Casting Through Ancient Greece
Casting Through Ancient Greece
95: The Battle of Mantinea
The battlefield at Mantinea in 418 BC witnessed one of the most consequential clashes of the Peloponnesian War, a moment when Sparta's reputation hung in the balance. Following years of diplomatic erosion and military hesitation, King Agis led a massive Spartan force north to confront a growing coalition threatening to unravel Sparta's entire alliance system.
What unfolded on that plain near Tegea wasn't merely a battle of spears and shields, but a collision of political visions for Greece. Alcibiades' ambitious strategy of isolating Sparta through diplomatic maneuvering had gained dangerous momentum. Even Tegea, Sparta's original partner in founding the Peloponnesian League, was considering changing allegiance. For Sparta, defeat would mean watching their carefully constructed hegemony crumble; victory might restore the respect their recent failures had squandered.
The battle itself reveals fascinating insights into ancient warfare and leadership. As the armies advanced toward each other—Spartans moving deliberately to flute music, Argives charging with fury—King Agis attempted a complex battlefield maneuver that nearly spelled disaster. The gap that opened in the Spartan line was exploited by elite Argive troops, while some Spartan commanders refused to execute orders they deemed too risky. This moment of crisis tested not just Spartan discipline but the very nature of battlefield command.
Ultimately, Sparta's victory transformed the political landscape. Argos was forced back into the Peloponnesian League, with Spartan garrisons installed and democratic institutions replaced by oligarchy. Athens saw its strategic opportunities in the Peloponnese vanish. Yet despite its immediate significance, Mantinea didn't fundamentally alter the war's trajectory—the stalemate between Athenian naval power and Spartan land dominance persisted for another decade. What the battle truly represents is Sparta's remarkable capacity to recover from adversity when its traditions and position were most threatened. Listen as we explore this pivotal moment when the fate of Greece hung in the balance.
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As Thucydides observed, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must, a reality nowhere more clearly demonstrated than at Mantinea in 418 BC. In his account, he regarded the encounter as the greatest that had occurred for a very long while among the Hellenes, where Sparta reasserted its dominance with ritual and restraint alike, even returning the enemy dead under truce. Hello, I'm Mark Selick and welcome back to Castings for Ancient Greece, episode 95, the Battle of Mantinea. In our previous episode, we explored the growing instability in the Greek world following the uneasy peace of Nicias. Although the treaty technically remained in place, its foundations had long been eroded. Rather than curbing hostilities, the foundations had long been eroded. Rather than curbing hostilities, the peace had become a diplomatic fig leaf concealing continued maneuvering and rising antagonism on both sides. At the centre of this escalation was Ausopiades, the ambitious and charismatic Athenian statesman whose bold vision sought to redraw the balance of power in the Peloponnese. He turned his efforts towards isolating Sparta by attacking its network of allies, particularly targeting Corinth and aligning more closely with Argos. Alcibiades' strategy was not without success. Sparta found itself increasingly on the defensive, compelled to respond without appearing to break the peace outright. Corinth was diplomatically cornered, while the Argive alliance, with Athenian support, pressed its advantage. Sparta's response, led by King Agis, was cautious at first. Despite mobilising a large force, agis avoided direct battle with the Argives, even when he had them surrounded in a position of clear advantage. Instead, he negotiated a sudden and unauthorised truce, one that deeply angered Sparta's allies and left the Argive Democratic Assembly feeling betrayed. Far from stabilising the region, the truce only served to deepen divisions and fan the flames of resentment. Alcibiades wasted no time capitalising on this discontent. Through persuasive diplomacy and public rhetoric, he reignited the anti-Spartan cause within the Argive League, ensuring that hostilities resumed before the truce had a chance to take hold. While Argos itself hesitated to openly break the agreement, its allies continued military preparations and Athenian support remained steadfast.
Speaker 2:As the campaigning season of 418 BC progressed, the stage was set for open conflict. Sparta now faced mounting pressure from within and without prepared to reassert its authority through force, agis, seeing to redeem his earlier failure and silence his critics, once again led the Spartan army northward, this time with determination to engage the Argives in open battle. This brings us to the Battle of Mantinea, one of the most pivotal and consequential land engagements up to this point in the Peloponnesian War. What took place on the plains near Mantinea was not just a clash of hoplites, but a collision of ideologies, alliances and reputations. For Sparta, it was an opportunity to restore its lost prestige and discipline among its wavering allies. For Argos, athens and their coalition, it was a chance to prove that the old order could be challenged and that Sparta's grip on the Peloponnese was no longer unshakable. In today's episode, we will trace the final moves leading to the battle, examine the composition and tactics of the opposing forces and follow the course of the fight itself. We'll also explore the far-reaching consequences that followed, how the single day of battle shaped the political and military landscape of Greece for years to come.
Speaker 2:We finished last episode with the city-state of Tigeia threatening to abandon the Peloponnesian League and ally themselves with Argos. For Sparta, this would be a huge blow to their credibility within the League. The past year had been one that would not have filled their allies with confidence. Athens had been able to lead a coalition of forces through the Peloponnese unopposed, which was threatening Sparta's allies. Then, when Sparta did get their army in the field, they failed to act decisively on a number of occasions. Then another ally of theirs, orchomenus, had fallen to the Argive League, this seeing a vitally important strategic location in the Peloponnese connecting a number of allies to Sparta, disappear. This new threat now emerging in Tigea, where factions within the city were looking to alter their diplomatic stance based on their evolving situation in the Peloponnese, would be a further blow that could possibly make it difficult for Sparta to recover. Tigea had been the city-state that Sparta had originally created the Peloponnesian League with. If they left, then this could have irreversible effects on the foundations of the League, effects on the foundations of the League Plus. It probably isn't too hard to imagine that if these debates on alliances were taking place in Tigea, others were also probably entertaining the idea.
Speaker 2:However, agis now had an opportunity to regain his reputation within Sparta. Acting with authority and in a decisive manner, he would lead one of the largest Spartan armies yet seen, mobilised. Thucydides would say lead one of the largest Spartan armies yet seen, mobilised. Thucydides would say Upon this news, a force marched out from Sparta of Spartans and helots and all their people, immediately and upon a scale never before witnessed. We are not entirely certain of the exact numbers here, but Thucydides appears to be referring to the Spartiites, who made up the backbone of the army, while when speaking of the helots, it becomes clear that many who had been freed due to their past services would be in this group, with it also reasonable to expect many still enslaved helots marching, as we had seen before. When speaking of all the people, he is probably referring to others such as the perioche, who were free but without citizen rights, to others such as the Perioeci, who were free but without citizen rights.
Speaker 2:As the Spartans made preparations for the assembly of the army, messengers had also gone out to their allies to converge on Tigeia. The Spartan army marched north and instructed the Arcadians to follow after them onto Tigeia, while the other allies, such as the Corinthians, the Oceans, phakaeains and Locrians, had only short notice of the campaign. Due to the distance the messengers had to travel, their instructions were to assemble and march for Mantinea as quickly as they could possibly do so. However, these allies would also have the hindrance of being cut off from the Spartans due to the fall of Aquamanis, which lay in the path of their march towards the objective, while they were also probably still annoyed at the indecisive nature of their previous campaigns. Agis with his Spartan army would link up with the Arcadians and had entered the territory of Mantinea, just north of Tigao, where they would establish a camp. With their camp in place right near the Temple of Heracles, they began plundering and ravaging the surrounding areas, taking what they could and denying supplies and resources to their enemies.
Speaker 2:Agis could expect to face an army of similar size as to the one he had faced the previous year at Argos. While he also had a similar size force in the field, his numbers were increased by the Arcadians and those at Tigeia, though he was still going to be outnumbered or on par with the Argive League unless his allies from the north could arrive in a timely manner. At some stage during the march, agus had sent back home the oldest and youngest of the Spartan army to defend Sparta. It appears he may have arrived at this decision after learning of the Spartan army to defend Sparta. It appears he may have arrived at this decision after learning of the Elans having fallen out with the Argive League regarding where an attack should be directed. This would see them march their 3,000 troops off to Leprium. This measure by Agus was to provide some security to Sparta, since Leprium was on the border. Plus, sparta was always nervous of leaving their territory unguarded with such a large helipopulation, though troop numbers were not the only concern he had to worry about. The morale of the army and that of his allies were probably at a low point, this being due to the lack of confidence Agis would have surely held within all the ranks.
Speaker 2:We have recently covered his campaigns, where he failed on a number of occasions to have taken decisive action. But this behaviour could be seen even before the peace of Nicias had come into being. Agis had led the Peloponnesian army into Attica on two occasions during the Archidamian phase of the war. On the first attempt, an earthquake had seen him abandon the campaign, while on the second, lack of provisions, storms and the threat of Pylos had seen him withdraw back into the Peloponnese. So in the eyes of his men and his allies he had yet to prove himself in battle. So far they had just seen him withdraw whenever he was faced with adversity, when a decisive decision had to be made. We'd also covered last episode how the Spartan government had misgivings about Agus as a leader in the field but had given him what appears to be one last chance to prove himself. They appear to have still gone with Agus to lead the army, as Plastionax would still have been unacceptable to many in Sparta, given his pro-peace stance and him being discredited in the past. Though to prevent seeing a repeat of the last two campaigns, ten advisers were sent with Agus to assist in decision making. Given the points we had just raised about concerns over Agus, we find he now faced a strategic dilemma in how to proceed with the campaign. Donald Kagan outlines this in his book the Peloponnesian War. The campaign. Donald Kagan outlines this in his book the Peloponnesian War.
Speaker 2:In undertaking the campaign, agus faced a tricky strategic problem. He had to get to Tigea as soon as possible to prevent a coup, but after his arrival he would have to wait at least a week for the arrival of the northern contingent, while in the meantime being forced to confront a larger enemy army. A different Spartan leader could choose to stay within the walls of Tigea and refuse battle until his allies appeared, allowing the enemy to ravage the Tigean land, destroying farmhouses, approach the city and hurl accusations of cowardice at the Spartans and their commander. But Agis could not afford to convey even the slightest hint that he was afraid to fight, because he knew he would face superior numbers. He also was forced to risk taking the entire Spartan army with him, leaving Sparta itself undefended at the time when the Mycenaeans were perched at Pylos, threatening to launch a rebellion of the helots, with the Spartans now establishing camp at Mantinean territory with their allies, the Argive Alliance would move to counter Aegis' army. They positioned themselves on ground that would be difficult to approach across from the Spartans, with the Argive League taking up battle positions. Aegis would arrange for his army to advance on the enemy enemy.
Speaker 2:Here we get the view from Thucydides that Aegis was acting in a rash manner, influenced by the harm done to his reputation back in Sparta and amongst Sparta's allies. From Thucydides' account, we are told that the Spartans were outnumbered at this stage and the Argyres were in a well-defended location. This, highlighting an attack on the Argyre position, would not be a smart move. Thucydides provides us an antidote to highlight this point. The Spartans immediately advanced against them and came up as close as a stone's throw or javelin's cast. At this point, one of the older men in the army, seeing that they were advancing against such a strong position, shouted out to Agis that he was trying to cure one evil with another, meaning by this that he was wanting to make up for the retreat from Argos for which he had been blamed, by now courting danger at the wrong time Agus would hold his army and have them withdraw back to their starting positions before they became engaged with the Argives. Thucydides does mention that it isn't clear if Agus was influenced by the old man's advice or had come to this decision on his own initiative. Whatever the reason, aegis was now aware the position that the Argives held provided them too much of a defensive advantage.
Speaker 2:The Spinozzi-Aegis looked for a way to dislodge them from their position so they could be engaged on more favourable terms. At some point during Aegis being in the territory of Mantinea, he had recognised that a battle was likely to result. He, or his advisors, now saw it was in the army's best interest to recall the troops Agis had sent back to Sparta. On their march to Mantinea, a message was sent back requesting King Plastionax to return with his troops to reinforce the Spartans. A river ran through Mantinea that then continued on through Tigea, and this same river had been the source of many disagreements between the two over their history. Agis would now use this river as a strategy to try and force the Argives from their position. He now took measures to divert the flow so that the supply of water would no longer feed into Tigea.
Speaker 2:However, from Thucydides' account. It doesn't appear that it was this operation around the diverting the rivers course that saw the Argos leave their defensive position, but rather internal disagreements between the men and their generals. The previous year we had seen that the Argos had been extremely frustrated with their commanders for allowing the Spartans to withdraw from outside Argos without a battle. They now saw a similar situation with the withdrawal that also had just taken place. We hear that they were astonished that the Spartans had come so close while they were in battle order and then allowed to fall back in their own time without any sort of pursuit. This pressure that was now coming from the men would see the commanders take the decision to leave their position and march down into the plains towards the Spartans, who were now out of sight. They would establish themselves a new camp in level ground and had the intention of advancing onto the Spartans' position.
Speaker 2:The next day, after Agus had completed operations on diverting the river in the area, he advanced his army back in the direction of Tigea to await the Argives' advance. However, as the Spartans went forward, agis was surprised to learn that the Argives had already advanced from their defensive position and were much closer than he had anticipated. It appears the terrain in the area had allowed the Argives to gain warning of the Spartan approach, as they would form up in battle order right where Agis would emerge, while the lay of the land would see that the Spartans had very little time to work with once seeing the enemy to arrange their battle line. However, this is where the Spartans held an advantage, with the discipline of their troops, along with the command structure stretching from the king downward. Orders were given out and were enacted with great efficiency and without any panic setting in. The result would be that now two armies roughly the same strength stood arranged in battle order in closest proximity to one another.
Speaker 2:The opportunity had now been presented to Agus to make up for his hesitation and lack of action over the previous years. He now had no excuse to not engage the enemy. They had left the ground that had seen him abort his initial attack, and they now no longer held an advantage over him, with both armies now standing in battle formations across from one another. The Argives had not attempted to charge the Spartans as they emerged from the wooded areas in column formations. Perhaps they were worried that this may have forced the Spartans to retreat into the broken ground where a decisive battle was unlikely to result.
Speaker 2:The Argive commanders were under great pressure to perform and give battle after their efforts at the previous engagements. Under great pressure to perform and give battle after their efforts of the previous engagements. However, now lined up ready to fight, the Argive League would see those with the most invested in their region taking up positions on the honoured right flank of this battle line. This saw the Mantineans on the far right of the line, with the other Arcadians next to them. These troops were basically fighting for their own territory territory and seen as the main leading force for the offensive and inter-defensive action. To also supplement the role of the right was the specially trained thousand strong elite Argives Making up the rest of the line. We see the main force of Argives in the center, while the left was made up of some smaller allies, with the Athenians who had recently arrived, bringing up the extreme left flank, where they also deployed the cavalry that they had brought with them. Opposing the Argive League Agis' force, who had been hastily formed into battle line, had the Scurite on their left operating as their own independent unit, this being the traditional role when part of a Spartan army Making up the main bulk of the Spartan left would be the Spartan troops, who had been the soldiers who had made up Brasidas' force in Thrace, with the helots who had also earned their freedom next to them.
Speaker 2:The centre of the line was then taken up by the different regiments of the main Spartan force. Following on from the main Spartan contingent was then the Arcadians allied to Sparta. Following on from the main Spartan contingent was then the Arcadians allied to Sparta. Making up the Spartan right was the Tigeans, who were given the right flank, given that they were fighting on their home territory. However, as the right was always seen as a position of honour in the battle line, the Spartans would have a small token force taking up the extreme right of the position, since this was a Spartan led army.
Speaker 2:Thucydides then goes on to tell us that the Spartan side looked the largest of the two armies, though this observation must have come from eyewitness accounts, since he was not present. Before going on to give his estimates of the size of the armies, he tells us that coming to a definite figure is difficult as the Spartans were secretive on their arrangements, while the figures of the Argive League, he says, could not be trusted as men are so apt to brag about the forces of their country that they could not be trusted the way Thucydides words. This paragraph suggests he is writing from the point of view of the Spartans. Thucydides then goes to give us his estimate of the Spartan-led force, based off of the known information he had of who was present, and the usual estimate of the Spartan-led force. Based off of the known information he had of who was present and the usual numbers of the formations, he would come to a figure of around 9,000 fighting men. While he doesn't give a figure of the Argive League, modern historians place them at around 8,000 to 9,000 strong. With both armies now drawn up in battle formation.
Speaker 2:The men were prepared mentally on both sides for the coming clash. The Argive League spoke directly to the Mantineans, encouraging them to fight for their country. Their actions would determine if they would keep their power in their land or be subjected to slavery. Their position in the Peloponnesian hierarchy would be elevated and restored to its heights of the past. The generals also addressed the Athenians, pointing out the glory that they would win by supporting their allies of the Peloponnese and defeating their traditional enemy, the Spartans. This would cement their power and security in the Greek world. On the other side, it would appear, the Spartans opted for less dramatic speeches in front of the army, where Thucydides tells us. On the other side, it would appear the Spartans opted for less dramatic speeches in front of the army, where Thucydides tells us Realising that the long discipline of action is a more effective safeguard than the hurried speeches, however well they may be delivered. Both sides were now ready for the clash that had for so many times failed to take place. This time around, however, one of the greatest battles of the Peloponnesian War to date would be fought.
Speaker 2:The Assyrius describes to us the opening stage of the battle, with both sides advancing on one another. The contrast in how they moved forward couldn't be any more different from one another. The Argive League, we are told, advanced with great violence and fury, while the Spartans came on slowly with the sounds of their flutes playing, keeping everyone in time. It appears here Thucydides is pointing out the disciplined nature of the Spartans as opposed to the other armies in the field. We also need to keep in mind Thucydides, at this stage, had been exiled from Athens and appears to have had a closer relationship to what was happening in Sparta During this advance.
Speaker 2:Thucydides also gives us insight into a movement common to just about all hoplite battles. We have previously brought up how hoplite armies tend to drift to the right due to the natural inclination of self-preservation. If you recall, when a hoplite holds their shield, they do so in a manner that protects the man to his left. However, this leaves the man on the extreme right of the battle line exposed, as he has no neighbour to his right. This then finds this man pulling the rest of the line of the battle to the right as he looks to avoid confronting the left flank of the enemy. The rest of the line then follows, as they do not want to be without the protection of the shield from the man to their right.
Speaker 2:Thucydides seems to detail the right drift on this particular occasion, as it appears to have been more dramatic than other battles. It tells us that the Mantineans overlapped the Spartan left considerably, even though the Spartan line was longer, this indicating that the Spartans had pulled their battle line to the right quite a way. However, due to this and the Spartan line being longer, agus was able to recognise the threat to his left wing being outflanked. He could then afford to redeploy a contingent of his troops to see that this overlap was now met with a line of troops. This redeployment was complex, however.
Speaker 2:Although the Spartans were renowned to carrying out difficult manoeuvres, they had a number of factors working against them. Firstly, not all those redeploying were Spartan troops. Also, this redeployment was ordered at very short notice and on the move. The result would see a hole in the Spartan line open up as those towards the left flank began moving to the far left. Those on the right who had been ordered to fill the gap failed to carry out the maneuver. With this, it is indicating the commanders of these elements were hesitant to maneuver, being so close to engaging the enemy and therefore placing themselves in a vulnerable position. These commanders would later be exalted from Sparta with the charge of cowardice for their failure to carry out their orders. However, there was just enough time for those who had made the initial move to start to fill back in the gap that had been created.
Speaker 2:This debacle on the move would see, once the lines clashed, the Spartans left would initially be defeated. As Agus had feared. There was still a weak point where the gap had been created, as it had not been fully filled. The Mantineans, with their allies and the picked Argive troops, exploited this point. These two actions on the left would see the Argives begin surrounding part of the Spartan army, where they would inflict many casualties on them as they attempted to fall back under the pressure.
Speaker 2:In this early stage, the Spartan left had been defeated. However, the Spartan right and the centre where Agis was located held firm. We hear that in the centre, the 300 Spartan knights, those Spartan hoplites who acted as the king's bodyguard, would fall upon the older elements of the Argives, as well as others, such as the Athenians, stationed next to them. Thucydides says that this part of the Argive line was put to flight, with many not even being able to take the initial shock of combat. This now saw the Athenians being closed in on all directions. Part of their line had already been defeated and the rest were about to be surrounded. However, the Athenians were saved from the complete disaster on account of two factors, one being the assistance from their cavalry providing in harassing the enemy bearing down on them, while Agis would also redirect this part of the battle line to go to the relief of his defeated left.
Speaker 2:This order would allow the Mantineans, their allies and the Athenians to escape the fate that was sure to overtake them if this battle continued as it was the victorious Mantineans and Argives, seeing that the rest of their line had been defeated and they were now coming under threat on their flank, stopped their continued assault on the Spartan left. They were now in exposed position and had begun to retreat. It seems the Mantineans were the closest to the new threat as they would suffer a great deal of casualties, but we hear the Argive Rite was mostly able to escape being surrounded and destroyed. The Spartans followed up the retreating troops but did not pursue them for too long. With this the Battle of Mantinea had been decided and it was an overwhelming victory for the Spartans. Thucydides says it was certainly the greatest battle that had taken place for a very long time among the Hellene states. It was no confusing who had won the battle. The Spartans were able to take up a position in front of the enemy dead, this showing that they held control of the field of battle. They erected a trophy and stripped the dead of their armour. To further cement this, the Argive League had to negotiate an armistice so as to collect their fallen. The final tally of those killed in the fighting, thucydides tells us of 1,100 falling on the Argive League's side, while he says the losses on the Spartan side were hardly worth mentioning, though he does admit it was hard to find out the exact numbers. He gives us a figure of 300 that he says was floating around at the time.
Speaker 2:So, with the battle now won, here I want to touch on the decisions that Agus had made during the fighting. I'm going to draw on the ideas that Donald Kagan brings up, as they do make some sense given the performance we have seen of Agus in previous years on campaign. The first has to do with his orders of manoeuvring the battle line while it was on the move to engage the enemy. This had seen a gap open up, while then another contingent was also ordered to move out from this formation. Kagan argues that these orders highlight his inexperience in battle. Kagan points out that it was normal for an army to drift to the right, as we have touched on earlier. He continues that Agus, seeing this, may have panicked and looked to correct what was happening, but risked disorganising his entire battle line. But, like we pointed out, the right drift may have also been much more dramatic than what was usual in a hoplite battle. However, it was also noted that there was no other example in a hoplite battle where these types of orders were issued before.
Speaker 2:Kagan also highlights that the two Spartan commanders who disobeyed Agus's orders could have in fact, saved the Spartans from a defeat. As we covered, they would be exiled, having been charged with cowardice, but in reality they were being punished for disobeying orders from the king. The cowardice charge would have been added to the punishment, as no Spartan would want to be known as a coward. However, their decision to ignore the orders fits in with Agus' lack of experience. These commanders would have recognised the situation before them and knew that attempting to carry out such a manoeuvre while advancing to meet the enemy would have most likely spelled disaster for their entire battle line.
Speaker 2:As the battle did begin, we saw the gap that had been opened up was exploited by the Argive League. If more had been created to respond to the first, then it would have been very possible. There would have been a number of vulnerable points along the Spartan line that could be exploited. This would have significantly increased the chances that the entire Spartan line would fall into disarray. However, with the commanders keeping their troops on the advance and ignoring Agus, they were able to see that the majority of the battle line held firm. There was only one weak point and, due to the rest of the line being in position, they were able to respond to it after defeating the forces they'd opposed them. They were able to respond to it after defeating the forces that had opposed them.
Speaker 2:The last point that I want to touch on that Kagan brings up has to do with Agas's orders when the main part of the Argive line was defeated. Instead of letting his right finish off the defeated Mantineans and Athenians, he ordered them to move to assist the left of his line that had retreated and was still under assault from the enemy On face value. From a military's perspective, it would make sense to give these orders, since he would want to preserve his own troops, remembering here every Spartiite was extremely valuable to the Spartan state. However, kagan also points out political reasons for making this order that might have come into Aegis' or his advisors' thinking. Technically, sparta and the Athenians were still at peace, even though they had just faced them at battle. The thinking here was that if Sparta destroyed the Athenian contingent, then those allied with Athens would have more fuel to convince Athens to take a more aggressive stance towards Sparta and perhaps even officially recommence hostilities, though if restraint was shown, then perhaps the Athenians would continue to take a moderate stance towards the Sparta, allowing them more time to rebuild their prestige on the Peloponnese.
Speaker 2:So Sparta had won the biggest battle fought during the Peloponnesian War so far and had done it without its usual host of allies. They did still have some from the Peloponnese present, but those larger allies, such as Corinth and their allies from beyond the Isthmus, had not been present when it seemed likely that a battle was going to eventuate. It appears that these allies were still on the march but, as we saw, they had only been given minimal time to get their forces on the move. The other Spartan king, plastinex, had also set back out from Sparta with his own force of younger and older men who had initially been sent back to guard against other possible threats. However, the battle would end up taking place before any of these reinforcements could make it to Agis. When news of the victory reached those on the march, they halted and turned back to their respective cities, the timing on the victory, meaning all those Dorians were able to return and disband their armies just in time for the Carnea festival to be celebrated. This victory did wonders to the reputation of Sparta in the eyes of its allies.
Speaker 2:Thucydides writes Although the Battle of Mantinea had taken place and been won by the Spartans, the political negotiations had yet taken place. Once the celebrations of the Carneia had finished, the Spartans brought their army back together and marched out to Dagea and sent off to Argos proposals for an accommodation. This action was done to remind Argos that Sparta was victorious and would once again go into action should negotiations be avoided or fail. Thucydides points out that the elite in Argos, who were in more favour of oligarchy and, by extension, friendlier to Sparta, were now more influential after the battle. This would see that any terms set forth by Sparta could have a better chance at being accepted, with these men being able to convince the people to follow. Thucydides also tells us that the aristocrats of Argos had plans to make a treaty with Sparta, followed up with an alliance, and then attempt to remove the democratic faction within Argos. Two proposals governing the peace terms were sent by Sparta, where they allowed them to pick the one they preferred.
Speaker 2:After the terms for beginning negotiations were sorted, sparta returned home and it was left to diplomatic measures to come to terms of peace. After these proceedings were followed through, the following was agreed to between Sparta and Argos Argos would accept a peace with Sparta, ending the competition between the two on the Peloponnese. This would also see Argos come back into the Peloponnesian League, effectively making them allies with Sparta once again. The constant hostility between the two traditional rivals would come to an end. For now, although this peace and alliance came into being, sparta was well aware of the history between the two cities. To ensure that the alliance would remain in effect, the Spartans would have garrisons stationed within the Argos citadel.
Speaker 2:Loyalty often needs to be backed up with a threat of consequences if not adhered to. The political system that had existed in Argos was more inclined with the threat of consequences if not adhered to. The political system that had existed in Argos was more inclined, with the ideals of Athens both being of democratic followings, to see that Argos would now align in more ideals and policies as Sparta. Measures were taken to see that the oligarchy became the dominant mode of government. Obviously, it was also ensured that those in Argos who had interests in this style of governing also had pro-Spartan leanings. The terms that were finally agreed on would technically see Argos an autonomous city-state, making decisions as they wished, though with all the other provisions within and being a member of the Peloponnesian League, it was at the mercy of the overarching decisions by Sparta when it came to policies affecting diplomacy and anything that would affect the relationships between themselves and Sparta. As we have seen, this control Sparta had within the Peloponnesian League would make it difficult for members to break away and act as they wished, while Sparta held a place of respect and authority. We had seen these notions had been tested and cities took the opportunity to make their own alliances, but now, after Mantinea, this respect had returned, making all those within the Peloponnesian League think twice about any plans to revolt.
Speaker 2:The Battle of Mantinea in 418 BC represented a critical moment in the Peloponnesian War, not only for its immediate military outcomes, but also for the political and strategic reverberations it sent across Greece. In the short term, the Spartan victory decisively checked the ambitions of the Argive-Athenian-Mantinean coalition, a rare alliance that had the potential to challenge Spartan authority in the Peloponnese. By defeating this force in a pitch-top-like battle, sparta restored the military reputation it had lost after the humiliation of Pylos and Bacteria, reasserting itself as a dominant land power in Greece. This success strengthened the head of the pro-Spartan faction within Argos, leading to a peace agreement that neutralised a key threat on Sparta's doorstep. For Athens, mantinea closed off opportunities to extend influence into the Peloponnese, forcing a reorganisation of a strategic focus elsewhere.
Speaker 2:Yet for all its immediate gains, mantinea did not fundamentally alter the course of the Peloponnesian War. Gains Mantinea did not fundamentally alter the course of the Peloponnesian War. The structural stalemate between Athenian naval supremacy and Spartan land dominance remained intact and neither side could deliver a decisive blow to end the conflict. While Sparta gained prestige and political breathing space, it failed to translate the victory into a lasting strategic advantage and the war soon shifted to other theatres. Into a lasting strategic advantage and the war soon shifted to other theatres. Mantinea, therefore, is better understood not as a defining turning point, but as a striking demonstration of Sparta's capacity to recover from adversity and reaffirm its military traditions when challenged. Its significance lies in the way it momentarily stabilised the Spartan dominance in the Peloponnese, yet without resolving the deeper tensions and rivalries that would keep the Peloponnesian War burning for nearly another decade.
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