his next campaign. His pledge temporarily halted any punishment, but he was now assigned advisors who would accompany him on future campaigns, ensuring that he could not act without their consent. It seemed the Spartan government was not questioning Aegis' abilities as a military leader, but rather his political missteps. As a military leader, but rather his political missteps.
Speaker 1:Aegis had likely been avoiding battle to buy time, hoping to sway the oligarchs of Argos to change their policies. Initially, much of the Spartan government supported this cautious strategy, but the loss of Orchomenus and the resulting frustration put an end to the patience for such an approach. The hope that Argos might fall from within had now cost the Spartans a strategically valuable city with potential ramifications for their future actions. While Aegis had been reluctant to act as swiftly as the majority of the Spartan government wished, he now found himself forced to comply with the broader consensus. Fortunately, another opportunity to reverse his earlier failures was soon to present itself Tigea, a city that had been a founding member of the Peloponnesian League in the 6th century had grown bolder in the wake of Sparta's perceived weakness. A faction within Tigea now favoured an alliance, with Argos gaining dominance in the city. The opposing faction, which sought to maintain the city's ties with Sparta, sent word to Sparta that if action wasn't taken quickly, tigea would join the Argyve League. The loss of Tigea was a situation Sparta could not afford. The fall of Ocumenes was already a blow, but the loss of Tigea would significantly weaken the Peloponnesian League and Sparta's position as a dominant power in the region. Sparta's alliance with Tigeia had been pivotal in its rise to power, and losing the city would now signal a decline in its influence. Faced with this intimate threat, aegis marched out once again, this time with a renewed sense of urgency. His mission was clear to save Tigeia and restore Sparta's prestige and dominance within Greece. As we have seen, the tensions within Greece were steadily increasing and by this point the peace of Nicias remained in place, largely because Athens and Sparta had yet to engage directly in battle.
Speaker 1:The episode illustrated Alcibiades' continued aggressive stance towards Sparta, where he sought to pursue his diplomatic goals through military action. Alcibiades' focus turned to isolating Sparta by targeting its allies, particularly Corinth. If Corinth and other Peloponnesian cities could be cut off from Sparta, it was hoped that these cities might either negotiate separately with Athens or join the Argive League. Sparta responded to Alcibiades' campaign but avoided direct confrontation with the Athenians, strategically positioning themselves to avoid battle. This outcome achieved Alcibiades' intended result. Corinth's isolation was further solidified. Though negotiations with Corinth took place, they failed to yield to Athenian demands, appearing more as a delaying tactic to buy time for the Spartans to launch a new campaign.
Speaker 1:The Spartans eventually mobilised a fresh army, sending it toward Argos in an attempt to relieve pressure on their northern Peloponnesian allies. However, aegis once again avoided direct engagement, causing Athenian forces to be drawn away from their position near the Isthmus to assist Argos. This marked the end of the 419 BC campaigning season, with no battles fought and both Athens and Sparta appearing hesitant to engage directly. That winter it became clear both sides were dissatisfied with the current policies. Athens expressed its discontent when Alcibiades was not voted into the position of general for the coming year. Within Sparta, the pro-war faction seemed to gain traction, largely due to Alcibiades' actions and Sparta's reluctance to respond forcibly.
Speaker 1:As the 418 BC campaigning season arrived, agis, the Spartan king took decisive action by launching an army to threaten Argos and relieve pressure on Epidaurus, which the Argives had besieged over the winter. This marked the beginning of the Peloponnesian campaign of 418 BC, which, despite its bold intentions and the immense size of the Peloponnesian army, ultimately faltered in its execution. The large army under Aegis at one point outmaneuvered and surrounded the Argive forces, holding the advantage both in numbers and position. Yet the opportunity to deliver a decisive blow was squandered, not due to miscalculation in the field, but because of a sudden and unauthorised political compromise. A hastily arranged truce resulted, leaving both sides deeply dissatisfied. Sparta's allies felt betrayed by Aegis' abrupt withdrawal, while the Democratic Assembly of Argos was outraged at being sidelined from the decisions that directly impacted their security and honour.
Speaker 1:Alcibiades' presence in the aftermath ensured that Sparta's fleeting moments of advantage did not translate into lasting stability. His speech at Argos reignited the anti-Spartan coalition and fractured any fragile peace that had momentarily settled over the region. While Argos itself refrained from openly breaking the truce, the rest of the League was convinced to continue hostilities, effectively undermining the very agreement that had just been struck. The events of 418 BC revealed how fragile alliances, personal ambition and political systems could quickly undo even the most coordinated military efforts. With the conflict reigniting so soon after a major campaign had ended, it was clear that the Peloponnesian War was far from over. Rather, the conclusion of the 418 BC campaign served as a prelude to one of the most significant land battles of the entire war, setting the stage for further escalation and turmoil in Greece.