Casting Through Ancient Greece
Casting Through Ancient Greece
97. Sicily, Deciding Disaster
The Sicilian Expedition stands as one of history's most infamous military disasters—a bold gamble that crippled Athenian power and ultimately sealed their fate in the Peloponnesian War. But what drove Athens to stake everything on this distant campaign?
When Segesta, a small Sicilian city, came seeking help against their rivals, Athens faced a pivotal choice. Though initially cautious, requesting proof of Segesta's resources and sending scouts to assess the situation, the Athenian assembly's deliberations quickly spiraled beyond simple alliance politics. The real drama unfolded in the clash between two visions of Athens' future: Nicias, the cautious veteran, warning against imperial overreach, and Alcibiades, the brilliant young aristocrat, painting visions of easy conquest and unlimited wealth.
What makes this moment so compelling is how Nicias' attempt to discourage the expedition by demanding excessive resources spectacularly backfired. Rather than deterring the assembly, his warnings only inflamed their ambition. The expedition ballooned from 60 ships to an unprecedented armada of 130 triremes and 5,000 hoplites—transforming a limited intervention into an all-or-nothing gamble on conquest.
Thucydides frames this decision as inevitable tragedy, the product of Athens' unchecked imperial appetite. Yet other ancient writers suggest the expedition wasn't doomed from inception—its failure stemmed from divided leadership, political sabotage, and cruel twists of fortune. This tension between deterministic failure and contingent possibility makes the Sicilian debate a perfect case study in how democracies make catastrophic military decisions despite warning signs.
The expedition's planning reveals deeper truths about Athenian society: their confidence after dominating the Aegean, their hunger for new conquests after the brutal subjugation of Melos, and the factional politics that would soon tear apart their command structure when religious scandals erupted on the eve of departure.
Listen as we explore this pivotal moment when Athens reached beyond its grasp—a decision still studied by military strategists today for its timeless lessons about ambition, overextension, and the dangers of democratic war-making.
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That we are not to sit down with what we have got If we can gain more. Nobody will dispute it is a principle that has made our city great, and that the only limit to our power is the failure of our resources. I say again that a city accustomed to rule and, what is more, accustomed to conquer, must not all of a sudden drop the habit. We are forced to encroach and we must encroach Thucydides. Hello, I'm Mark Selick and welcome back to Casting Through Ancient Greece, episode 97, sicily Deciding Disaster In the Peloponnesian War.
Speaker 1:We're now back at a point where both Athens and Sparta were in the same positions of power when war first broke out. Through the past 15 years, there had been a number of occasions where it appeared one or the other was starting to get the upper hand, while the other was diminishing in power and influence, though the changing events and political situations would often see a reversal in these fortunes, rescuing them from the jaws of defeat. The latest of these reversals had only just occurred where Sparta seemed it was in the worst position militarily and politically since the outbreak of hostilities. It would seem the events at Sphacteria and Pylos had begun to see this decline, though the signing of the Peace of Nicias and not consulting their allies also added, diplomatically, to their troubles, to their troubles. This would end up resulting in the creation of a new league to challenge their authority on the Peloponnese. Further adding to the perception of weakened Spartan strength would be the inaction by King Agus on multiple campaigns. Then, finally, it appeared Sparta was on the cusp of losing their status of a first-rate power when a number of their allies began defecting. However, with Tigea, one of Sparta's oldest allies, threatening to defect, they would be forced into action with a renewed vigour. This would end up seeing King Agis lead his army to the fields of Mantinea, where they would face off against a coalition formed under Argos, with Athens also being present.
Speaker 1:The Battle of Mantinea would be a resounding Spartan victory. However, it did not see a conclusion to the Peloponnesian War. If anything, it would see that the war would continue, as its main effect was to restore Sparta's reputation and prestige, attracting allies back to their league and securing Sparta as a dominant force in the Peloponnese. However, the defeat did not harm Athens enough to cause a reversal in their power and influence. The defeat had caused frustration for Alcibiades, who was trying to push his aggressive policy on the Peloponnese in the hope of delivering the death blow to Sparta. In Athens at this time, though, there were conflicting points of view on policy. The defeat at Mantinea would see that the aggressive policy had to be put on hold, while Nicias attempted to gain support for his moderate policies focusing on recovering lost territory and resources in Thrace. This stalemate in Athenian political manoeuvrings would see the first ostracism in a generation occur, though, rather than one of the opposing faction leaders being exiled, it would be the man proposing the measures to be expelled after Alcibiades and Nicias joined forces momentarily to rid themselves of this common enemy. So the political situation in Athens would remain unchanged, with both still looking to advance their policies.
Speaker 1:While this was unfolding, the Athenians would decide on launching a fresh campaign against the island of Melos, who had still avoided being incorporated into the Athenian Empire, though, in Athens' eyes, benefiting from the security afforded to them. This would end up resulting in the famous Melian Dialogue, presented by Thucydides, where Athens sent envoys to negotiate the city's surrender and the Melians defied them. It would become a stark confrontation between power, politics and ethical principles that continues to influence political thought today. The strong do what they can. The weak must suffer what they must becomes Athens' uncompromising position, as they reject appeals to justice, fairness and divine intervention. The eventual fall of Milos and the brutal execution of its male citizens revealed the darker face of Athenian imperialism. What had begun as a defensive alliance against Persia had transformed into an empire maintained through fear rather than leadership. This episode of apparent success feeds a dangerous overconfidence in Athens that would soon lead them towards a greater gamble and ultimate disaster the Sicilian Expedition. And it is this Sicilian Expedition that we will now be turning our attention to, where we will first look at Athens in the aftermath of the siege of Melos, and then the political manoeuvrings and arguments that would give rise to the planning of this expedition to the west.
Speaker 1:The Athenian Expedition to Sicily has come down in history as one of the biggest disasters of the entire Peloponnesian war for the Athenians, so much so that military colleges and strategists still study it today. It provides many lessons and can be used as a case study when planning contemporary campaigns, as we will see as we move through the next series of episodes, looking at the campaign, a number of these lessons will become apparent. Some of the key points of interest for these planners can be seen in the danger of over-ambitious objectives, the critical need for accurate intelligence and planning, the importance of commander selection, the pitfalls of democratic politics influencing war and how to avoid doubling down on failing enterprise. Ultimately, we will see that the disaster underscores that even brilliant strategic ideas can fail catastrophically due to the faulty execution, lack of political will and poor leadership. However, even with the lessons the ancient Athenians have provided for us throughout history, many nations would still fall into many of the traps for themselves. Here we can think of the Gallipoli campaign during World War I, the American war in Vietnam and even the wars in the Middle East of our time. Even having the view of history to draw lessons from, these mistakes continue to take place. Perhaps here can be seen the complex problem of human nature overriding all rational arguments of logic and only hindsight being able to reveal the points of mistake after it is too late, therefore providing a lesson for future generations who mistakenly believe they are now equipped not to make the same errors.
Speaker 1:With any disaster in human affairs, one of the first actions that a population engages in is to seek out what caused it or, more importantly, who is to blame. Often, the people's gaze shift to the decision-making process of what gave birth to the idea in the first place. Our episode today will be on the arguments and decisions that would give rise to the expedition to Sicily. Today will be on the arguments and decisions that would give rise to the expedition to Sicily, though if we can find the causes to the disaster in the ideas leading to the expedition is another question. Often, with such grand undertakings, the answers to this question are multifaceted and require far more context or follow-on than just the original concept. However, let us now advance deeper into the unfolding events of the Peloponnesian War with a look at what and why this disastrous campaign would be decided upon. Before we dive straight into the decisions being made in Athens, we first need to gain some context in why the island of Sicily would be the target of an Athenian campaign in the first place.
Speaker 1:As we have covered some time back, sicily was mostly made target of an Athenian campaign in the first place. As we have covered some time back, sicily was mostly made up of cities that had been established by Greek colonies coming from many parts of the mainland Greece. These colonies would grow to end up becoming the dominant group on the island. However, with this growth and different Greek ethnic groups would also come conflict between themselves and with other powers looking to gain a foothold. We had spent some time looking at affairs in Sicily, which ultimately resulted in the First Sicilian War, 480 BC. This had seen the Greek cities of Sicily defeat the efforts of Carthage to stake a claim on the island. However, with their defeat would come the rise of tyrants in the Sicilian cities and conflict amongst them. These tyrants would end up being overthrown one by one, leading to a number of governing regions being established under democracies and oligarchies. However, like on the mainland of Greece, these conflicts between these governed areas would continue, and these conflicts would sow the seeds for a second Sicilian war to break out in 410 BC.
Speaker 1:We had seen that Athens had launched an expedition to Sicily some ten years earlier. However, it was not on the scale that would come this time around. We can see the main reason for this first expedition being summed up as to defend its local allies against the power of Syracuse who, like Sparta, were a Dorian city. The Athenians saw the Sicilian Dorian states as a potential threat, as they might provide grain or other aid to the Peloponnesian allies. This initial engagement, led by Lassius, was a response to a request for help from the city of Leontini, but it ultimately led to a stalemate and a peace treaty among the Sicilian cities, excluding the Athenians. Rather than a decisive success, however, this treaty, negotiated at the conference in Gela in 424, would leave Athens concerned about the state of affairs in Sicily. The main point that would leave Sicily in the mind of Athens was the provision that had been put in place that no foreign state was to interfere in Sicilian affairs. This, for Athens, would still see the problem of potential Sicilian aid being extended to Sparta. However, within Sicily itself, this provision would come as an advantage to Syracuse, who now didn't have to contend with an outside power interfering with their expansionist aims. Athens had sent a representative to assess the growing power of Syracuse, and he had attempted to organise a resistance to this. However, his efforts would come to nothing and he would head back for Athens when a unified front could not be formed, though this continued interest by Athens in Sicilian affairs would not be lost on those cities that were coming off second best against Syracuse and their allies.
Speaker 1:Now, in 416-415, the Segesta, who were Ionian in the west of Sicily, had entered back into conflict with Silenius of Dorian ancestry. If you remember, back to our episode dealing with the Athenian intervention in Sicily during 427,. It was the conflict between these two that had led to the Athenians sailing west. Selenius, backed by Syracuse, had moved into Segestan territory and defeated them. With Segesta hard-pressed, they now looked to outside aid and would once again turn to Athens for help. Segesta would send a delegation to Athens in hopes of securing their support, where they would initially remind Athens of the alliance that had been made in the time of laches in four twenty seven.
Speaker 1:At the core of this request was for athens to provide ships and men that could assist in the war directly. However, they would present the conflict taking place as something larger than just, if left unchecked, would have to eventually deal with themselves directly in their own war. The cities would have the Segestans present the following to the Athenians and, among a number of other considerations, urged as a capital argument that if the Syracusans were allowed to go unpunished for their depopulation of Leotini, to ruin the allies still left to Athens and Sicily and to get the whole power of the island into their hands, there would be a danger of their one day coming with a large force, as Dorians to the aid of their Dorian brethren and as colonists to the aid of the Peloponnesians who had sent them out, and joining these in pulling down the Athenian empire. The Athenians would therefore do well to unite with the allies still left to them and make a stand against the Syracusans.
Speaker 1:Thucydides also points out to his readers that Athens always had designs on attacking Sicily with the aim of conquering all of it. This request for help by Segesta was but a convenient pretext to putting in motion these plans. However, to further make their request for aid more attractive to Athens, segesta would finance the costs of war. From what Thucydides says, it appears that this argument put forward was not the first time the Segestians had approached Athens seeking help. As he says, the Athenians heard these arguments frequently repeated in their assemblies by the Segestians and their supporters. But now, with the actions on the Peloponnese on hold for the time being, the cancellation of the campaign in Thrace and the resolution of Melos the timing for a new venture was much more favourable.
Speaker 1:The Athenians, after hearing this latest round of arguments put forward to them, would, this time around, vote to send a delegation to Segesta. The aim of this delegation was to firstly assess whether Segesta had the money it boasted as having in their treasury and temples. The Athenians would have been very interested in the idea of having a fleet paid for rather than footing the cost themselves. However, they wanted to ensure that they were not going to be caught out financially. The second reason for this delegation was to assess the situation on the ground. Athens wanted to get an accurate picture of the forces Segesta had available and wanted to gain an understanding of the current state of affairs in the war itself. It was of no use to Athens if Segesta was on its last legs and the Athenians were being committed to a hopeless cause.
Speaker 1:During the Athenian delegation's visit, we would find out through hindsight that the Segestians had in fact embellished the levels of wealth they held. With the Athenian delegation's arrival, the Segestians implemented a plan whereupon the delegation's tour of the treasury and temples that were shown what appeared to be impressive silver bowls, goblets and other items, but in reality were of relatively small value. To further give the impression of great wealth, the Athenian ship's crews were entertained by the Segestians in their private houses. In their houses they had collected up all the cups of gold and silver of the city and borrowed others from neighbouring towns to give the impression that the citizens held great wealth. Also, these articles would make the rounds of the city, appearing in houses wherever the Athenians would be entertained. This gave the impression of the abundance of wealth that existed in the city. This gave the impression of the abundance of wealth that existed in the city. These tricks, employed, would work, as the Athenians that had been present at Segesta would report back that the Segestians would be in a position to finance the Athenian expedition.
Speaker 1:Earlier on in Thucydides' account, we were given the impression that Athens were looking for any reason to attack Sicily and were now given the opportunity to act with Segesta's request. This makes it seem like Athens was acting rashly, jumping on the first opportunity that presented itself. However, given what we have seen in the accounts of Athens' response to the request for aid, it would appear they were acting with caution and being calculated. Firstly, although Thucydides outlines the request here in detail, it would appear this was not the first time Athens was requested by them, but there were frequent appeals for them to help in Sicily. This shows us that Athens was perhaps not looking for the first opportunity to act, although at least not so rash to act while they had other commitments elsewhere. As well as this, we can see Athens did not agree to a campaign immediately. Instead, they were careful to make sure that what they were being told was in fact accurate. They had sent representatives to assess that the Segestians were in a financial position to support the campaign, while they also sought to assess the military situation, making sure they were not getting involved in a hopeless situation. Ultimately, no decision on launching a campaign west was made in 416 BC. The Athenians were awaiting the reports from their delegation, who had spent the end of 416 and beginning of 415 making their assessments.
Speaker 1:By spring of 415 BC, the Athenian delegation had returned to Athens and were now able to present their assessment to the assembly. A delegation of Segestians had also accompanied the Athenians on their return. The Segestians had also brought along with them 60 talents of uncoined silver, which was enough to pay the crews of 60 ships for a month. This appears to have been an upfront payment designed to get the Athenians to commit. An assembly was arranged to hear the Segestians and the returning Athenian delegation. The Segestians probably restated their request for aid, but now most likely focused on the 60 talents of silver they brought with them. This would have been attractive to the Athenians as it was tangible proof that they were making good on their word of financing the expedition. The report then made by the Athenian delegation would have also calmed any nerves about the continued financial support beyond the first month. The reports being made spoke of the great wealth that the Athenians had witnessed in the treasury temples and even the private homes of the citizens.
Speaker 1:With the reports made by both delegations, the Athenians were now satisfied that the financial risk of such a venture west was nullified, with the Segestians footing the bill, while was to gain much. If the campaign went in their favour, the Assembly would now vote that 60 ships should be sent to Sicily to help with Segesta. With the vote out of the way, they then also appointed the commanders of the expedition, alcibiades, nicias and Lamarcus. Their orders were to assist Segesta against Salinas in their war, to re-establish the city of Leotini and, if the war went well, to then advance Athens' interests within Sicily. This was the outcome from the initial assembly held after the delegation's return, but more were to follow.
Speaker 1:Given the planning required for such an expedition, the selection of generals here was a curious choice, with Alcibiades and Nicias almost disagreeing on all matters. Through Plutarch we are told that Nicias opposed the measure in the assembly and presumably the earlier requests also while Alcibiades had been at work on the Athenians. Even before the official request of aid this year, where we find Plutarch saying before the assembly had met at all, alcibiades had already corrupted the multitude and got them into his power by means of his Sag9 promises, so that the youth in their training schools and the old men in their workshops and lounging places would sit in clusters drawing maps of Sicily, charts of the sea about it and plans of the harbour and districts of the island which looked towards Libya. For Plutarch, he presents Alcibiades' aims as much more ambitious than just controlling Sicily. He had aims with his gaze focused on the possessions of Carthage and saw Sicily as a springboard in these aims. However, the close of the assembly would see all three men placed in a position of command, where we can find some reason behind each choice. Nicias, as we saw, was against the expedition, but although he warned all from voting on such a campaign, he would find himself in command. The biggest reasoning here most likely comes down to the fact that, although his arguments didn't carry the day, there was still a large following behind him. If Alcibiades was to command, then it would be prudent to have a counterbalance to his aggressive nature. Alcibiades probably doesn't need much explaining as to why he was chosen. He had argued for the campaign and was naturally seen as the perfect leader for it by his supporters, while the selection of the third man, lamarcus, appears to be a balance between the two, since it was likely they would not agree on much. Also, lamarcus was a less political animal, but instead an experienced soldier with a reputation for bravery and boldness, so he is more likely a compromise providing military credibility and balance between the extremes of Alcibiades' aggressive ambitions and Nicias' conservatism.
Speaker 1:Five days later, another assembly would be held to further discuss supplies and mobilisation. This also allowed Nicias another opportunity to attempt to talk his fellow citizens out of the expedition. To attempt to talk his fellow citizens out of the expedition. Although he was appointed as a general, he had not sought the position and saw the campaign as a great folly on Athens' part. This second assembly has Thucydides presenting speeches by Nicias and Alcibiades Nicias attempting to reverse the decision and Alcibiades defending the expedition. However, we will find in both their attempts they would hurt their own positions. Nicias would, in fact, deepen Athens' commitment to Sicily, while Alcibiades would indirectly create suspicion and distrust towards him amongst the Athenians. These speeches given by Thucydides are quite long, so instead of quoting them, I'll summarise the essence of what each was presenting and look at how what they would say would come to backfire on them.
Speaker 1:Nicias began by urging the Athenians to reconsider the wisdom of their course. He reminded them that their enemies were not on the same distant shore, but close at hand, in the Peloponnese, where Sparta and her allies still posed a constant threat. Sicily, by contrast, was remote and formidable, its cities populous and well-resourced. To embark upon such an enterprise, he urged, was not to secure Athens, but to gamble with its very survival. He sought to remind the Assembly of its existing commitments, warning against the temptation of expansion. For its own sake, empire, he implied, was already a burden heavy enough without being stretched to breaking point.
Speaker 1:When this appeal of prudence failed to stir the citizens, nicias shifted tactics. Rather than opposing the expedition outright, he sought to daunt them by the sheer scale of the preparations required. If they were truly determined to conquer Syracuse and establish Athenian power in Sicily, then nothing short of immense force would suffice. They would need a fleet of unprecedented size, a large body of hoplites, archers, slingers and, above all, a cavalry strong enough to counter the Syracusan horse. Vast sums of money must be found, ships refitted and allies compelled to contribute.
Speaker 1:Nicias' purpose was clear by setting the bar impossibly high, he hoped to dissuade the Assembly from the enterprise altogether. Yet here lay the cruel irony of his speech Instead of deterring the Athenians, his words inflamed their confidence. The more he emphasized the need for overwhelming resources, the more the people believed that such resources, once provided, would make success inevitable. What Nicias presented as a warning was received as a challenge, and the Athenians, in their characteristic spirit of daring, rose to meet it. Far from shirking from the expedition, the assembly voted to expand it. The fleet and army assigned to the Sicily became one of the largest Athens had ever raised.
Speaker 1:The consequences of his speech were therefore the reverse of what Nicias intended. In his effort to restrain Athenian ambition, he only magnified it. Thucydides presents this as a moment of tragic miscalculation, where the cautious instincts of a seasoned general collide with the restless energies of a radical democracy. The Athenians, confident in their wealth, their fleet and their imperial destiny, refused to hear restraint. Nicias' warning, rather than checking the tide, gave it greater force, with it enlarged to 130 triremes and 5,000 hoplites.
Speaker 1:Thus, the second speech of Nicias is emblematic of the wider fate of the Sicilian expedition. What was conceived as a bold stroke of empire became, through misjudgment, overconfidence and division of command, the ruin of Athens. In Thucydides' telling of Nicias' speech stands as a tragic moment of irony the man most opposed to war gave it its greatest scale, ensuring that when disaster came, it would be all the more complete If Nicias' second speech had the unintended effect of enlarging the Sicilian expedition. It also cast a shadow over his fellow commander, alcibiades, for Alcibiades had been the principal advocate of the venture from the beginning, dazzling the assembly with promises of wealth, allies and the extension of empire. He embodied the spirit of restless ambition that Nicias condemned. And in the counterpoint between their speeches, the Athenians began to measure the distance between cautious restraint and reckless daring.
Speaker 1:Alcibiades' advocacy for Sicily was not simply a military proposition, but a projection of his own political character. Young, wealthy and ambitious, he had long been regarded with unease by the more conservative citizens. To some, he was the very image of Athenian brilliance, bold in speech and action, the heir to Periclean leadership. To others, he was dangerous, a man who confused the glory of the city with the gratification of his own desires. Nicias, in warning the people against overextension, implicitly warned them also against Alcibiades himself. He urged them to be aware of those out of private ambition, urged the people into perilous enterprises.
Speaker 1:In the heat of the debate, the assembly did not withdraw its confidence in Alcibiades. Indeed, it endorsed his vision with greater enthusiasm. Yet beneath the surface, nicias' words had planted the seed of suspicion. When he spoke of leaders driven by personal vanity, of men who urged war not for the good of Athens but for their own glory, the audience could not fail to think of our sobrieties. The brilliance with which he had painted Sicily as a land of easy conquest now seemed to some too dazzling, too self-serving. This tension would soon resurface in the scandals that accompanied the departure of the fleet and when rumours spread profanation of the mysteries, it was Alcibiades who was most readily suspected. The distrust had already been sown. Nicias had given shape to anxieties that many Athenians felt, but had yet not spoken that Alcibiades was reckless, impious and ready to risk the city for his own advancement. So Nicias' speech, though it failed to avert, the Sicilian campaign, suddenly undermined Alcibiades' standing. It gave a voice to the doubts of the cautious and lent moral force, to the change that Alcibiades was unfit for so great a trust when his enemies later sought to recall him from Sicily to stand trial. They were drawing upon this very suspicion that Nicias had invoked. In this way, the interplay between the two general speeches foreshadowed the division of command and political manoeuvrings that would fatally weaken Athens' great expedition.
Speaker 1:With what we have covered so far, we can see that the initial request for aid by Segesta growing into something much larger we have already seen through Thucydides' account that he was of the opinion that Athens saw much greater aims in the campaign, well before this request For raid had come. Thucydides makes the stated aims of the war and its true ambitions central in his narrative of the decision to launch this expedition. However, what we need to ask ourselves was this ambition always present, or did it become part of Thucydides' narrative with the benefit of hindsight? At the First Assembly, the Athenians agreed to dispatch a fleet of 60 triremes accompanied by hoplites and supporting troops. This was a significant but not overwhelming commitment. For the immediate pretextual aim assisting Segesta against Salinas and restraining Syracuse in influence such a force might have been sufficient.
Speaker 1:Syracuse was the most powerful city in Sicily, but Athens was no stranger in projecting force abroad. With moderate expeditions, a contingent of 60 ships could plausibly intimidate secure allies and achieve limited goals without overreach. However, this number was entirely inadequate for the larger, unstated ambition of subduing Sicily as a whole. The island was vast, its cities populous and its resources formidable. To conquer Syracuse, let alone dominate the wider region, required not a raiding force but an invasion army of unprecedented scale. Nicias highlighted this in his second speech, warning that only an armament of extraordinary size could hope to succeed. Ironically, his intention was to deter Athens from proceeding, but instead the assembly voted to enlarge the expedition dramatically, sending over 130 triremes and 5,000 troops, one of the greatest forces Athens had ever assembled.
Speaker 1:In Thucydides' interpretation, this progression from a modest fleet to a vast armament encapsulates the restless ambition of Athens. He portrays the initial figure of 60 ships as revealing the naivety of the Athenians, who underestimated the scale of what they were attempting. For him, the true cause of the expedition was never the defence of Segesta, but the imperial impulse to conquer Sicily, and so he can present the original vote as inherently flawed. By framing the pretext as a mask for deeper ambitions, thucydides links the small beginnings of the enterprise directly to a disastrous end. Yet it is important to note that this interpretation is coloured by hindsight For contemporaries. In 415, the disaster was not foreseeable. The Athenians had faith in their fleet, their resources and their empire, and they saw no reason why Sicily should not fall, as other states had before.
Speaker 1:Thucydides, however, writing with knowledge of the expedition's ruin, shapes his narrative to emphasise the inevitability of failure. He retrospectively casts the early preparations as insufficient and misguided in order to underscore the dangers of imperial overreach and the tragic hubris of Athens. So the initial force of 60 ships may have been sufficient for the pretextual aims of aiding Segesta, but was wholly inadequate for the larger imperial ambitions that Thucydides insists were the true motives of the expedition. By connecting the inception to disaster, thucydides interprets the enterprise not as a bold gamble gone wrong, but as a tragedy predetermined by the Athenians' ambition. His account therefore serves less as a neutral record of preparations and more as a moral and political commentary on the dangers of unchecked imperial appetite. So we can see, thucydides uses hindsight to connect inception to outcome. The same ambition that sent Athens to Sicily guaranteed her ruin. His account is therefore highly deterministic, emphasising the inevitability of failure once Athens committed to such an enterprise.
Speaker 1:Other writers, however, do not always frame the expedition with such tragic inevitability, do not always frame the expedition with such tragic inevitability. Plutarch, in his Life of Nicias and Life of Alcibiades, focuses more on the role of character and fortune. He presents the Sicilian disaster less as an inevitable product of Athenian ambition and more as the consequences of poor leadership, bad timing and the vices of individuals. In his portrait, alcibiades' recklessness, nicias' indecision and the misfortunes of chance, such as the lunar eclipse delaying the retreat, combine to turn what might have been a bold but plausible undertaking into a catastrophe. For Plutarch, therefore, the expedition appears contingent. Success was possible had Athens been better led and less divided.
Speaker 1:Somewhat in a similar vein, diodorus Siculus, writing in the 1st century BC, offers a more straightforward chronological account in his Library of History. He does not dwell on the inevitability of imperial overreach, but emphasises the scale of the armament and the drama of events. His narrative allows room for contingency. He highlights how, at several moments, the Athenians might have triumphed had they pressed their advantage or avoided hesitation. For example, he stresses Lamarcus's early plan to strike directly at Syracuse as a lost opportunity, implying that the disaster was not predetermined but the result of decisions made along the way. Taken together, these perspectives reveal the uniqueness of Thucydides' interpretation, where Plutarch and Diodorus see the Sicilian expedition as a gamble that might have succeeded under different conditions. Thucydides views it as a tragedy of overreach, a case study in the dangers of unrestrained ambition. His hindsight allows him to weave the story into his broader theme the rise and fall of Athens through the very qualities that had once made her great.
Speaker 1:The question of whether Athens' ambition was always present or whether it was the product of Thucydides' hindsight remains central. The initial preparations 60 ships for a limited intervention could have sufficed for the official pretext, but they were inadequate for the grander conquest, thucydides insists was the true aim. By linking the inception and disaster, thucydides interprets the disaster as doomed from the beginning. Yet Plutarch and Diodorus remind us that the campaign might have not been inherently hopeless. It was the combination of misjudgment, division and misfortune that sealed its fate. In this way, history reveals two different ways of understanding the expedition as a predetermined tragedy of ambition or as a contingent event whose outcome was not inevitable until the very end.
Speaker 1:So, by the close of the Second Assembly, athens stood committed to an undertaking far beyond its original pretext. What had begun as a limited intervention on behalf of Segesta now swelled into an expedition of unprecedented scale. The Athenians, urged on by the competing voices of Nicias and Alcibiades convinced themselves that, with sufficient force, sicily would fall, as so many others had before. It was a decision born of confidence, yet shadowed by division, and it set the course for one of the most ambitious expeditions in the history of the Greek world. For Thucydides, this moment serves as a lesson in the dangers of imperial appetite. He shapes the episode so that the ambition driving Athens to Sicily also guaranteed her undoing. In his telling, once the people resolved upon such an enterprise, their fate was already sealed.
Speaker 1:But other ancient writers remind us that matters were not so inevitable. Plutarch sees chance and character, the rashness of Alcibiades, the hesitations of Nicias and the hand of fortune as the decisive elements that turned a bold gamble into disaster. Diodorus too, allows for contingency. Bold gamble into disaster. Diodorus too allows for contingency, highlighting lost opportunities and choices that, if taken differently, might have led to triumph.
Speaker 1:This divergence of perspectives leaves us with a crucial question Was the Sicilian expedition doomed from the very moment of its conception, or was it still a contest whose outcome depended on leadership, decision and luck? In Athens of 415, no such doubts seemed pressing. The city was alive with preparation, resources were poured into the cause and the people anticipated glory to rival even that of marathon Few. Could have imagined that the greatest force Athens had ever raised would sail not towards victory but towards calamity. In our next episode, we will follow the Athenians as they ready this grand expedition and we will see how, even before the fleet left, the Piraeus scandal and suspicion would unsettle the venture. For, in the midst of the city's excitement, sacred statues were mutilated, mysteries profaned and suspicion fell on none other than Alcibiades himself. The expedition that promised greatness would depart under a cloud of fear and division, foreshadowing the disaster to come.