103: Defeat of the Athenian Navy

Athens is the greatest naval power in Greece, yet in Sicily it starts to feel helpless. We pick up the story at the moment Nicias sends a careful, politically protective message home and the Athenian Assembly hears what it wants to hear: send more ships, send more men, and force victory. That decision to double down shapes everything that follows, because it gives Syracuse and Gylippus time to do what Athens assumes no one can do, learn fast enough to beat the Athenian navy.

We walk through how the Syracusans adapt their triremes and tactics for the cramped waters of the Great Harbor, where classic Athenian maneuver warfare matters less than brute collisions, grappling, and discipline under pressure. Demosthenes arrives with major reinforcements and tries to end the campaign with an immediate strike, including a daring night assault on Epipolae. Thucydides’ account of the darkness, the noise, and the sudden collapse into confusion makes the disaster feel personal, not abstract, and it pushes the generals into a brutal debate: withdraw now while the sea is still open, or stay and gamble on uncertain intelligence and political cover.

Then fate, religion, and timing collide when a lunar eclipse delays a secret departure, exposing Athenian intentions and letting Syracuse close the trap. From there the narrative accelerates into the decisive naval battles, the death of Eurymedon, a blockade at the harbor mouth, and a final desperate attempt to break free with improvised “Iron Hands” designed for close-quarters combat. The end result is not just a tactical loss but a morale collapse so complete that crews refuse to man the ships again.

If you want the Sicilian Expedition explained with clear stakes, leadership lessons, and vivid ancient naval warfare details, press play. Subscribe, share the episode with a friend who loves history, and leave a review so more listeners can find the series.

Transcript

Nicias And A Costly Message

SPEAKER_00 0:46

The fate of the Athenians being placed in their fleet. Their fear for the event was like nothing they had ever felt, while their view of the struggle was necessarily as checkered as the battle itself. Thucydides. Hello, I'm Marc Sellic, and welcome back to Casting Through Ancient Greece, Episode 103, Defeat of the Athenian Navy. 413 BC saw a point in the Athenian Sicilian Expedition, where a decision could have been made to pull the Athenians back from a campaign that was not going in their favour. However, Nicius, commanding the forces, had not been straightforward enough in his assessment and recommendation for the campaign. He had outlined the troubles Athens was facing, however, he also left the matter open to where these troubles did not seem insurmountable. Though even more crucially, he had provided options for the Athenians back home, who were not experiencing the campaign for themselves. His letter was interpreted that for Athens to succeed, they needed to send another expedition to reinforce the current one. Nicius, instead of being frank and urging the recall of the expedition, had attempted to protect himself politically, by putting forward another possible option. This was so that when Athens recalled the fleet, Nicius would still be able to argue he had sought reinforcements to continue the campaign. It appeared this was his intention, as the reinforcements he was seeking seemed to him to be ridiculous in number. And Athens would surely not take this path. However, this was the same tact he took when arguing against the expedition in the first place, and it had backfired on him. Nicius had not learnt from this experience, and now had given Athens faith that they could still yet prevail in Sicily. After deliberation in Athens and the options put forward by Nicius, it appears the assembly had no real support on recalling the fleet. Most had latched on to the fact that more resources were needed to gain victory. Perhaps the vast sums of money and men committed already, the riches that were on offer, and their own reputation as the most powerful maritime power of their time, led to Athens convincing themselves that what Nicius requested in men and resources was reasonable. So Athens would double down on their commitment to the Sicilian expedition. Gallupus and the Syracusans knew that large reinforcements were being sent from Athens, while they were also well aware of the poor state the Athenians were in. It was recognized that their best chance of kicking Athens out of Sicily was to inflict a decisive and irreversible defeat on the current army before the reinforcements could arrive. Work began on raising more forces and training them, while also equipping a fleet large enough to challenge the Athenians. If they were to defeat Athens decisively, they would need to cripple their fleet. Moving forward, the attacks that were launched by the Syracusans were combined land and naval operations. Initially success would be had on land with the capture of the forts down by the Great Harbour, but on the water, the untested fleet could not match that of the Athenians. Frustratingly, although gaining a strategic victory on land, Athens was still not defeated. However, Syracuse was able to use the victory to gain more support from their allies in Sicily and from the Greek mainland. Further opportunities were sought to launch continued attacks before the Athenian reinforcements could arrive. However, these would not yield the decisive victory they were looking for, but with each engagement the Syracusans were gaining experience and adapting. This would finally lead to one more push in the Great Harbour to inflict a great defeat on the Athenians. The Syracusans had modified their ship bases on structural changes the Corinthians had made, which would make manoeuvring less important for the less experienced Syracusan crews, while also providing more strength to their triremes in a head-on clash. Lessons had also been learnt on how the Athenians operated after battle, to where the Syracusans would launch a renewed surprise attack, when Athens thought the day's fighting to be done. This would end up resulting in the Syracusans gaining their first victory over the Athenian fleet, though the decisive result would still elude them. Even further plans were made to reorganise forces, so more attacks could be launched as soon as possible. Though before any more could take place, the Athenian reinforcements would finally arrive to relieve Nicius' position. Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived in Sicily with some seventy three ships, five thousand hoplites, and a large force of lighter armed missile troops. The effect on the Syracusans was tremendous. They had found themselves on the edge of defeat and fought their way back, having Athens on the back foot. They had been in a position to where it seems that all that was needed to break the resolve of the Athenians was one decisive victory. Their continued efforts had seen them get closer and closer to this goal, where it looked as though it would eventually take place, it was just a matter of time. However, the appearance of such a large reinforcing fleet had left the Syracusans feeling as if they were back at square one. The reinforcements appeared to have shattered the illusion that the Athenians could be defeated, and now looked as though the power of Athens had no bounds. For Athens, their current state of mind was one of hopelessness. They were being pressed continuously, they had suffered one setback after another, men were falling ill, and the ability to keep them supplied was diminishing steadily. Though the sight of the mass Athenian and Allied ships had seen the depressive state on land shift to one of growing confidence. Upon his arrival, Demosthenes began assessing the situation at once. He was aware that Nicius had also been in a strong position when he first arrived, but had failed to act quickly, instead wintering in Catana, which allowed the Syracusans to get messages of aid out and set in motion the arrival of Gylippus. Demosthenes now looked to act immediately, while he was at his strongest and while the enemy were stunned by his arrival. He identified the Syracusan counter wall that was preventing the completion of the Athenian siege wall, and would make this point the focus of his attack. If the Athenians could capture the wall, it would also gain them back control of the Epipolae. He knew that Golippus was commanding the troops protecting this section, but the risk was well worth what could be achieved. Thucydides tells us that Demosthenes' thinking was that, whatever the outcome from this attack, the war would be ended, where he says, for he would either be successful and take Syracuse, or else would withdraw the expedition and not allow the Athenians serving in it to have their lives uselessly thrown away, or the resources of their whole country squandered. The first action that Demosthenes had the Athenians undertake was to march out and ravage the lands outside Syracuse, near the Annapas River. This action appears to be somewhat for psychological purposes, to show the Syracusans that the Athenians were not on the verge of defeat any more, and were in numbers where they could go out and do as they wished to the Syracusan land. The Syracusans did not send their army out to meet the Athenians, but only had their cavalry and light troops head out to harass them where they could. Next an attack on the counterwall was arranged, with siege engines brought up to support the infantry. The engines appeared to have been concentrated in one section to breach the walls, while the infantry had been attacking at different points along the wall. However, the Syracusans were prepared for the attack, and were able to satellite the Athenian siege engines, and were able to push back the attacking forces. From Thucydides' account, this first attack doesn't appear to be the initial plan Demosthenes had come up with. It seems as though that this attack was focused on a section of the Syracusan's counterwall, not on top of the Epipoli. It's unclear why this first attack then was made. Perhaps it was the initial action after arriving that Demosthenes came up with plans for the attack on the Epipolae, or he had yet to gain approval from the other generals for the plans he had come up with. Whatever the true sequence of events, Thucydides would then say after the initial attack, he thought it best not to wait any longer, after having obtained consent from Nicius and his fellow commanders, began to put in operation his original plan for making the attack on the Epipola. We are told that Demosthenes had recognized that launching an attack on the heights by day would only have a slim chance of success, as the enemy would be able to see his forces coming and be able to prepare for them. So he would launch his attack at night. We had seen how Nicius had been able to originally capture the Epipolae by using the cover of darkness. The night of the attack would see twenty thousand troops being put into action, half being hoplites and the other half light troops. The first target was the pass at Eurylus, where the Syracusans had established a fort. The Athenians managed to achieve complete surprise by advancing onto it before the moon had even risen, covering their approach even more effectively. The fort was captured, but some of the garrison were able to flee and get word to the others up on the heights. A small force of elite Syracusans attempted to wrest back control of the fort, but they were quickly routed. The Athenians wasting no time now advanced to exploit their initial success. They split into two forces, one clearing the way, while the second one made for the counter wall. When the second force reached their target, the Syracusans appear to have also been caught off guard, as they withdrew instead of defending the wall. The Athenians were then able to capture it and begin tearing it down. Golippus and his men were in a state of shock and still recovering from the surprise of the assault, as he had not anticipated such a daring attack. He had perhaps become more accustomed to the lackluster performance of the Athenians under Nicius, who would have been on the brink of defeat. Golippus did the best he could, getting men into action in an attempt to stem the advance of the Athenians. However, as the Syracusans went forward in their disorganized state, they were almost immediately pushed back. However, the Athenians kept on pushing eastward across the heights, driven by their success and thinking victory was near. They eventually lost their cohesion as the advance pushed on, and unfortunately for them, they were now approaching Syracusan forces that had not yet been committed to the counterattack. The first fresh troops the Athenians came across were the Bootians, who, seeing the Athenians come on in a disordered state, charged them and routed them. This moment would prove to be the turning point in the battle, where we are told the Athenians were now in a state of confusion. Thucydides writes it is hard to know what was unfolding, as even during daylight battles, the noise and dust limit the perception of soldiers, but at night it becomes almost impossible to get to grips with what was happening, especially when the situation abruptly changes. The Athenians could not tell if those coming on at them were friend or foe in the dark. There were companies of Athenians still advancing, but they were not sure if they were the enemy now engaging them, or other Athenians attempting to get through their ranks to the rear. The problems then also began to compound, with no clear leadership being placed back at the Eurylus. Back there were groups of Athenians advancing forward, others retreating back, and some newly arrived companies unsure which groups they should be following. If this wasn't bad enough, more chaos was thrown into the mix when the Syracusan forces began shouting orders at the confused Athenians, while sections also began singing their pians, which now terrified the already confused Athenians. The result of the chaos would see the Athenians begin engaging each other, seeing friend fight friend, and these battles only stopped with great difficulty. Many Athenians had fallen or even jumped to their deaths from the cliffs in the panic. What we need to remember here was that a good proportion of these Athenian troops were part of the newly arrived contingents, and were not familiar with the layout of the landmarks on the heights. These men had been the ones who had suffered the most in the panic. Many of the men who had been in Sicily since Nicky's arrival had been able to make their way back to the camp. However, the rest were left wandering around on the heights, and as the sun came up, the Syracusan cavalry hunted them down and killed them where they found them. This attack on the heights would end up seeing the biggest Athenian disaster yet. Somewhere between two thousand and two and a half thousand men were killed. Not to mention the psychological impact this would have on the army. The reinforcements saw the Athenians gain their confidence and the offensive spirit, however, this was brutally squashed with the loss of a quarter of their employed forces when they saw themselves on the brink of victory. For the Syracusans, the victory helped restore their morale that had been seriously hit after seeing the arrival of the Athenians. Gilippus, seeing the Athenians could still be defeated once again, used this victory and spike in confidence to recruit more allies. Syracuse needed to keep the pressure while Athens was suffering defeats. More allies could be enticed after seeing the reinforced Athenians subjected to another defeat. Momum was on Syracuse's side, they just needed more troops to maintain offensive pressure. Demosthenes had seen that it was imperative to act decisively as soon as possible. The idea was to launch an immediate offensive with the Syracusans' morale low after his arrival. However, the offensive had failed to achieve the quick result he had hoped for. His idea had been to end the war through this attack, or it seemed likely the Athenians would need to look at withdrawing from Sicily as soon as possible. He had come to this conclusion after arriving and seeing the state of the Athenians' positions and the army already there. His assessment had been that even with his reinforcements, the army would not be able to hang on long. Even his fresh troops were being put into undesirable conditions, the morale of the veterans would be infectious, not to mention the sicknesses they were carrying, while the camp conditions were less than desirable to say the least. The Athenians were now forced into maintaining a camp down at the Great Harbour on the edge of the marshlands, which further degraded their health. Demosthenes had thought the Athenians had one last shot to win the war. He had taken the chance, come so close to victory, but was ultimately defeated. He saw it was now best to withdraw while the army and the fleet were in the condition to do so. It was with this mindset that Demosthenes addressed his fellow commanders, where using these points he argued for not staying any longer in Sicily. He added that it was best to leave now while the worst of the weather had yet to set in, and while they still maintained superiority at sea, making their withdrawal across open water much more likely a success. He also shifted the focus to the goings on in Attica, and Sparta now taking more aggressive moves. It was better to send the fleet home to defend against threats to Athens and not continue wasting resources on the venture in Sicily, where now being present he could appreciate the hopelessness of the situation. However, Nicius now came forward and attempted to counter Demosthenes' assessment. He did know that his men were in a poor state, for he had outlined their condition in his original letter back to Athens. Even with the arrival of the reinforcements, he could still see their condition had not improved, but Nicius was concerned that if word got back to the Syracusans that the Athenians were planning withdrawal, then they would be cut off in their attempt. He also seems to have put forward the idea that even with Athens in a poor state, they just needed to outlast the Syracusans. He shared that he had information from within Syracuse from a group that had been consistently arguing for surrender to Athens. This group had informed him that Syracuse was quickly running out of funds to support the war, and if the siege was held, Syracuse would very soon have no means to continue the war. We also see that he was hesitant of a withdrawal, as he believed the generals would be solely held accountable since Athens had not issued any orders to return. Thucydides tells us that in reality Nicius was caught in two mines, but was unclear which was his best path forward. It's clear his reasoning for not wanting to withdraw was down to the political consequences he would face, or worse. He tries to give reasons for staying using the information of a pro-Athenian faction in Syracuse, but it comes across that he wasn't even really convinced that this was a good idea. He was just clutching at excuses not to defy Athens' orders. So we find Nicius in the mindset he had when penning his letter to Athens. Not willing to act and force a decision he saw best for the army, he remained cautious and indecisive. Donald Kagan, in his history of the Peloponnesian War, lays out the points Nicius uses to argue for staying are hardly compelling. He says, even if the sea lanes were cut off, Syracuse could still get supplies over land, and hopes of treason from within the city were comerical. Those wanting surrender, lacked adequate support, and they were not likely to gain more after Syracuse's recent victories. The arrival of Gongolus and Gilippus had ended their only real chance of capitulation. Kagan points out Nicus' real motivation was more selfish. Where we can find what Thucydides reports of Nycius's speech to somewhat support this idea. Nycius was worried that if he made the decision to depart, that even though the soldiers were now complaining of their conditions and the danger they were in, they would very quickly, once back in Athens, proclaim just as loudly the opposite, and would say that their generals had been bribed to betray them and return. Demosthenes, however, had no time for seeing the siege continued, though he was prepared to compromise on the withdrawal. He said that if a decree from Athens was needed for Nicius to consider leaving Sicily, then he insisted the Athenians in the meantime should fall back to Catana, or nearby, where the army had much more space to occupy and access to resources, while also having some breathing room for the constant fighting. He also pointed out that the fleet would be in a much better position, as the Syracusans, if they wanted to engage on water, would be compelled to fight on the open seas, where the Athenians held the advantage. However, even this compromise was rejected by Nicius. In Thucydides' account, he is presented as being suspicious of why Demosthenes was adamant about leaving their current position. He is said to have thought Demosthenes was not giving him the whole story of what he knew of the situation. Demosthenes had the support of Eurymedon, but Nicius had the support of the commanders that had been assigned to him while waiting for the reinforcements. So in this way Nicius would be able to get his way and have the army remain. During these talks and after, Golippus had been actively recruiting to increase the size of his forces for a fresh attack. The Athenians had seen more forces come in to support Syracuse, while, as the days passed, the conditions in the Athenian camp continued to deteriorate, as Demosthenes had predicted. Nicius had also seen what was happening and started to soften his stance on withdrawing. He would finally come out to see reason, and was now supportive of the idea, though he was still worried about the enemy getting wind of the orders to depart, so he insisted that their decision should be kept within the command circle, and arrangements be made in secret. Only when everything was ready would a signal being given to alert the men to begin manning the ships. So finally it seemed the Athenians would be able to extricate themselves from the mess that Sicily had turned out to be. Fate, the gods, or just dumb luck, would now intervene. The preparations were all finally ready, and the men were given orders on the twenty seventh of August four hundred thirteen BC to embark on their ships. That night an eclipse of the moon would take place, which allows us to pinpoint the date the departure was planned. Thucydides tells us that the men were impressed by the display, and urged the generals to wait. It's not entirely certain if this was meant the men were impressed, as in, wow look at that, or this had been an impression on their pious side. However, we are then told Nicius would put a halt to the departure after having consulted with the soothsayer. Supposedly, Nicius took religious matters very seriously. The advice he was given that the Athenians needed to wait thrice nine days, to pass before they could finally set sail, the supposed implication being that the crossing of the sea would meet a terrible end. This turn of events would see to it that the secrecy behind the withdrawal was now compromise. We had seen Nicias was worried about this factor, but it was now him who decided to halt the departure after all the careful preparation. Predictably, now that the entire Athenian force was aware of the intended retreat, it wasn't long before the Syracusans got word of what had been developing in the Athenian camp. For Gilippus he now sped up his preparations, and he was greatly encouraged as the Athenians' attempted retreat confirmed to him that they were now acknowledging they were weaker than the Syracusans on both land and sea. Gilippus would have made sure that this news and what it meant to the Syracusans was spread through the city. He wanted the spirits of the men to be at their height, as he now began to put in motion the plans for a new attack on water. Given that Syracuse had been getting steady streams of reinforcements, further training was required so that all knew what was required of them when it was time to launch their assault. Golippus had the men training for a number of days, going through manoeuvres at sea, while also having the army practicing in the field. One gets the impression that Golippus and the Syracusan generals could see victory on the horizon, and wanted to finish off the Athenians as soon as possible. However, they had experienced how overconfidence and rash decisions could lead to defeat. That's why it seems it was seen necessary to ensure the men were properly trained. However, they would also need to have in their minds that the Athenians were looking to withdraw, so they could not take all the time they wanted. There had to be some point where Golippus was satisfied that the men were proficient enough to then launch his attack before the Athenians could make their getaway. A day was finally picked for the initial attack. This day would see operations on land mounted and directed at the Athenian lines. The Athenians would respond by sallying out a force of hoplites and cavalry. They were able to push the Syracusans back. However, when pursuing them back to their lines, the ground became very narrow, and the Athenians lost seventy of their cavalry and some hoplites. It's unclear what the intention of this attack was. Perhaps it was to fix the Athenians in place to prepare for an attack from the landward side, or perhaps it was to convince the Athenians that this was where the main threat would be coming from. The next day, however, the Syracusans would do as they had previously when attacking the Athenians. They would launch a combined land and sea attack. It seems pretty clear from Thucydides' account that the sea engagement was their main push. They would send out seventy six triremes, and it appears the Athenians were not caught off guard this time around, as they would sail out and meet them with eighty-six of their own. This time it appears the Syracusans were able to defeat the Athenians without much trouble. Thucydides doesn't give us the same in-depth account of the back and forth nature of the tricks employed to gain the upper hand. Here he writes The Syracusans and their allies first defeated the Athenian centre, and then caught Eurimedon, the commander of the right wing, who was sailing out from the line more towards the land, in order to surround the enemy in the hollow and recess of the harbour, and killed him and destroyed the ships accompanying him, after which they now chased the whole Athenian fleet before them and drove them ashore. So we essentially see here the death of Eurymenon and the defeat of his right wing would be the point where the Athenian challenge ended. As the retreating Athenians came ashore, many had done so in panic and landed or fled beyond the safety of the Athenian stockade. Gilippus led down a group of troops to cut down these exposed men, where a clash between both forces would take place as the Athenians came out of their camp to protect their ships laying along the shoreline. The clash grew as more and more men from both sides joined the battle down near the shore. However, the Athenians were able to push the Syracusans back into a retreat. The Athenians had been able to rescue most of their triremes, but during the struggle the Syracusans were able to carry off eighteen into their possession. The Syracusans, in another attempt at relieving the Athenians of their ships, floated an old cargo ship set alike towards where the Athenians had their fleet ashore, though they were able to stop the ship and extinguish it before it reached their stockade. This was the Syracusans' most decisive battle against the Athenians yet, and they erected trophies for both their land and sea battles. The Athenians had also constructed a trophy on land their victory over Gallippus, but in reality the Athenians did not have anything to celebrate. They were now in a tough position, they had delayed their withdrawal, only to now be defeated in a sea battle. This gave the Syracusans control of the great harbour, and they now took measures to block the Athenians inside. They anchored across the opening of the harbour, triremes and other boats joined together by boards and chains. This opening of the harbour was Athens' only real means of escape from Sicily. Their fleet was the only way they were going to transport their army back across the open seas. The Athenians had no choice but to go back to battle with the Syracusans. They needed to get their fleet free of the harbour. The Athenians had called a council of war to discuss their best course of action, in the face of the Syracusans tightening the noose around their escape. They were in a position where they no longer had provisions to maintain any length of time in the current position. When preparing for their departure, they had sent word to Katana not to send any more, and now their only means of resupply was blocked. In their discussions, they decided to occupy a smaller footprint and move everything down to the stockade. Here they would have a small group of men, along with the sick, remain with everything, so that every man that could be spared would now crew the triums in one last ditch effort to break free of the harbour. They planned to fight it out, and if victorious, they would sail on to Katana, presumably picking up those that were still on land before doing so. However, a contingency was also arranged. If they were not successful in their naval engagement, they would fall back to shore and set their ships alight, then in close formation they would attempt a landward retreat to the closest friendly city they could make it to. Once they had condensed their camp, every man that could be spared boarded the triremes. With the manpower they had left, they were able to put on water one hundred and ten ships. All that was left was for Nicius to rouse the spirits of his men before going into battle. Though, looking around at the body language and expressions, this was going to be a hard task. Nicius' speech takes up a few pages in Thucydides' account, so I'm just going to sum it up here briefly. Nicius addressed his men with stark honesty as they prepared to break out of the Great Harbour, stressing that this battle will determine their survival. He reminds them that they are experienced Athenians whose past successes should give them confidence, but makes clear that conventional naval tactics will no longer suffice in the confined and chaotic conditions they face. Instead, they must fight with aggression and resolve, adapting to close quarter combat. Nicius emphasizes that each man's courage is crucial as the fate of the entire army rests on this collective effort, and that defeat will mean death or captivity far from home. He closes by appealing to both their sense of duty and the hopes of a divine favour, urging them to commit fully to this final, desperate struggle. While the Athenians were preparing their final attempt to break free, the Syracusans were able to determine what they were planning. Golippus was also concerned that the blockade of the harbour might not prove to be effective enough to prevent the Athenian escape. So he had also planned to have the Syracusans man their ships to prevent this attempt. The way Thucydides presents this part has him setting up the climax to the conflict in Sicily. This was the one final chance for Athens to free themselves, or for Syracuse, to secure their destruction, so he would also have Gallippus address his troops before this final climatic clash. He would address them with confidence, framing the coming battle as an opportunity to decisively crush the trapped Athenians. He reassures his men that they already hold the advantage, both in position and momentum, and contrasts their strength with the exhaustion and desperation of the enemy. Golippus emphasizes that the Athenians, once feared as a naval power, are now reduced to fighting in unfavorable conditions where their skills count for less. While the Syracusans are fighting close to home with everything to gain. He urges them to press this advantage boldly, arguing that victory will not only secure their safety but bring lasting glory, for defeating so great a power, transforming them from defenders into conquerors of Athenian prestige. With that, two fleets would now move out to engage one another. The Syracusans confident and in high spirits after their victories. The Athenians tied and almost broken. The Athenian fleet looked to resemble the old days of naval warfare, with it reliant on missile troops and grappling the enemy, so that the hoplites could engage. However, they had learnt from the Syracusans' modifications and installed on their ships what they called Iron Hands, which were designed to grab hold of the enemy ships as it crashed into them head on. This would prevent the Syracusan ships backing out after ramming and leave them exposed to the Athenians boarding them. Initially the Syracusans spread themselves all around the harbour, with one detachment guarding the mouth, which would allow them to come on on the Athenians from all directions. The Syracusan army lined the shores of the harbour, except for the small section the Athenians controlled. Any Athenian from wrecked ships being washed up onto the shore wouldn't have good prospects for surviving. The Athenian fleet was able to make the first move. Their goal was to break free of the barrier, set up to contain them. So they charged it in the hopes of smashing a gap through it. The Athenians made right for the small gap in the barrier the Syracusans had made for the passage of their own ships. The first ships to make contact with the barrier began cutting the chains holding the ships together. It was at this moment of contact, at the barrier, that the Syracusan generals gave the signal to advance and engage. The Syracusans came on the flanks and rear. The harbour was congested with ships all in close combat. Once the gap had been closed, there was now no chance of ramming, and what ensured resembled land combat. For Athens, this was unlike to the last couple of generations of sea combat that they had built their experience and dominance on. Likewise, for the missile troops and hoplites, they were used to fighting on solid ground. This effectively took away any advantage and experience the Athenians had. They now had to resort to attacking with whatever means they had available. The fighting would have been chaotic and confusing, and to highlight this I wanted to read out one of the passages Thucydides writes of the fighting. So long as the vessels were coming up to the charge, the men on the decks rained darts and arrows and stones upon him. But once alongside, the marines tried to board each other's vessel, fighting hand to hand. In many quarters also it happened, by reason of the narrow broom, that a vessel was charging an enemy on one side, and being charged herself on another, and that two or sometimes more ships had been forced to get entangled round one, obliging the heldsmen to attend to the fence here, a fence there, not one thing at once, but many on all sides. While the huge din caused by the numbers of ships crashing together not only spread terror, but made the orders of the boatsmen inaudible. Thucydides also reports that the men on land were moving through varying emotions, as they had different vantage points and witnessed different acts taking place on the water. Some who witnessed their friends winning victories were gaining courage in the fact that they may be saved, while others were witnessing their countrymen getting the worst of it and felt their hearts sinking. And some could not see who was getting the upper hand, and tensions surrounding them could be cut with a knife. However, finally the toll on the Athenians was too much, and they began routing to the shoreline in panic, ditching their ships on the shore and running for the safety of their camp. The scene posed is probably one of the worst to affect the Athenians in living memory. Their spirit had been broken, and most had lost all their wits about them, seeking self preservation. We are now even told that they did not even seek a truce to bury their dead that night. An act that was tied to their pious thinking of the time and seen as inexcusable. The general feeling in the camp was that only a miracle could now save them. Demosthenes, however, kept a cool ahead in the face of the disaster. That night he had made calculations on the Athenians' next move. He thought that they still had one last attempt to break out of the harbour. He had seen that they still had sixty serviceable triremes, while he estimated the enemy had fewer than fifty. He went to Nicius, proposing they give the breakout one last try the next morning, where Nicias was in agreement with what he proposed. However, the next morning, when they tried to address the men and renew the escape attempt, it became very clear that the Athenian expedition in Sicily had fought its final battle on the sea. The resolve and spirit of the men had been entirely crushed. They refused to man the ships once again. For Demosthenes and Nicius, although they believed they still had the military strength to continue, the morale of the men had just spent its last drop. It was now time to fall back on the backup plan. One that was built more on the hope that they could get as many of them to somewhere of relative safety. That afternoon, the commanders began planning a treacherous and risky retreat by land. Thank you everyone for your continued support, and a big shout-out to all those supporting the series over on Patreon and through Buy Me a Coffee. I would like to give an extra special shout-out to all those supporting the series at the Archon level. So thank you to Nick Kablomfakis, Neil Bennett, John, and Bresden. Everyone's contribution plays a big part in helping me financially keep the series going. If you've also found some value in the show and would like to support the series, please consider checking out the Casting Through Ancient Greece Patreon page or buy me a coffee page. Otherwise, leaving reviews and sharing episodes on social media also help the series grow through word of mouth. Be sure to stay connected and updated on what's happening in the series, and join me over on Facebook or Instagram at Castings for Ancient Greece or X at Casting Greece. Once again, everyone, thank you for the support, and I hope you can join me next time where we continue the narrative in the series.