Casting Through Ancient Greece
Casting Through Ancient Greece
Bonus: Sparta's About Turn (Patreon)
his is a teaser of the bonus episode, "Sparta's About Turn" found over on Patreon.
The precarious Greek alliance against Persia hung by the thinnest of threads in 479 BCE. After watching Athens burn twice while Sparta refused to march beyond the safety of the Peloponnese, Athenian patience had run out. When their final delegation arrived in Sparta, they delivered what amounted to an ultimatum: stand with us against Persia, or we may have no choice but to negotiate on our own.
Behind Sparta's reluctance lay a complex web of motivations – their preference for defensive warfare, religious observances, fears of helot rebellion, and the delicate politics of their Peloponnesian alliance. While Athens had twice rejected Persian offers that included autonomy and even dominance over other Greeks, Sparta remained fixated on the defense of the isthmus wall. What changed?
Something remarkable happened within Spartan leadership. Whether driven by strategic necessity, emergence of leaders like Pausanias, or the stark realization that Athens might actually defect, Sparta suddenly mobilized on an unprecedented scale. Five thousand Spartiates marched forth, each accompanied by seven helots, joined by another five thousand perioeci. As they moved north, other Greek cities rallied to the cause, transforming a fractured resistance into the largest Greek army ever assembled.
This pivotal moment represents more than just military history – it captures a rare instance when bitter rivals Athens and Sparta found common purpose. Their brief alliance, forged in crisis, would determine not just the outcome of the Persian invasion, but shape the cultural and political landscape of the ancient Mediterranean for centuries to come.
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Hello everyone and welcome back to another bonus episode here on Patreon where this time we will look at the about turn Sparta would take in the lead up to the Battle of Plataea. Last bonus episode, we looked at the idea that a fracture in the Hellenic League had now taken place. We had seen through the main series and here in the bonus episodes that through the Second Persian Invasion there were many times where it seemed that the unity of the League was at a breaking point, though it would manage to stay intact. This unity was threatened mainly due to the policy disagreements that the League members had in regards to the defence of Greece. Basically, the Peloponnesians had been in favour of falling back into the Peloponnese and mounting a defence at the narrow point of the Corinthian Isthmus. Those members outside of the Peloponnese were in favour of meeting the Persians as far north as possible to prevent their territories being invaded. One of the biggest reasons that the Hellenic League would stay united and not retreat back into the Peloponnese was due to the fleet being of major importance to the campaign, Since Athens had the majority of the fleet's strength. This would see the Peloponnesians holding their positions outside the Peloponnese. When push came to shove would see the Peloponnesians holding their positions outside the Peloponnese. When push came to shove, however, with Salamis I and the Persian fleet being effectively wiped out, the fleet no longer held the importance it had.
Speaker 1:In the eyes of the Peloponnesians, the land forces were now the main arm that was going to win the war. This is what we basically saw take hold last episode. The Peloponnesians had withdrawn back to their homes and were now very reluctant to march back out and meet the Persian army, now left under the command of Mardonius. Although tensions would rise between the Persians and Greeks with the coming of the 479 campaigning season, sparta and the other Peloponnesians would not march out. Mardonius would end up marching on Athens and sacking it for the second time in the campaign, after Athens refused their offer to come over to the Persians. Athens would attempt to make the Spartans concerned over the Persian offers and make Sparta act, but Sparta would still remain within the Peloponnese. This episode will pick up the developments where we left them last time, but we will be looking at the diplomatic manoeuvrings as best we can, while we will then attempt to try and explain why Sparta and the other Peloponnesians would seemingly decide to march out of the Peloponnese suddenly, in great strength to engage with the Persians.
Speaker 1:Last episode we saw that Athens a number of times had attempted to get the Spartans to act and have their army march into Boeotia. They'd even allowed the Spartans to think it might be possible that Athens might do a deal with Persia, leaving the rest of the League to contend with the war. In the speeches that followed around these talks of concessions with Persia, herodotus tells us that Athens had no intention of accepting any Persian terms, but took the opportunity to scare the Spartans into action. However, even after this, sparta failed to act. This would see Mardonius capture and burn Athens once again while the Athenians made the crossing back over to Salamis. They had again sent representatives to convince Sparta to act, but all that could be guaranteed by the Spartans was that they were prepared to take in Athenian refugees. So here we need to try and gain an understanding of why Sparta would fail to act at every turn before we move on to why they would suddenly alter their stance.
Speaker 1:Perhaps the first point we can look at is Sparta's preference for defensive warfare and their reliance on the wall on the Corinthian isthmus. Here we have seen that all through the Persian invasion so far the Spartans had been hesitant in engaging the Persians far forward in Greek territory At every turn when, on the eve of battle with the Persian forces, they, along with the other Peloponnesians, had argued for the League to fall back. They, along with the other Peloponnesians, had argued for the League to fall back. We even saw when the decision to send an army to Thermopylae, the Spartans were very cautious in sending their full army that far north into Greece. Only a small force of 300 men would accompany the other Greeks. The wall on the Corinthianism was also another point they often brought up in their talks over the League strategy, this also featuring before Xerxes had ended Greek lands. However, no matter how heated the debates had become, even with the imminent mutiny on the Evisalamus, the League would remain intact outside the Peloponnese. Now, though, with the Persian fleet defeated, the situation in the eyes of the Peloponnesians had changed.
Speaker 1:Our next consideration to try and help explain the delay comes to internal issues in Sparta, such as around religious considerations, concerns around revolts and even diplomatic reasons within the Peloponnesian League. We have seen previously, sparta had used the excuse of religious festivals to not march out and become involved in warfare. The most famous example of this was 10 years earlier, before the Battle of Marathon. We know the Spartans were extremely pious and seemed to have taken religious matters more seriously than other Greek cities, so it is possible that this was also a consideration. Around this time, as we had seen during one of the later Athenian delegations, it was noted the Spartans were celebrating the Canaea festival. The Spartans may have also had to take into account possible discontent within their own territory with the helot population. They appear to have always been wary of sending all their fighting men out of the region, as this might encourage the slave population to attempt to rise up. While it is also possible Sparta might have to contend with the concerns of the other members within the Peloponnesian League over marching away from home, it seems all of the Peloponnesians would need to be on the same page with their decisions, otherwise this could risk fracturing the Peloponnesian League and undermine Sparta. So, as we can see, it may have been these internal issues that had varying degrees of influence on Sparta's decision to delay.
Speaker 1:We also need to address the idea that Sparta was more concerned with the protection of the Peloponnese than with any notion of pan-Hellenic unity. This idea feeds a little into the first point we brought up over being more defensive in nature. It is clear that Sparta viewed the Peloponnese as its primary concern, since they had created a league that looked to preserve their influence in the region. We also need to remember the ancient Greeks didn't see Greece as a unified country, but viewed each city as separate from one another. What concerned a city-state in Greece was their city and the region it existed in. For Sparta, the geography of the Peloponnese provided their territory the best defensive chance of surviving an invasion. The concerns for other cities outside the Peloponnese would only have been a secondary concern, and only if these cities provided an advantage to Sparta's interests, which is what the Athenian fleet had done. But, like we had said, the situation had now changed and perhaps these secondary concerns were no longer as important as they once were.
Speaker 1:As the 479 campaigning season continued and the smoke still lingered over the ruins of Athens sacked for a second time, the Athenians found themselves again in exile across the waters on Salamis. However, this time, the destruction carried with it not only physical devastation, but also the bitter sting of betrayal. The repeated appeals to Sparta had gone unheeded, and now the Athenians had come to a breaking point. What followed would be their most direct and forceful diplomatic effort, yet a final ultimatum to Sparta. Direct and forceful diplomatic effort, yet a final ultimatum to Sparta. Athens would send an embassy to Sparta, this time making it clear their patience had run out. Herodotus preserves this exchange that took place, and in it we hear a sharper tone than had been used in previous delegations.
Speaker 1:The envoys reminded Sparta that Athens had rejected generous offers from Mardonius, who sought to detach them from the Hellenic cause by promising autonomy, the rebuilding of their city and domination over the Greeks. Yet, despite such tempting terms, athens had remained loyal to the cause, even in the face of repeated destruction. Now, however, the envoys warned this loyalty was not guaranteed to last If Sparta and the Peloponnesians continued to sit behind the walls of. The envoys warned, this loyalty was not guaranteed to last If Sparta and the Peloponnesians continued to sit behind the walls of the isthmus while Athens bore the brunt of the Persian advance. They could not be expected to endure alone indefinitely. The implication was clear Either Sparta act or risk losing Athens to Persia, or at the very least see her withdraw from the Hellenic League and fight on in her own way.
Speaker 1:This was not just a diplomatic request. It was a calculated and desperate gambit. The Athenians understood the gravity of the moment. They had refused the Persian terms, but they also knew that another refusal, without any Spartan support, might soon leave them with no choice but to negotiate. This put an immense pressure on Sparta. The idea of a defection by Athens was not merely a strategic blow. It would mean that the largest and most capable naval power in Greece would either be neutralised or, worse, turned against the Hellenic cause.
Speaker 1:Athens' final ultimatum, then, was not simply about compelling military aid. It was a call for Sparta to decide the fate of the entire alliance. Would they let the war be fought, and perhaps lost, in central Greece while they remained behind their walls, or would they finally acknowledge that the Persian threat required a united front beyond the boundaries of the Peloponnese? Sparta, as we shall see next, would at long last begin to stir from its seeming inaction. Whether it was the moral pressure, the geographical ramifications or internal shifts in opinion, something had changed. The ultimatum delivered by Athens would soon be followed by the first signs of movement from the south.
Speaker 1:In the wake of Athens' uncompromising ultimatum, the wheels of decision-making in Sparta finally began to turn Up. To this point, the Spartans had seemed immovable, committed to a strategy of defence within the Peloponnese and reluctant to commit their full force beyond the isthmus. However, something had changed, where once there had been hesitation, now there was resolve. The question becomes why? To begin answering this, we must look at the internal workings of Sparta itself. The Spartan political system was one of dual kingship, but real power often lay with the Ephors and the Gerousia, a body of elders who weighed matters of war and peace. Herodotus provides little detail on the actual deliberations, but it is not unreasonable to suggest that intense debate must have occurred behind closed doors.
Speaker 1:The Athenians' warning, coupled with the visible cost of Spartan inaction, the sacking of Athens would have laid bare the consequences of continued delay. One major concern was likely strategic. If Athens were to make peace with Persia, the balance of power in Greece would shift dramatically. Sparta would lose the naval force that had effectively dictated strategy at Salamis and ensured the cohesion of the Hellenic League. Furthermore, a Persian-aligned Athens, whether through alliance or neutrality, would isolate the Peloponnese and expose it to future attack. The Isthmus Wall, strong though it may have seemed, could not serve as a permanent shield. The enemy had already proven their ability to overcome terrain and resistance alike. Inaction risked eventual destruction, and not just delay.
Speaker 1:In this climate, key figures began to emerge in favour of intervention. Among them was Pausanias, the regent for the young king Lysdarchus and a member of the royal agiate house. Pausanias is somewhat of an enigmatic figure in Herodotus' account, but what is clear is that he would eventually take command of the Hellenic land forces. His assumption of leadership may suggest he was already advocating for decisive action during the debates. Whether motivated by genuine Pan-Hellenic sentiment, personal ambition or political calculation, pausanias would become the face of Sparta's military response.
Speaker 1:Relative signs may have also played a role. As we have seen before, the Spartans often delayed action due to religious observations or unfavourable omens. It is entirely possible that a shift in the interpretation of divine signs, perhaps an oracle or sacrifice that now favoured war, tipped the scales. If the Carneia festival had passed and no other major hurdles remained, the Spartans would have found fewer justifications for an action. Additionally, pressure from within the Peloponnesian League itself may have contributed. While Sparta led the League, it still had to maintain the confidence of its allies. With the Persian threat now so clearly affecting the balance of the Greek affairs, other Peloponnesian members may have been urging action, especially if they feared being seen as cowards or losing influence to more proactive states like Athens.
Speaker 1:Ultimately, sparta would make the decision to march. Not only would they act, they would do so in a manner that shocked other observers. Rather than sending a token force or limited expedition, they mobilised what Herodotus describes as the largest Greek army yet assembled. While precise numbers are debated among modern historians, the symbolic weight of the force was unmistakable. Sparta had committed itself and in doing so signaled to the rest of Greece that the final reckoning with Persia would not take place behind the walls, but on the fields of Boeotia. This decision marked a turning point not just in the campaign, but in the fragile alliance holding the Hellenic League together. What had once seemed fractured now began to take shape again as a unified front.
Speaker 1:With Sparta's decision made and mobilisation underway, events began to unfold rapidly. For the first time since the outbreak of the invasion, the Spartans would commit a full force to the operations outside the Peloponnese. It was a moment that must have lifted the spirits of many among the allied cities, especially Athens, who had grown increasingly frustrated with the Peloponnesian inaction. Sparta's move now promised a more united Greek front, something that had seemed perilously close to collapse mere weeks earlier. The army that now marched north out of the Peloponnese was, according to Herodotus, the largest Greek force yet assembled. The Spartans themselves contributed 5,000 Spartiites, each accompanied by seven helots, alongside a further 5,000 perioeci, free but non-citizen inhabitants of Spartan territory.
Speaker 1:The presence of such a substantial helot contingent was unusual, but likely necessary to support logistics and reinforce numbers. This in itself shows the seriousness with which Sparta was now approaching the campaign. As the Spartan host made its way northward, it would be joined by other Peloponnesian allies, each bringing their own contingents. Corinth, tegir and other cities had earlier advocated for defence within the Isthmus, now aligned themselves behind Sparta's initiative. The very movement of this army helped galvanise further contributions. Even cities that had wavered or remained hesitant earlier now began to commit forces, seeing a genuine opportunity to drive the Persians out once and for all.
Speaker 1:The logistical effort behind this march must have been immense. While sources disperse on the specifics, moving such a large and diverse coalition force would have required careful coordination, particularly given the varied priorities and military traditions of the participating city-states. The ability of the Hellenic League to function in such circumstances speaks to the remarkable achievement in cooperation and in an otherwise fragmented Greek world. As they advanced, the Greek army would eventually coordinate with the Athenians and central Greek forces already in motion, the Athenians and central Greek forces already in motion. The Athenians, who had borne the brunt of the Persian aggression and twice seen their city occupied and sacked, were now eager to reassert themselves on the field.
Speaker 1:Despite the tensions of previous weeks, athens and Sparta were now, at least for the moment, aligned in purpose. Their forces would rendezvous in central Greece where they would now begin planning for the decisive confrontation. This unity forged through crisis would prove to be one of the greatest strengths of the Greek cause. While old rivalries and suspicions lingered just beneath the surface for the time being, a greater threat had brought them together. The Hellenic League was once again on the move, not retreating, not entrenching, but advancing.
Speaker 1:The decision of Sparta to finally march out in full strength marked not only a shift in military strategy, but a critical turning point in the fragile unity of the Greek alliance. For much of the campaign, the relationship between Athens and Sparta had been strained, marked by mutual suspicion, differing strategic priorities and a fundamental divergence in world view. Yet it was at this point, when the fate of Athens hung in the balance and the very future of Greek independence was at stake, these two leading powers found a measure of common cause, while Sparta would provide the leadership and military muscle of the land campaign to come. It must be recognised that it was Athens' persistence, diplomacy and strategic leverage that ultimately compelled action. Time and again, athens had appealed to the greater cause in framing the conflict not merely as a defence of territory, but a struggle for the survival of Greek freedom. Their refusal to accept Persian overtures, even when their own city lay in ruins, underscores a commitment that forced the hand of their more reluctant allies. Without Athenian resolve, the Hellenic League may very well have fractured, leaving the Greek world divided and vulnerable.
Speaker 1:This movement, then, stands as more than just a prelude to the Battle of Plataea. It represents a brief but significant evolution in the relationship between Athens and Sparta, two city-states whose rivalry would one day dominate Greek history. Here, though, they stood aligned. Their combined efforts pointed towards a decisive confrontation with the invader. As we look ahead, the coming clash at Plataea promises to be the culmination of years of conflict and shifting allegiances. It will be a battle not just for territory but for the legacy of resistance, for the preservation of autonomy and for the fragile idea of Greek unity. Though the outcome remains to be explored, the decisions made in the lead up to the battle have already shaped the course of the war and the future of the Greek world. Thank you all for your continued support here on Patreon. I greatly appreciate it. I hope you look forward to next month's episode where we will deal with some questions around what took place at the Battle of Patea.