105: Aftermath of Sicily

Athens doesn’t just lose a battle in Sicily, it loses the foundation of its power. We start with Thucydides’ brutal assessment of the Sicilian Expedition: a fleet shattered, an army trapped, commanders executed, and survivors driven into captivity. Then we follow the story where it gets even more unsettling, back home in Athens, as rumors arrive that sound too impossible to believe. A city that has lived on naval dominance for generations suddenly has to imagine life without triremes, without trained rowers, and without the veteran hoplites who defend Attica.

From there, we walk through what the disaster actually costs: warships effectively vanishing, thousands of citizens dead, the treasury strained by two massive expeditions, and an empire now held together by confidence more than capability. As panic spreads and fears of revolt rise, Athens responds with emergency governance and hard choices. We talk through the leadership crisis, the creation of the proboloi, the push to rebuild the fleet, and the financial reforms that include a 5% tax on maritime trade, all designed to keep the city alive long enough to fight the next round.

Finally, we widen the lens to the geopolitical chain reaction: Sparta senses opportunity, allies look for exits, and Persia reenters Greek affairs as the one power with the money to change the naval balance. We trace the competing agendas of satraps like Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, the role of Alcibiades, the pivot toward Chios, and how earthquakes, debate, and delay produce a risky three-pronged strategy aimed at Chios, Lesbos, and the Hellespont. If you’re following the Peloponnesian War for the big turning points, this is one of them. Subscribe for what comes next, share the episode with a fellow history fan, and leave a review with your take on Athens’ best move after Sicily.

Transcript

Thucydides On Total Destruction

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Next winter, the whole of Hellas, after the great disaster in Sicily, turned immediately against Athens. Thucydides. Hello, I'm Mark Sellick and welcome back to Casting Through Ancient Greece, Episode 105, Aftermath of Sicily. The last phase of the Sicilian expedition had seen the grand Athenian fleet and army in a very different position from the one they had arrived. Given the sheer scale of the expedition, the Athenians had sailed off with great confidence and optimism. They had every reason to think that they would further extend their influence, as such ventures had now become commonplace, with Athens continuing to expand for over a generation. Surely this time would be no different, given they were committed to the largest fleet yet employed for such an undertaking. The average rower and hoplite probably maintained the optimism as they began operations in Sicily. As we have seen, the issues facing the expedition had almost immediately made themselves known to its generals. Once the Athenians had established themselves in Sicily at Catana, operations against Syracuse began. Although faced with early troubles, this phase of the war had seen Athens hold the advantage in combat for the most part. Their lack of cavalry would prove another weakness they discovered, but they looked to remedy this through future reinforcements. Even with Nicius, the most cautious of the commanders, left as the sole commander, the Athenians had Syracuse in a position where its surrender seemed imminent. However, Sparta and the Peloponnesians would become involved, sending generals to advise and help guide operations against an enemy that they had been fighting for years in the Greater Peloponnesian War. This would prove to be the turning point where Athens' advantages in combat began to shift. Both sides would experience victories and defeats, though for Syracuse it would seem they took two steps forward and one step back, which ultimately saw the campaign tip in their favour. Athens would double down on its commitment by sending another expedition, matching the size of the first, as reinforcements. Initially this whole resolve returned to the Athenians, but the damage had already been done. There was one opportunity left to attempt victory over Syracuse, but it would fall short, as the moral and physical damage to the army and fleet had reached a point of no return. The Athenians now turned to planning on how they were going to escape the island and return home, rather than focusing on gaining a victory. We could use the common term that the ships had already sailed, but the Athenians would find themselves in an even worse position when their fleet was destroyed in the Great Harbour, ensuring that no Athenian ship would be sailing anywhere. By this stage almost all hope of a safe return to Athens had been lost. The survivors would now attempt to trek over land to the nearest safe city. Yet after a week of constant harassment, the Athenian columns would surrender before reaching any haven. Their commanders Nicius and Demosthenes would be executed, while the men would find themselves held in captivity under harsh conditions as slaves of Syracuse. Many would die working in the quarries of the island, and very few would ever find their way back to Athens again. So much emphasis is placed on the political, economic, social, and military achievements of Athens from a historical perspective. It therefore highlights the importance this expedition holds in Athens history when Thucydides says This was the greatest Hellenic achievement of any in this war, or, in my opinion, in Hellenic history. At once most glorious to the victors, and most calamitous to the conquered. They were beaten at all points and altogether. All that they suffered was great. They were destroyed, as the saying is, with total destruction, their fleet, their army, everything was destroyed, and few out of the many returned home, such were the events in Sicily. Here Thucydides highlights that the greatest Greek military victory of the age had been achieved by another Greek city against Athens. Back in Athens, after the defeat, news began to trickle in describing the scale of the disaster inflicted upon the expedition. However, the Athenians were not prepared to believe the reports that initially arrived. Only a couple of years earlier they had witnessed the sight of such a powerful fleet sailing west from the Piraeus. So much celebration and excitement had taken place at that time. It seemed impossible to

Athens Hears Rumors And Doubts

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imagine how this Amada could fail to achieve victory. Plutarch in his life of Nicius tells a story that was supposedly one of the first messages describing what had taken place to reach Athens. He writes A certain stranger, as it would seem, landed at the Piraeus, took a seat in a barber's shop, and began to discuss of what had happened, as if the Athenians already knew all about it. The barber, on hearing this, before others learned of it, ran at top speed to the upper city, accosted the Archons, and at once set the story going into the marketplace. Understandably, this would have caused much panic amongst the Athenian Archons, who, we are told, convened an assembly so that the foreigner could address it. Plutarch then continues, but on being asked from whom he had learned the matter, he was unable to give any clear answers, and so it was decided that he was a story maker, and was trying to throw the city into an uproar. We also hear through Thucydides that even when reports made it back to Athens from those soldiers fortunate enough to have escaped the destruction, they too were disbelieved, despite these men being highly respected. The news though brought back, told of defeat so complete that the Athenians at home could not comprehend how it was possible, and therefore found the reports difficult to credit. When we pause to consider what the Athenians were being told through the many reports arriving in Athens after the defeat, it becomes easy to see why many disbelieved the scale of the disaster, while others, perhaps more connected to the governing system, feared the worse but did not want to believe it could be true. They were being told of the complete loss of two entire fleets that had departed Athens under Great Fanfair. This had been one of the largest fleets ever sent out by the Athenians, and for it to no longer exist, when the people had witnessed the scale in four hundred fifteen, was almost beyond comprehension. Over two hundred warships had effectively vanished before their eyes. Added to this fact was that the Athenians had enjoyed such a long history of naval dominance. Since the Greco-Persian Wars over sixty years earlier, their fleet had triumphed in just about every major naval clash. The reports would also tell of the thousands of Athenians who had been killed and whose bodies had been left in Sicily. These were Athenian citizens whose families and friends had gathered to farewell them on the expedition's departure. Given the size of the force that had been sent, it is probably fair to say that nearly every citizen family would have been directly affected by the losses suffered. Added to this, and probably even greater concern for the Athenians as a state, was the fact that such a high proportion of its experienced hoplites had now been lost. The hoplite class was instrumental in defending Attica against the Spartans and their allies in the wider Peloponnesian War. Further adding to the sheer scale of the loss, beyond the personal connections and experience, was also the destruction of the cavalry Athens had sent. Athens was not known for its cavalry arm, but the losses had severely weakened a force that was never particularly strong to begin with. Yet the greatest loss of life had likely taken place amongst the rowers of the Athenian fleet. More than forty thousand men were needed to keep over two hundred triremes sailing. This, more than anything else, would have touched nearly every Athenian household, not to mention that much of the hardened experience of the vaunted Athenian fleet had now been wiped away. Finally, the resources required to raise such an expedition represented one of the greatest expenditures in the city's history. Not only that, but Athens had then raised yet another expedition to reinforce the first. The expenses had placed enormous strain on the Athenian treasury at a time when the Peloponnesian War remained unresolved. The risks had been accepted because of the potential rewards in wealth and influence. However, few really wanted to confront the reality of what failure would mean. With the constant flow of information describing disaster, and with more and more credible sources reporting the same calamities, the Athenians would finally come to accept the full scope of failure. With this realization also came the tremendous collective emotional and psychological shock. Their self-created belief that imperial strength would inevitably bring victory had been shattered. With that illusion gone, many within Athens began to question what the future held for their city as a great power in Greece. While the Athenians mourned the deaths of so many friends, family members, and fellow citizens, other questions and possibilities that promised further suffering for the city were being raised through the polis. Realising the full scale of the disaster, it was clear to many that Athens' enemies would sense weakness, and that a renewed military offensive from Sparta and other Peloponnesians would be imminent. These fears centered on outside threats, but there were also concerns that members of the Empire, or subject states, depending how we choose to view them, would likely recognize Athens' weakness and seek to break away. Many feared that widespread revolts would soon follow. We have gone through the scale of the losses suffered by Athens, but it was precisely these losses that gave rise to and magnified the fears that now gripped Athens. Ultimately, how were they going to respond effectively to these threats when their fleet no longer existed and the most experienced elements of their hoplite force had been destroyed, and their treasury had been drained, with no rewards to show for the investment. With this perceived crisis brewing in Athens, cooler heads were also present within the political system. They were able to see that Athens faced a leadership problem as well as the challenge of dealing with future eventualities. Nicias, Eurymedon, Lamarcus, and Demosthenes were all dead, while Alcibiades remained in exile. The other four known generals were inexperienced, having not held major commands previously. The decision was taken to elect a board of elder men to serve as proboloi, a board of magistrates tasked with dealing with the crisis. It seems their recommendations were then followed without much question. Thucydides would say In Athens itself, they would take measures of economy and reform, appointing a body of older men to give their advice on the situation whenever the occasion arose.

Shock, Grief, And Fear Of Revolt

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In fact, like all democracies, now that they were terrified, they were ready to put everything in order. Their decisions were carried out at once. The picture of panic and pessimism in Athens that we are given does not seem to have infected the political system to the same extent, or at least it was brought under control relatively quickly. Athens chose instead to show resolve and begin rebuilding what had been lost in order to deal with whatever challenges lay ahead. They sent envoys wherever they could to obtain timber and commerce and commence the construction of a new fleet. They also took measures to ensure that their most important allies remain loyal and looked for ways to raise additional funds to replace those lost in the treasury, while at the same time avoiding alienating their allies in the process. To help achieve this, a reformed system of tribute was implemented. Instead of the old system of assessment, a standard 5% tax on all goods imported or exported by

Emergency Reforms And Fleet Rebuilding

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sea was introduced. The thinking here was that the new tax system would shift the burden away from the landowners onto the merchants, who relied on the security of the empire for their business and therefore might be more willing to tolerate the increased taxation. Another part of this economic approach was to assess what was imperative for weathering this difficult period and to cut those projects that were viewed as unnecessary. For example, a fort would be constructed on the southern tip of Attica at Sanium to protect the grain ship surrounding the Cape. At the same time, the fort they had established in Laconia when setting out on the voyage to Sicily was abandoned, having come to be seen as an economic burden. Although we are presented with a picture of disbelief and panic in Athens, we can also see that the political system reacted quickly to the situation and began taking a pragmatic approach. To deal with the fallout from this disaster in Sicily, measures were taken to strengthen defences, rebuild the fleet, conserve money, and enact emergency political reforms to make all this possible. Athens' fears of being targeted by their enemies in Greece and of revolts taking place within their empire would prove well founded. Thucydides would write Next winter the whole of Hellas, after the great disaster in Sicily, turned immediately against Athens. Those who had not been allied with either side thought that, even though they were not asked, they ordered not keep out of the war any longer, and should go against Athens of their own accord. And those who were allies of Sparta were all the more eager than before to be freed quickly from the sufferings they had endured so long. Thucydides also points out that many of Athens' subjects were ready to revolt,

Hellas Turns Against A Weakened Athens

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though at this stage they were more willing than able to carry out what they desired. However, for Sparta, seeing those within the empire prepared to turn against Athens was a positive sign and an advantage they could exploit to attack Athens from multiple directions. For Sparta, the Athenian disaster in Sicily, and the fallout that followed, had greatly encouraged them. Not only were their Peloponnesian allies motivated to renew the offensive against Athens, but calls for revolt were now coming from many of Athens' subject cities and islands. It was even thought that Syracuse might follow up its victory in Sicily by sailing east to Greece and pressing its advantage over Athens even further. If this were to eventuate, it would be a significant benefit for Sparta, since Syracuse had built a sizable navy and now possessed experience in defeating the Athenian fleet. With all these developments working in Sparta's favour, they abandoned the cautious approach that they had largely adopted following the peace of Nicius. Thucydides tells us they were now determined to throw themselves into the war without reservation. They believe Athens stood on the brink of defeat in the wider conflict, and that should another decisive blow be delivered in Greece, Sparta would finally secure its dominance throughout the Greek world. The Spartans would have known that the Athenians would immediately begin preparations to build their fleet. After all, this is what had given Athens power and influence over the past fifty years and sustained it through the same time. Aegis, aware of Syracuse's naval triumph, understood the significance of leaving the Athenians without a fleet. He at once began raising money to ensure the Peloponnesian fleet could be brought to a size capable of challenging the Athenians. The plan called for the construction of one hundred ships. Sparta itself would provide twenty five of these, while the remaining Peloponnesian allies were to contribute the rest. Another twenty five were to come from Boeotia, while Phocus and Locris were to provide fifteen between them, with a further fifteen from Corinth. Arcadia, Pelina, and Sicion were to procure ten between them, while Megara, Trozen, Epidaris, and Hermoni were to do the same. While this activity was being undertaken, the Peloponnesians were also preparing their land forces for the opening of a new phase of the Peloponnesian War. These preparations were very similar in nature to those that had preceded each annual invasion of Attica prior to the signing of the Peace of Nicius. While the Peloponnesian League was preparing to go on the offensive once again, it also began receiving messages from Athens' allies, who were seeking to break away from the empire that had been imposed upon them. Eubea was the first to send representatives seeking Sparta's help in securing its succession. Initially, Aegis put in motion plans to support the Eubeans by gathering 300 freed helots under the command of Alcamenes and Melanthus. These forces arrived at Decalaea, where Aegis was stationed, but during that time, messengers from Lesbos also sought assistance from Aegis in mounting a revolt against Athens. This caused Aegis to reassess his plans, and he instead decided it was best to focus on the uprising in Lesbos first, with plans to send Alcimenes with a force there instead. It is interesting to note here that Aegis seems to be acting with far more authority than was usual for a Spartan king. This had come about due to the glory he had won for himself at the Battle of Mantinea. He had also become the figure in Sparta who embodied an ambitious policy against Athens, while no effective counterweight had developed within Sparta during this period. Aegis was also operating outside the Peloponnese, in enemy territory stationed with an army at Decala. Given the difficulty of maintaining effective communications with Sparta, he had been given greater freedom to act on his own initiative. This allowed him to send troops wherever he wished, raise new forces from allies in the region, mainly from Boeotia, and levy money to fund his operations. So far we have seen that Sparta was moving in the right direction with the actions it was taking to bring the fight back to the Athenians. It was undertaking an active shipbuilding program, coordinating its allies to contribute to the renewed effort, and now had a king in a position to act with greater autonomy. However, we need to pause and address some realities here. The shipbuilding program called for a total of a hundred triremes to be constructed by Sparta and its allies. Realistically, that number was not going to be enough to seriously challenge the Athenians. Granted, they had lost almost their entire fleet in Sicily, but they were also already constructing new ships. They had far greater experience in shipbuilding and a larger capacity for production. As it would turn out, Sparta, by the time spring arrived, appears to have had only thirty-nine of the one hundred triums ready for service. The political climate, morale, and diplomatic ties within the Peloponnesian League

Sparta’s Naval Push Meets Reality

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had returned to a state of willingness for renewed hostilities. However, their treasury and levels of production did not match the levels of enthusiasm that they had to go back on the offensive. Sparta, as the head of the Peloponnesian League, was a powerful state in its own right, but unlike Athens, most of its allies were smaller and poorer than the members of the Athenian alliance. Many of Athens' allies relied on maritime commerce and therefore possessed fleets and wider trading connections. The Peloponnesian allies were more land-based cities and towns, where trade was largely regional and military power rested primarily on the hoplite. The reality was that the Peloponnesian War would ultimately be decided at sea. Sparta needed to find a way to eliminate the Athenian naval dominance, effectively neutralizing Athenian resistance and choking their economy. To do that, Sparta needed a powerful ally that could see its treasury and production systems raise to match its renewed drive to defeat Athens. The plain reality was that Persia was the only power that would be able to provide what the Peloponnesians were looking for. However, Sparta would have their work cut out for them in obtaining Persian support. Not only did they need to negotiate an arrangement that Persia would be willing to enter into, but Persia also had its own motivations, interests, and objectives along the edges of the Athenian Empire. As we have seen, with the rise of the Athenian Empire, islands, cities, and lands along and within the Anatolian coast had been pulled away from Persian influence and into the Athenian sphere. For Persia it would be attractive to support Sparta in the hope of weakening Athens' hold on its eastern possessions. If this could be achieved, Persia could move in and once again reassert control over many of these territories. They had been under its influence before the Greco-Persian wars, which in turn would see more tribute flow back into the empire. However, this was where Sparta also faced another difficult aspect in gaining Persian support. They had entered into the Peloponnesian War on the basis of freedom for the Greeks. This was repeatedly used as their justification for war, as they claimed Athens was stripping away the freedoms of many in order to expand its own influence. To make an agreement with Persian. Persia that resulted in many of these subject cities simply exchanging an Athenian master for a Persian one would be seen as hypocrisy and risk undermining Spartan support within the Peloponnesian League. Not only that, but once those willing to revolt learned of a Spartan Persian agreement, it might drive them back towards Athens. To further complicate matters, many within Sparta also believed that if they succeeded in wresting these allies away from Athens, they might be able to exploit them for Sparta's own gain. Persia had been part of the strategic calculations of both sides since the defeat of the Persians at 479. Athens had fought naval engagements along the Anatolian coast in the first decade after their victory in order to establish control over those regions. Sparta had also remained in contact due to its concern over the growing Athenian influence. However, no meaningful agreements between the two powers had emerged due to conflicting aims. Athens had also attempted negotiations with Persia around the same time, but Artaxerxes died during this period, unleashing a succession struggle. Persian interests were then focused inward due to the many threats to the throne. Athens in 424 would eventually negotiate a treaty with Darius II, establishing what was called a friendship for life. This had been done because Athens feared that Persia might support Sparta in some way during the campaign of Brassidus. For Persia, this treaty with the Athenians had proved advantageous. As when revolts broke out on its western fringes, Athens was not in a position to exploit them. Once the peace of Nicius had been established, Darius had little reason to upset the status quo. If anything, he was dissuaded from taking action against Athenian spheres of influence, now that resources were no longer being spent on direct conflict with Sparta. Now, however, with the disaster in Sicily, this balance that had existed was overturned, and new opportunities presented themselves to many powers. This would see Persia reenter Greek affairs in a far more meaningful way than it had since the defeat of the second Persian invasion, nearly seventy years earlier. However, as we have outlined, the Persians and Spartans would need to first settle the terms between themselves before any advantage could be directed against Athens. Two different Persian satraps would end up coming to Sparta in an attempt to negotiate with them. These satraps were Pharnabas and Tisiphenes. Pharnabas governed the northwestern parts of Anatolia, including the Hellespontine region and Pharygia, while Tisiphenes governed the southwestern region, including Lydia and Caria. Although both ultimately answered to Darius, it was their respective regions that had direct contact with the Greeks, and although they were part of the Persian Empire, they were governors in their own right, each with different interests. The central Persian court was not interested in directly intervening in the far west.

Persia Reenters The Greek War

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That was why governors were placed in charge of these regions. Darius was primarily concerned with ensuring that these governors acted in the interests of the empire. It was therefore up to them to push for control and influence that would ultimately result in more tribute reaching the Persian court, and for the governors themselves, greater favour with the king. It is worth providing some context for why these two satraps were negotiating with Sparta separately. As we have noted, Darius II had come to the throne during something of a succession crisis. Next episode, I think it will be useful for us to explore the wider situation within the Persian Empire during the later half of the 5th century BC, particularly as Persia is now becoming increasingly central in the Greek narrative once again. Even after Darius came to the throne, other half brothers remained who were willing to seize the opportunity to claim power for themselves, especially since Darius himself had done the same to his predecessor. Revolts within the empire were also a major feature of this period, meaning that if a satrap was seen not to be delivering in the interests of the empire, suspicion could easily fall upon him. Due to the political situation within the empire, Vinabazus and Tisophernes, whose region bordered one another, became rivals. They faced many of the same problems and opportunities, but were each attempting to solve them in ways that advanced their own self interests, had perhaps ensured their own political survival. Both controlled different trade routes into and out of the Aegean, that they wanted secured, and both also had Athenian controlled cities and islands along the edges of their territories. In this respect, their objectives were very similar, but focused on different regions that would ultimately benefit themselves. To achieve these aims, Sparta was a power that could assist them, since Athenian influence extended into both their spheres. Both satraps had been active on the borders of Athenian influence, sending envoys to meet with pro-Persian nobles in Athenian controlled cities and islands. In doing so, they were beginning to gauge the mood for breaking away from Athens in favour of the Persians. Once both had identified their candidates as most likely to break away from Athenian control, they then sought an alliance with Sparta. The simple aim was to request Spartan naval involvement along the Anatolian coast, and in return they would provide financial support for Sparta's war against Athens. Both also had the long-term view that once Sparta achieved victory over Athens, it would find itself indebted to Persia, thereby placing Persia in an advantageous position over the Greeks. The envoys sent by both the satraps argued their cases before the Spartan authorities, outlining why support should be directed for the respective regions. For Sparta, this presented a number of decisions. Firstly, there were those within Sparta who opposed sending its fleet and troops so far away to become involved in foreign affairs. This was nothing new and reflected the same tension that had existed in Sparta since the 6th century BC. However, once the issue of overseas intervention was set aside, Sparta effectively had four options before it. Already in motion were the pleas from Eubia and Lesbos, that Aegis had been handling. Now Sparta also had Persian requests concerning either the Hellespontine region or Libya. As we have seen, Aegis had already decided to send aid to Lesbos, though this had not been done under the authority of the Spartan government. Within Sparta, debate took place over where Spartan support should be directed, with all four locations offering competing reasons for assistance. Eubia was where Athens held its flocks and herds, which formed a major source of its provisions. Lesbos was strategically located to cut Athens off from the route to the Black Sea, while the island itself was large, wealthy, and populous. However, the final two options, offered by the Persian satraps, also came with the promise of financial support. Pharnabaz's offer would give the Spartans access to the Hellespont, along with Persian gold. Nevertheless, it would ultimately be Tisifernes' proposal that the Spartans chose to accept. Tisiphernes had identified the island of Cheos as a prime candidate for revolt against Athens. He possessed one of the largest navies within the Athenian Empire, behind Athens itself. This factor alone went some way in towards supporting the decision to back Tisiphenes. But there were also other considerations that fed into the choice. It appeared that Tisiphenes held a superior command position and was already favoured by Darius, due to his recent suppression of a revolt in Ionia. More on this when we look at Persia in this period next episode. As well as denying Athens a large contingent of ships from its allied state, Sparta itself, which struggled to produce a sizable fleet, would gain access to these valuable ships to use against Athens. In addition, Alcibiades was still in Sparta following his departure from the Sicilian expedition. Although his presence was welcomed, the Spartans still treated him with caution. Alcibiades also favoured a Spartan focus on Ionia. This presented an opportunity for him to prove his worth, as he had strong connections with influential figures in the Greek cities of Ionia. So a decision was made to support Tisophenes by focusing on the island of Cheos. Before preparing the fleet to sail, the Spartans first sent envoys to Chios to ensure that the reports that they had received regarding its wealth and power were accurate. With the Spartans satisfied with the information their envoys brought back from Chios, preparations were then made to sail forty ships to meet the Chean fleet. However, before the mission could be launched, an earthquake occurred in the Peloponnese, causing the Spartans to reconsider the operations they were about to undertake. They would drastically revise their plans and instead send only five ships, under a replacement commander. We know that the Spartans were a superstitious people and took such omens seriously, but as Donald Kagan points out, there were most likely other strategic considerations that also contributed to their change of plans. It is also possible that the earthquake acted as a catalyst for them to reassess their strategy. Had

Chios, Earthquakes, And A Split Strategy

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it not occurred, they may well have proceeded with the original plan. However, we do see that the plans were revised, since only a token force was ultimately sent, while the Peloponnesians then convened a conference at Corinth, where the Allied fleet was anchored in the Gulf for Safety. It would appear that Aegis had become involved after learning of the Spartan government's plan for Cheos, while other figures within Sparta also advanced stronger arguments for their push into the Hellespont. The result of the Congress at Corinth was that three separate objectives were now to be pursued simultaneously. The operation against Chios would go ahead, but Lesbos would also become a focus of the Peloponnesians, which had been Aegis's intention all along. Meanwhile, another fleet would be sent out after the force destined for Lesbos had departed, this time heading for the strategic waters of the Hellespont. It would appear, therefore, that the Spartan government had reached its initial decision before other influential elements within Sparta had been fully accounted for. The Peloponnesians were now committing themselves to a triple pronged operation in Athenian waters, instead of concentrating their strength on a single objective. They were spreading their forces across a wide geographical area. Granted, they had military support from the rebel cities, but the question remained whether they were diluting their own power. It seems the Peloponnesians viewed the Athenians' ability to respond with a degree of contempt. Without a large fleet, it was assumed that Athens would be unable to effectively challenge their movements in Athenian controlled waters. However, if we have learnt anything from this drawn out war, it is that underestimating the enemy and failing to respect their capacity to recover has repeatedly led to shifts of fortune. As it would turn out, the delay caused by Spartan deliberation would give the Athenians time to learn what was unfolding in the Aegean. They would discover the plot being formed on Cheos, as well as further details of the wider Peloponnesian plans. This would then allow Athens to take measures to counter what was about to unfold. They would redistribute their fleet in response, while the limited number of ships they had managed to bring into service would be deployed where they were most needed. As we have seen this episode, the aftermath of the disaster in Sicily had left Athens in a vulnerable position. Initially reports making their way back to Athens regarding the scale of what had taken place were disbelieved. In Athens it was hard to fathom that the fleet that they had seen depart could have been completely wiped out. Athens was a preeminent naval power in Greece. However, the unsettling news would gradually take hold as those in government, who had heard of the difficulties during the campaign, began to realize that things were even worse than the oppression Nicius' letter had conveyed. With more reports filtering in, all telling a similar

Athens Counters As Operation East Looms

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story, the rest of Athens was forced to come to terms with the reality of what had occurred. This would then flow into questions about what this meant for Athens' future. Among the general population, panic would begin to take hold, with fears of enemies present in all directions. However, certain political figures would step forward and make a leading role in steadying Athens as it attempted to navigate this threatening period. Measures were taken to address the leadership crisis caused by the loss of the most experienced generals in the Sicilian expedition. A council of elders was created with special powers. From there, reforms were introduced to meet the potential threats of revolt that were beginning to emerge. A fairer system of tribute was enacted in an attempt to ease tensions across the various subject cities and islands. A new shipbuilding program was also put in place to replace the lost fleet as quickly as possible, ensuring external threats could be counted and the empire's trade routes protected. At the same time, economic reforms were approved to ensure that money was spent only where it was necessary for Athens' immediate survival. While Athens was attempting to strengthen its position, those observing from outside saw weakness and opportunity. Sparta and the Peloponnesians were now more motivated than ever to continue hostilities against a weaken Athens. Likewise a number of cities and islands saw their chance to break away and secure full independence. Also watching the situation closely was Persia, which now saw an opportunity to reclaim its former Western territories. This would lead to renewed rounds of negotiation involving the Spartans, Ionian Greeks, and the Persians, all seeking to take advantage of Athens' current weakness. Although they were acting on a shared opportunity, each pursued its own distinct motivations and interests. In the end, a plan would develop that saw a three-pronged operation directed at the Hellespont, Lesbos, and Chios. However, reaching this point had taken time and the delay had given Athens the opportunity to learn more about what was unfolding, and to put countermeasures in place. The question remains whether this would prove to be yet another lost opportunity caused by hesitation. We will pick up with how Athens responds and how the situation unfolds as the Peloponnesians launch their Operation East. However, before doing so, I want to take a brief detour in the next episode, now that Persia has re-entered the picture. I want to bring us back up to speed with developments within the Persian Empire in the later part of the 5th century BC and throughout the Peloponnesian War. Persia itself would face a succession crisis, and threats would emerge against the new ruling king. This will give us a clear understanding of the Persia that re-enters Greek affairs in the later stages of the war. Thank you everyone for your continued support and a big shout out to all those supporting the series over on Patreon and through Buy Me A Coffee. I would like to give an extra special shout out to all those supporting the series at the Archon level. So thank you to Nick Kablofarkas, Neil Bennett, John, Ben Williams, and Bresden. Everyone's contribution plays a big part in helping me financially keep the series going. If you've also found some value in the show and would like to support the series, please consider checking out the Casting Through Ancient Greece Patreon page or buy me a coffee page. Otherwise, leaving reviews and sharing episodes on social media also help the series grow through word of mouth. Be sure to stay connected and updated on what's happening

Next Steps And Ways To Support

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in the series, and join me over on Facebook or Instagram at Casting Through Ancient Greece or X at Casting Greece. Once again, everyone, thank you for the support, and I hope you can join me next time where we continue the narrative in the series.